Showing posts with label FARC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FARC. Show all posts

01 April 2010

Mexico : Fear of 'Narco Guerrilla' Haunts Officials

Cieneguillas state prison in Zacatecas, Mexico, where armed commandos freed more than 50 inmates in a raid May 16, 2009. Photo by Oscar Baez / AP / Huffington Post.

Phantom of Mexican narco guerrilla
Haunts U.S. security chiefs


By John Ross / The Rag Blog / April 1, 2010

MEXICO CITY -- Last May, in a meticulously planned raid reminiscent of classic guerrilla jail breakouts that are legend in Latin America, a commando of 20 heavily armed fighters freed 53 comrades from a prison in the northern state of Zacatecas. Were the perpetrators in fact guerrilleros from some as-yet unknown revolutionary foco or narcos emulating a guerrilla-style jailbreak intent on freeing their own?

Recent assassination attempts against high-ranking state officials -- Sinaloa's Secretary of Tourism (successful), Coahuila's Attorney General (the restaurant at which he was dining with a Texas mayor was sprayed with automatic weapon fire), and a Baja California finance undersecretary (hung by the neck from a Tijuana freeway overpass) -- suggest revolutionary retribution in a year that marks the 100th anniversary of the Mexican Revolution in which jitters of new uprisings are legion -- January 1st was welcomed in with anarchist bombs, sabotage, and "expropriations" in Mexico City and Tijuana on the northern border.

Although the incidents cited suggest revolutionary subversion, they were all the handiwork of Mexico's five narco cartels locked in an intractable war with both President Felipe Calderon's military and federal police -- and reportedly hundreds of U.S. drug warriors -- that has now taken more than 19,000 lives since December 2006.

The jail breakout in Zacatecas and the Sinaloa and Coahuila shootings are attributed to the syndicates headed by Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, his former associates in the Beltran Leyva gang, and the notorious Zeta cartel.

The hanging of Baja California state finance official Rogelio Sanchez Jimenez was charged to a blood-drenched capo Teodoro Garcia Simentel aka "El Teo" or "Three Letters" who is deemed responsible for hundreds of hangings, beheadings, and excessively violent homicides -- an associate, Santiago Meza ("El Pozalero") has reportedly confessed to dissolving 300 victims in vats of acid -- most allies of the fading Arellano Felix clan with whom El Teo is contesting Tijuana.

Simentel was captured this past January 14 in an upscale residential neighborhood of La Paz in adjouning Baja California Sur state, the second top-rung narco purportedly taken down by Mexican authorities in a month. The bust earned bouquets of kudos from Washington, which is financing Calderon's drug war under the $3,000,000,000 Merida Initiative.

The U.S, role in the capture of El Teo and Arturo Beltran Leyva, "the Boss of Bosses" who was gunned down by Mexican marines December 16, appears to have been purposefully downplayed. According to an unidentified member of Calderon's Security Cabinet as reported by Gustavo Castillo, a La Jornada correspondent with exceptional sources, Simentel was located by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement, a first indication that ICE is now being deployed in Mexico's drug war.

The Drug Enforcement Administration and the FBI are also thought to have armed agents on the ground here under provisions of the Merida Initiative and the North American Security and Prosperity Agreement.

The Calderon government vehemently denies that participation of U.S. agents led to the capture of El Teo or Beltran Leyva although it acknowledges enhanced cooperation between the two nations' drug fighters. The suggestion that Washington has assets on the ground here is not acceptable to many Mexicans whose country has been repeatedly invaded and even annexed by U.S. troops, and is regarded as a violation of national sovereignty.

The number of U.S. security agents working in Mexico is closely held but observers of Washington's presence here such as specialist Jorge Camil affirm that it has been rising dramatically since the 9/11 terror attacks on New York and Washington and now totals in the hundreds. The DEA and the FBI now have offices in provincial capitals such as Tuxtla Gutierrez Chiapas, close to the Guatemalan border and multiple smuggling routes.

Mexico is not only in the crosshairs of the U.S. security apparatus because of the flourishing drug trade -- the infiltration of terrorists across the porous border also excites attention although all reported incidents to date have proven to be false alarms.

Of increasing interest to Washington is the possible alliance of narco gangs with Mexico's fledgling guerrilla cells, an interpolation of the Colombian model.

The concept of narco-guerrilla coalescence was first proffered in the mid-1980s soon after Ronald Reagan officially proclaimed the War on Drugs. Then-veep George H.W. Bush, a Navy man, was placed in charge of overseeing interdiction efforts in the Caribbean to stop the Colombian cocaine flow into the southern United States.

Under Bush's watch, intelligence reports placed the onus on the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Army of National Liberation (ELN), and M-19, a left nationalist movement later decimated by the Colombian army, for extending protection to such world-class kingpins as Pablo Escobar.

The truth was, however, more diffuse: paramilitary units such as the United Auto-Defenders of Colombia (AUC) armed by right-wing rural "terratenientes" (rich land owners) and the Colombian military were the big players in the so-called "narco-guerrilla" although several FARC fronts openly provided protection to the druglords.

The narco-guerrilla thesis eventually became the underlying reason d'etre for Plan Colombia in which the twin wars on drugs and terrorism were married. Since the late 1990s, Washington has pumped billions into Colombia to sustain this counter-insurgency strategy. The Merida Initiative, signed in that Yucatan city by George Bush and Felipe Calderon in 2007, is often referred to as Plan Mexico. As recipients of billion dollar boodles in U.S. drug war largesse, Colombia's Alvaro Uribe and Mexico's Calderon are Washington's most significant allies on a continent where the left has taken power in a majority of countries.

Today, despite a decade of Plan Colombia, Colombian cocaine production has held steady and the FARC ranks as Latin America's most powerful narco-guerrilla. Although Mexico has no known counterpart, FARC activities here are closely monitored. FARC offices were shuttered during the presidency of Vicente Fox (2000-2006) -- the FARC and Colombian president Andres Pastrana entabled negotiations in Mexico City in the 1990s.

A Colombian-born National University graduate student was deported to Bogotá last year on terrorism charges for sympathizing with the FARC and Uribe has issued extradition warrants for a Mexican student who survived the bombing of the Ecuadorian jungle camp of FARC leader Raul Reyes (not his real name) in 2008.

One connection: FARC operators are said to consort with the Valle del Norte Cartel, the main Colombian supplier for El Chapo's Sinaloa Cartel. A purported 2007 jungle tete a tete between Reyes, and an unidentified cartel representative suggested the possibility that the Sinaloa boys would buy cocaine directly from the Colombian rebels rather than deal with a series of middlemen suppliers.

The Zapatistas have waged a crusade against drugs in their autonomous communities in southeastern Chiapas. Photo from latinamericanstudies.org.

Mexico's armed leftists take pain to steer clear of association with drug gangs. Military intelligence first identified the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) as drug and gunrunners on the Guatemalan border, an estimate said to have been backed up by CIA satellite overflights. The Zapatistas have dodged the stigma by waging a vigilant crusade against drugs in their autonomous communities in southeastern Chiapas. Cultivation of marijuana by militants is severely punished by banishment from the EZLN. Nonetheless, the Mexican Army has repeatedly stormed into Zapatista villages on the pretext of marijuana patch sightings.

Mexico's homegrown guerrilla bands have their roots in the north of the country where this distant neighbor nation's 1910-1919 revolution first germinated -- revolutionary martyrs Francisco Madero, Pancho Villa, Venustiano Carranza, and Alvaro Obregon were all northerners who marched their armies south to seize power.

In 1965, Arturo Gamiz, a disaffected rural schoolteacher, and 12 rebels laid siege to army barracks in Ciudad Madero, Chihuahua -- all were killed in the assault. Six years later, the September 23rd Communist League based in the northern industrial city of Monterrey took its name from the date of the assault -- 15 armed groups of which the September 23rd league was the most prominent operated throughout Mexico in the 1970s. The Forces of National Liberation (FLN), also based in Monterrey, gave birth to the EZLN in Chiapas. A sister guerrilla, the Villista Army of National Liberation in Chihuahua was never consolidated.

Conditions in the north of Mexico where both the narco cartels and the military concentrate their forces are propitious for a resurgence of guerrilla activity. Unemployment in the region, driven by the decline of the maquiladora industry (many assembly plants have moved to China), is at a 15-year high. The rural economy has been eclipsed by neo-liberal adventures such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the deepening recession, the worst in 80 years, is forcing campesinos to abandon their land. A hundred years ago in this vast, mineral-rich region of deserts and scarred mountains, landless peasants and displaced farmers formed the nucleus of Pancho Villa's revolutionary army.

In 2010, many survive the economic crisis by turning to drug cropping -- a half million Mexicans are said to earn their living in the drug economy. One indication of increasingly close ties between militant farmers and the drug cartels was the slaying of Margarito Montes Parra, longtime leader of the leftist UGOCEP (General Popular Union of Workers and Farmers) who was ambushed by cartel gunmen in Ciudad Obregon last fall.

Widespread human rights abuses by federal troops who combat the narcos along the northern border has provoked a wave of anti-army, anti-government anger in many northern states and conditions for a Gamiz-like assault on military installations cannot be discounted should drug gangs and armed radicals find common cause.

For prospective guerrilla formations, alliance with narcos has its perks: weapons and money. Both the narcos and the radicals are interested in subverting the state although their motives may be distinct. For anti-imperialist revolutionaries, poisoning the Yanquis with drugs is a weapon of class war. But negatives abound: everything the cartels touch is corrupted by profit-driven mercantile greed that is at odds with revolutionary ideals -- although there are always those who will argue that the end justifies the means.

For Homeland Security and Washington's security apparatus, the nightmare prospect of a coalition of narcos and guerilleros cruising the border is reason enough to sustain agents on the ground south of the border whether or not Mexican authorities are prepared to admit their presence.

Indeed, this January, Obama's Justice Department announced the merger of its International Terrorism and Narcotics investigation units to prepare for just such an eventuality. The vision of Mexico as a potentially failed narco-state advanced by the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a 2008 evaluation is a five-star national security issue for Washington and the option of a U.S. preventative invasion is always on the table.

[John Ross continues to slog across Obama's America now in the second month of his monster book tour. Ross and El Monstruo -- Dread and Redemption in Mexico City will visit St. Louis April 4-7, and Millsaps College in Jackson, Mississippi on April 9 for a symposium on Mexico City. He will tour Baltimore, Washington, New York, and Boston April 19 through May 1. For details write johnross@igc.org.]

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20 February 2010

Colombia and FARC : Six Long Decades of Fighting for Peace

Andres Pastrana, President of Colombia from 1998-2002, in peace negotiations with FARC leader Manuel Marulanda Velez. Photo from Latin American Studies.

A Promise of Peace:
Colombia, the guerrillas, and the paracos


By Marion Delgado / The Rag Blog / February 20, 2010

Part One: Peace and the FARC

[The phrase “peace process” has been heard throughout the country of Colombia for years. It refers to a way to end the violence, now more than a half century old that, has involved many different groups and many different governments of this war-torn country. This is the first of a three part series from our man in Cartegena, Marion Delgado.]

CARTAGENA DE INDIES, Colombia -- In October 1997, in a non-binding ballot accompanying municipal elections, the vast majority of voters -- 10 million Colombians in all -- voiced support for a peaceful end to Colombia's conflicts.

That was not the first time that the people of Colombia have voiced their desire for peace. Votes, marches, petitions, commissions, promises; in every way imaginable Colombian citizens have for 60 years, since El Bogotazo of 1948, called for an end to the Bogota government's war against the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia -- Ejército del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia -- People's Army), also known by the acronym of FARC or FARC-EP. This war has killed, and is still killing, hundreds of thousands, and has displaced millions.

This time, their wish got some traction.

After the vote, the people kept up the drumbeat for peace, and the media joined in. Even the ruling class, forgetting for a minute how much the war had benefitted them, joined the outcry. In May 1998, on the one-year anniversary of the murder of two human rights workers, thousands of Colombians took to the streets to demand peace. The peaceful protests were the largest in Bogotá in decades.

1998 was a presidential election year, and on June 15, with popular clamor growing for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, peace became a key issue in Colombia's presidential campaign. Candidate Andrés Pastrana revealed that his emissary, future High Commissioner for Peace Victor G. Ricardo, had met with FARC leader Manuel Marulanda Velez (alias "Tirofijo," or "Sureshot").

Pastrana’s cooptation of the desire for peace worked. He was elected president. By October 1998, one year after the “Vote for Peace,” the government and guerrilla representatives were discussing a FARC proposal to pull all security forces out of five municipalities in southern Colombia, creating a temporary "clearance zone" for holding peace talks. The municipalities were Vistahermosa, La Macarena, Uribe, and Mesetas in Meta department and San Vicente del Caguán in Caquetá department.

The guerrillas' clearance plan required that the "Cazadores" Infantry Battalion vacate their headquarters in San Vicente del Caguán, Caquetá. The government, however, insisted that the 130 troops stationed there be allowed to remain.

Eventually, the government and the FARC agreed to demilitarize the five municipalities, except for the Cazadores Battalion. In November, the first 90-day demilitarization period officially began in the five municipalities where talks were to occur. Except for those stationed in the Cazadores Battalion, all soldiers and some police in the newly demilitarized zone were recalled.

(Colombia has several types of police. Those recalled, sometimes referred to as "housed" or "domiciled" police, live in barracks, usually in a compound, as opposed to ordinary street cops that live at home.)

The FARC conditioned the start of official talks on the removal of the Cazadores Battalion and added a new condition. They wanted the government to agree to a controversial prisoner exchange.

Finally, on December 14, FARC leader "Tirofijo" and Ricardo agreed to hold talks on January 7, 1999. Ricardo agreed to withdraw the Cazadores Battalion, apparently without consulting the Colombian Army (COLAR).


Peace talks begin


On January 7, 1999, formal peace talks began between the government and FARC.

Things got off to a rough start when Victor Julio Suarez Rojas, aka "Jorge Briceño Suarez" or "Mono Jojoy", the number two man in the FARC, threatened to begin kidnapping congress people and other politicians if the government refused to agree to the proposed prisoner exchange.

Pastrana responded that the peace process would end immediately if the FARC carried out Briceño's threat. By the end of the week, citing an upsurge in paramilitary activity, the FARC "froze" the peace dialogue until April 20. Talks would not continue, a guerrilla communiqué stated, until the government acted against right-wing paramilitary groups (paracas) and military officials believed linked to them.

Though talks with the FARC remained frozen, on February 6 the Pastrana government announced a 90-day extension of the demilitarized zone in southern Colombia. The "clearance" was then set to expire on May 7.

Indigenous-rights activist Ingrid Washinawatok was kidnapped and murdered by FARC forces. Photo from El Pais.

With FARC talks frozen the “hot” war resumed. Three U.S. indigenous-rights activists, Terence Freitas, Lahe'ena'e Gay, and Ingrid Washinawatok, were abducted on February 25 by FARC guerrillas in the northeastern state of Arauca. Their bodies were found on March 6. The three had been working with the U'wa, an indigenous ethnic group in the region. After conducting its own investigation, the FARC admitted responsibility for the murders, asking forgiveness and blaming the act on a low-ranking field commander in the area.

The Colombian government, however, alleged that higher-ranking FARC commanders ordered the killings, including the chief of one group operating in the area, German Briceño ("Grannobles"), the brother of Mono Jojoy.

In early May, President Pastrana visited FARC rebels in the "clearance zone" for the second time since becoming president. Pastrana met with FARC leader Marulanda for six hours, convincing him to agree to formal peace talks with the government starting May 6. In a statement, Pastrana mentioned the "unwavering political commitment of both sides to find a political solution to the conflict."

Although the size of the clearance zone was not expanded, its expiration date was postponed. The two leaders also agreed to form an international commission to verify agreements and monitor FARC actions in the clearance zone.

FARC and government officials met again on May 6 and agreed on a joint Twelve-point Agenda for formal negotiations, a stage that past talks with the FARC were unable to reach. The formal talks were to begin in approximately three weeks.

Just as talks were about to begin, the respected Minister of Defense, Rodrigo Lloreda, threw a hissy-fit and abruptly resigned, citing disagreements over the peace process with the FARC. Lloreda protested statements made on May 21 by government Peace Commissioner Ricardo that the "clearance zone" might be extended indefinitely. The defense minister also cited Pastrana's failure to return a phone call asking about Ricardo's statements.

Lloreda's resignation was accompanied by the alarming resignations of at least 50 other high-ranking officers, including 18 generals. While President Pastrana accepted Lloreda's resignation, he refused to accept the others. The head of the armed forces, Gen. Fernando Tapias, offered Pastrana a public show of support.

Luis Fernando Ramirez was named as the new Defense minister.

In June, the government announced that the formal negotiations with the FARC would begin on July 7. But on July 6, the government and FARC postponed peace talks until July 19. Reasons given for the postponement were (1) the inability of three members of the FARC negotiating team to arrive at the clearance zone on time, and (2) the need for more time to define "the rules of the game" for the international commission, agreed upon by Pastrana and Marulanda, that would verify conditions in the clearance zone. Things seemed to be back on track, until...

Two days later, the FARC launched a five-day offensive throughout Colombia which one army official called "the largest and most insane guerrilla offensive in the past 40 years." The attacks occurred in 15 towns, one only 35 miles south of the capital, Bogotá. The guerrillas bombed banks and blew up bridges and energy infrastructure; they blocked roads and assaulted police barracks.

The Colombian military successfully countered the offensive, thanks in part to U.S. intelligence that enabled government aircraft to bomb FARC transports en route to target areas. Government reports claimed that over 300 combatants lost their lives in the fighting, over 200 of them FARC guerrillas. The FARC said the government exaggerated FARC losses.

The Associated Press called a FARC attack on the town of Nariño, Antioquia, "one of the most deadly guerrilla assaults on civilians in memory," with 300 guerrillas going up against a police station guarded by 35 police officers. The guerrillas' use of inaccurately launched bombs made from gas canisters destroyed the downtown area and killed 17 people, including eight civilians, four of them children.


On October 24, between six and 12 million Colombians mobilized in the streets to demand an end to the fighting. Several peace and human rights groups, among them País Libre, Redepaz and Viva la Ciudadanía, organized this nationwide protest against kidnappings and the armed conflict.

This same date also saw a restart of talks between the FARC and the government.

In November, a FARC offensive -- believed to be in response to President Pastrana's call for a holiday cease-fire -- dealt the peace process another setback. Colombian armed forces turned back a FARC attempt to take Puerto Inírida, the capital of remote Guainía department.

FARC leaders and Colombian government officials held a televised meeting at Los Pozos, Meta, on December 5, asking the Colombian people for suggestions or questions via e-mail, fax and phone. The event, however, was plagued by technical difficulties which prevented many Colombians from viewing it or contacting participants.

Beginning on December 9 and lasting until December 20, the FARC carried out another offensive, with combat in seven different departments. The greatest casualties resulted from an attack on a naval post in Juradó, Chocó, near the border with Panama, and from a military air attack on FARC fighters outside Hobo, Huila.

On December 20, the FARC announced a holiday cease-fire, calling off military operations until January 10, 2000. Peace talks were to resume on January 13.

On January 14, 2000, FARC leader Marulanda paid a surprise visit to the site of the talks in Los Pozos. Marulanda voiced optimism, stating that talks were near the point at which substantive negotiations, following the Twelve-point Agenda agreed to in May, could begin.

In spite of the imminent peace talks, its Christmas truce over, the FARC carried out attacks again in Nariño department and southeast of Bogotá on the day of the announcement.

With Colombia's economic model the first topic on the agenda, Finance Minister Juan Camilo Restrepo traveled to Los Pozos in February to meet Marulanda and seven other FARC leaders. He stayed two weeks. The purpose of the meeting was to evaluate the cost of making peace and other economic issues, particularly unemployment

FARC leader Manuel Marulanda Velez, center, with number two man Mono Jojoy in San Vicente del Caguan, southern Colombia, April 29, 2000. Photo from AP.


International efforts

At the same time, Peace Commissioner Ricardo and a delegation of FARC negotiators traveled to Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Italy, France, and Spain on a "tour" facilitated by Jan Egeland, the special representative for Colombia for UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

The trip's primary purpose was to inform the negotiations' discussion of Colombia's economic model by familiarizing participants with the mixed economies of Scandinavia and Western Europe. An unstated secondary goal was to increase the FARC's exposure to a changing world and international expectations.

In March 2000, America Online co-founder James Kimsey traveled to the FARC demilitarized zone for a meeting with Marulanda. The meeting's purpose was to educate the guerrillas about the changes in the world economy wrought by new technologies and international investment.

A group including some of Colombia's most important businessmen (known colloquially as "los cacaos") traveled to the zone to meet Marulanda and the FARC leadership.

Even as the peace process showed progress, the war went on. The FARC earned widespread condemnation by carrying out a brutal attack in Vigía del Fuerte, Chocó, killing 21 policemen and several civilians.

In April, the FARC and Colombian government hosted a "public audience" in Los Pozos, inviting Colombian organizations and citizens to the demilitarized zone for an open discussion on "the generation of employment." Though the meetings were marked by tensions between representatives of unions and business groups, both called on the FARC to implement a cease-fire, a halt to kidnappings, and respect for international humanitarian law in the conflict.

Government and FARC negotiators announced that a possible open-ended cease-fire agreement was "on the table." Cease-fire discussions would take place behind closed doors, with confidential proposals. According to reports, the FARC's proposal foresaw a temporary cessation of hostilities for a fixed period that could then be extended. A bilateral government-FARC commission would verify the agreement. The most difficult condition in the FARC proposal was a demand that the cease-fire apply to all parties to the conflict, including right-wing paramilitary groups.

Mono Jojoy then announced that any person whose net worth exceeded $1 million would be "taxed" by the FARC.

Peace Commissioner Ricardo, in apparent response, announced his resignation. While Ricardo said he was leaving because the peace process had reached "a point of no return," there was speculation that frequent death threats influenced his decision.

Camilo Gómez, the president's private secretary and a member of the government negotiating team, replaced Ricardo as high commissioner.

On May 17, 2000, President Pastrana suspended peace talks with the FARC for several days after a woman in Boyacá department was killed by a bomb placed around her neck. It was the first time since the peace process began that the government had suspended the talks. A few days later, the Colombian government acknowledged that evidence did not implicate the FARC in this crime and peace talks resumed.

June came and went with little movement on either side. More than 20 diplomats from Europe, Canada, Japan, and the United Nations meet in San Vicente del Caguán with Colombian officials and FARC leaders to talk about alternatives to drug production. This was the first discussion of drug policy since peace talks began.

On July 3, FARC and government negotiators exchanged cease-fire proposals in sealed envelopes. Though the proposals were to be discussed after a one-month analysis period, no progress was made.

September saw more war than peace. A FARC guerrilla named Arnubio Ramos hijacked a commuter airplane and forced it to land in San Vicente del Caguán, in the FARC demilitarized zone. Government officials insisted that the guerrillas turn Ramos over to show their commitment to the peace process. The guerrillas refused to hand him over, arguing that Ramos hijacked the plane on his own account and "the FARC bears no responsibility."

The FARC called an "armed strike" in the southern department of Putumayo, where the U.S.-funded anti-drug offensive is very active. Demanding an end to Plan Colombia's military component, the guerrillas prohibited all vehicular traffic in Putumayo. As a result, isolated towns and hamlets suffered severe shortages of food, gasoline, and drinking water. The prohibition lasted until early December, when the FARC unilaterally lifted it.

October brought more peace initiatives and voting. More than 300 people met in Costa Rica for a three-day gathering known as "Paz Colombia." The meeting was designed to increase civil-society participation in peace efforts and to come to agreement on alternatives to "Plan Colombia."

The meeting brought together representatives from the Colombian government and civil society. More than six weeks after the Arnubio Ramos hijacking, government and rebel representatives resumed talks. Discussions of a possible cease-fire led the agenda.

Four FARC units then launched attacks in Dabeiba, Antioquia, and Bagadó, Chocó. The upsurge in fighting came right before nationwide elections for both municipal and departmental posts. Officials said that, aside from isolated fighting between members of the FARC and army troops in the outlying provinces, the election was carried out with no major disruptions.

On October 15, the FARC declared a unilateral "freeze" on the peace process. The guerrillas said they were suspending talks until the government took firmer measures against paramilitary groups. On October 29, Carlos Julio Rosas, mayor of Orito, Putumayo, was assassinated; the seventeenth Colombian mayor killed that year.

At the end of 2000, Camilo Gomez met with Manuel Marulanda, though the talks remained officially "frozen." President Pastrana announced that the guerrillas' despeje (demilitarized) zone was extended until January 31, 2001.

COLAR chief Gen. Jorge Mora declared that the Army was prepared to reclaim the demilitarized zone whenever it was called upon to do so.

On the eve of the New Year, Diego Turbay, a Colombian legislator who headed a congressional peace committee, was assassinated along with his mother and five other people on a highway in southern Caquetá, not far from the demilitarized zone. The assassination was widely attributed to the FARC, casting further doubt on the future of peace talks.

James Monaghan, Martin McCauley, and David Bracken, alleged to be members of the Irish Republican Army, were arrested and accused of training the FARC. Photo from Latin American Studies.


Year three

The two-year anniversary of the FARC peace talks passed in a moment of pessimism, with dialogue frozen since mid-November. Reports indicated that the FARC might release 100-150 soldiers and police officers in its custody by the middle of February.

On January 23, the FARC rejected a Colombian government proposal for re-starting the talks, which had called for an end to kidnappings and the guerrillas' use of homemade bombs. With a January 31 deadline for renewal of the demilitarized zone approaching, the COLAR announced that 600 counter-guerrilla troops had been airlifted to sites near the zone. "If Manuel Marulanda wants an extension of the safe haven, he has to sit at the negotiating table," President Pastrana said.

On the eve of the deadline, Pastrana extended the zone for four more days, asking for a face-to-face meeting with FARC leader Marulanda. Marulanda agreed to meet on February 8-9.

President Pastrana stayed overnight in the FARC demilitarized zone between the two days of meetings with Marulanda. The two emerged with a deal to revive peace talks, the 13-point "Pact of Los Pozos.” Pastrana and Marulanda agreed to extend the demilitarized zone for another eight months, and to negotiate a prisoner exchange and a possible ceasefire.

The Pact created a 3-panel advisory group to report on the paramilitary and guerrilla terrorism problem, side issues that could threaten the peace process, and conditions in the demilitarized zone. The pact, while often ambiguous, increased optimism about the peace talks' future.

Under a June 2 accord, the FARC agreed to free 42 sick military and police personnel in exchange for 15 ailing guerrillas in government prisons. On June 5, FARC released police Col. Alvaro León Acosta and three other officers, a beginning of compliance with the exchange agreement.

But on June 23, FARC militias attack La Picota prison in southern Bogotá, freeing 98 prisoners, including several FARC members.

Later that week, the FARC unilaterally released 242 soldiers and police agents it had held prisoner, in most cases for years. The group threatened more kidnappings, however. Jorge Briceño told prisoners he released, "We have to grab people from the Senate, from Congress, judges and ministers, from all the three branches (of the Colombian state), and we'll see how they squeal."

The public-relations impact of the prisoner release was further dulled by the group's kidnapping of Hernán Mejia Campuzano, vice-president of the Colombian Soccer Federation. Mejia was not kidnapped because of his position; in fact, the guerrillas released him unharmed on June 29 so that the Copa America tournament, scheduled to begin in mid-July in Colombia, wouldn't move elsewhere.

Queen Noor of Jordan and America Online founder Kimsey visited the demilitarized zone for a meeting with Marulanda and Gómez in July, but two more FARC kidnappings angered the international community and slowed the peace talks.

On July 15, FARC guerrillas in Meta kidnapped the department's former governor, Alan Jara, while he was traveling in a clearly marked United Nations vehicle. A FARC statement later accused Jara of paramilitary ties, criticized the UN for transporting him, and promised to submit the former governor to a "popular tribunal."

Then, on July 16, the FARC kidnapped three German development workers in Cauca department, demanding an end to U.S.-driven aerial spraying of coca plants in the zone (which had started the day before). The UN and European Union issued strong protests.

The Pastrana government named a new team of negotiators (now called "consultants") for the peace talks: Manuel Salazar, the president's advisor for social policy; Ricardo Correa, secretary-general of the National Association of Industries (ANDI, one of Colombia's main business associations); Reinaldo Botero, coordinator of the government's human rights program; and Luis Fernando Criales, assistant high commissioner for peace for the FARC peace talks.

In August, the Colombian government arrested three suspected members of the Irish Republican Army in the Bogotá airport. James Monaghan, Martin McCauley, and David Bracken were accused of spending five weeks in the FARC demilitarized zone, offering training in urban terror tactics.

Finally, in September, a "notables commission" created on May 11 to find solutions to the paramilitary problem issued a report recommending that government-FARC talks proceed under a six-month cease-fire. Under this proposal, the FARC would abstain from kidnappings and extortion, while the government would pay for the FARC members' basic needs and refrain from herbicidal spraying of small-holding coca-growers.

On September 29, Liberal Party presidential candidate Horacio Serpa was forced to give up an attempt to lead a protest march into the FARC demilitarized zone. FARC fighters at the zone's entrance fired warning shots with rifles and mortars, calling into question the status of the zone just over a week before its renewal deadline.

Soldiers then found the body of Consuelo Araújonoguera, a popular former minister of Culture and the wife of Attorney-General Edgardo Maya. Araujonoguera had been kidnapped September 24 by the FARC at a roadblock near Valledupar, Cesar. The FARC admitted the kidnapping but denied the murder, though witnesses say Araujonoguera's guerrilla captors shot her at pointblank range while being pursued by COLAR.

Days before the FARC demilitarized zone’s next expiration deadline of October 10, FARC and Colombian government negotiators signed the "San Francisco de la Sombra Accord," renewing the zone until January 20, 2002. (FARC negotiators expressed disappointment that it was not renewed until August, when President Pastrana's term would end.)

The accord committed both sides to focusing talks on conditions for a cease-fire, and the FARC pledged to cease its practice of "miracle fishing," staging roadblocks and kidnapping travelers for ransom. The government pledged to increase anti-paramilitary efforts.

In a letter to his negotiators, dated November 7, Marulanda listed demands for the stalled peace talks' resumption. These included, among other items, suspension of government over-flights of the demilitarized zone, a government affirmation that the FARC are not terrorists or narco-traffickers, an end to military incursions in the zone (COLAR denied any such episodes had occurred), and suspension of the government's ban on unauthorized foreigners in the zone.

If these demands were not met, Marulanda said, "it will be necessary to agree upon a day... to officially hand over" the demilitarized zone to the government. President Pastrana and other government officials rejected Marulanda's "ultimatum."

Residents of the indigenous community of Caldono, Cauca, resisted an attempted FARC takeover of their town by assembling nonviolently in the town center. Similar examples of nonviolent resistance to incursions followed in several indigenous towns in southwest Colombia. FARC fighters killed some nonviolent resisters in Purace, Cauca, on December 31, 2001.

FARC leader Marulanda invited Pastrana, leaders of business groups, Colombia's Congress, judiciary, and the Catholic Church to a January 15 meeting in the demilitarized zone. The meeting, Marulanda indicated, would seek to determine "what is negotiable" among a list of concerns, among them Plan Colombia, drug crop eradication, prisoner exchanges, and paramilitarism. The meeting would occur five days before the January 20, 2002, deadline for expiration of the demilitarized zone where talks were taking place. The Colombian government declared it would "study" Marulanda's proposal and respond in writing.

Presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt was kidnapped by the FARC on Feb. 26, 2002. Photo from Latin American Studies.


Year four

The third anniversary of the beginning of peace talks rolled by. The FARC and Colombian government agreed to hold talks, for the first time since mid-October, on January 3 and 4, 2002. According to a January 3 FARC communiqué, the talks' purpose was "to find formulas to get the process moving and to allow for discussion" of the talks' common agenda, a cease-fire, subsidies for the unemployed, the September recommendations of the "notables commission," and the previous October's San Francisco de la Sombra accord.

No progress was made in two days of talks. The FARC continued to insist that the government lift the control measures it had implemented in the area surrounding the group's demilitarized zone, such as border controls and air patrols that the guerrillas viewed as tantamount to a blockade. Arguing that the control measures had brought a reduction in kidnappings, the government, particularly armed forces Chief Gen. Fernando Tapias, made clear its intention to keep them in place.

On January 8, another meeting between the FARC and the government failed to make progress. The FARC continued to cite government controls on the demilitarized zone as the chief obstacle to progress and to the guerrillas' compliance with the San Francisco de la Sombra accord. In a letter, Marulanda left the talks' future up to Pastrana. He also proposed a timetable, should the present difficulties be overcome: discussion of a subsidy for the unemployed in February and March, and discussion of a ceasefire in April and May. The FARC released a series of open letters to officials and sectors of society.

The next day, the Colombian government announced the suspension of peace talks. The military was to enter the demilitarized zone 48 hours after Pastrana issued an order. The U.S. State Department blamed the FARC for the talks' collapse.

As troops massed on the fringes of the demilitarized zone, Pastrana granted the United Nations time to find a solution to the stalled dialogues with the FARC. If no agreement was reached, the 48-hour countdown for the guerrillas' exit from the zone would begin the evening of Saturday, January 12.

UN representative James LeMoyne arrived in the demilitarized zone in early afternoon of January 11 for last-ditch talks with the FARC. The two sides had until 9:30 pm the following day to find a way to save the peace process.

After two days of talks with LeMoyne, the FARC released a proposal for re-starting the peace talks, just before the 9:30 deadline. The guerrillas' draft re-affirmed the commitments of the San Francisco de la Sombra accord, but left out the question of government controls in the area surrounding the demilitarized zone. The FARC had demanded that these measures be lifted in order for talks to continue.

To most observers, the statement tacitly acknowledged that the FARC had yielded on the issue of the control measures, though the guerrilla proposal would create a commission to investigate complaints about the measures.

At midnight, Pastrana rejected the guerrillas' proposal and ordered COLAR to re-take the zone at 9:30 pm on Monday, January 14. Pastrana offered one last hope: that the guerrillas clearly state that the dialogues may continue even with the control measures in place. The UN's Lemoyne and FARC negotiators continued meeting on January 13.

The FARC announced that they would hand over the demilitarized zone's town centers, officially ending the three-year-old peace process.

In late afternoon on the 14th, after a day of efforts from the UN, international, and church representatives, the FARC announced that guarantees existed for the peace process to continue, complying with President Pastrana's demand. The January 20 deadline for the demilitarized zone's renewal remained in place, Pastrana said, unless both sides could agree on a strict timetable for cease-fire discussions. Future talks would include international representatives in a more formal fashion.

FARC offensives on February 5, much of it sabotage of infrastructure and bombings of urban areas, further increased skepticism about the peace process. The Colombian government issued a proposal for a six-month cease fire.

Shortly before the February 14 deadline for expiration of the guerrilla demilitarized zone, the FARC and the Colombian government agreed to a timetable for cease-fire discussions. The main issues to be discussed were cease-fire terms, kidnapping, and paramilitarism. The document, drawn up in the presence of UN, foreign embassy, and church representatives, laid out a brisk schedule that would bring a cease-fire by April 7. President Pastrana extended the demilitarized zone until April 10.

As time ran out on the FARC peace process, several presidential candidates, including Horacio Serpa, Luis Eduardo Garzón, and Ingrid Betancourt traveled to the demilitarized zone for a meeting scheduled as part of the peace talks' timetable. All candidates sharply criticized the guerrillas' ongoing offensive against civilian targets.

FARC and government representatives exchanged cease-fire proposals. The government proposal called for maintaining guerilla fronts in small zones to keep them separate from the armed forces.

February 20, 2002. Last call.

The end of the FARC peace process

The FARC hijacked a domestic airliner, forcing it to land on a stretch of highway in Huila department. All passengers were freed but one, Colombian Senator Jorge Gechem Turbay, the fifth member of Colombia's Congress to be kidnapped by the guerrillas since June 2001.

President Pastrana responded by announcing the end of the three-year-old talks with the FARC. Aerial bombardment, the first phase of military operations to re-take the demilitarized zone, began at midnight.

It should be noted that this declaration was signed in Washington, D.C., where Pastrana had gone to receive orders from his masters of war.

Senator and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt was kidnapped three days later by FARC while traveling to the former demilitarized zone on a mission to advocate respect for the rights of the zone's residents.

The FARC gave the Colombian government one year to negotiate the exchange of Betancourt and five other kidnapped legislators for FARC prisoners in Colombian jails. She was freed by the COLAR six and a half years later.

Presidential elections were held on May 20, 2002. Alvaró Uribe Velez won. That was the end of the “peace process” as it relates to the FARC.

Under the Uribe regime, a new and different kind of “peace process” would take place.

Next: Colombian peace process, Part two: the AUC. (This very different peace process, between the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia [AUC], [United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia] and the government of Alvaro Uribe Velez, began even as the previous one with the FARC failed.)

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06 January 2010

Colombia : Pablo Emilio Moncayo: A Pawn in Uribe's Game

Pablo Emilio Moncayo in 1996, 19 years old.

Colombia's Uribe:
Playing politics with Pablo
Somewhere in the Amazon jungle tonight, Pablo sleeps chained to a tree stump, his release prevented by the government he served all these long years in order to continue the class warfare that U.S. taxpayers pay for.
By Marion Delgado / The Rag Blog / January 6, 2010

CARTAGENA DE INDIES, Colombia -- On 21 December 2009, Pablo Emilio Moncayo marked his 12th year as a captive of Colombia's Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia -- Ejército del Pueblo (FARC or FARC-EP; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – Peoples Army).

While President Uribe's propaganda machine says that he was kidnapped, he was actually captured in battle in 1997. Pablo was a corporal in the Colombian Army (COLAR) then; he has been promoted to sergeant while a POW. Like all stories, Pablo’s began many years before he became a pawn in the decades old military/political class struggle between COLAR and FARC-EP.

Like many revolutionary armies, FARC-EP began as a rag-tag group of campesinos protecting an agrarian class displaced from their land by rich landowners. That was in the late 1950s. Because of the brutal opposition it met, the FARC had to become not just a defensive, protective force for the people, but an army with offensive capabilities. They declared themselves a belligerent army in 1964 and named themselves the FARC in 1966.

Pablo Moncayo was four years old in 1982, when the events that led to his current situation began to take shape.

At the Seventh Guerrilla Conference in 1982, work began to turn the FARC from a guerrilla organization into a rebel army (the "People's Army"). FARC added ranks and badges to its uniforms, introduced a new inventory system for firearms and ammunition, and provided new weapons and technology for FARC militants.

In theory, a properly organized and trained guerrilla army would thus meet the international requirements for recognition of a "state of belligerence" as defined by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and later protocols. FARC considers that it lives up to this definition and argues that it has been accepted as a legitimate army, in particular during negotiations with successive Colombian governments.

FARC opponents and the government claim that the group's practices of civilian kidnapping for ransom and taxing coca crop buyers make it an illegitimate army and point to a wide rejection of FARC positions in national surveys. Assassinations of opponents and forced displacements are inflicted on the general population by all forces involved in the Colombian civil war, making FARC's belligerent status claim harder to accept. This is further complicated by the coca eradication efforts of the Colombian government that involve U.S. support and that have led to FARC being declared a terrorist organization by the U.S. government and the EU.

FARC maintains that it does not grow or process or transport Colombia’s main agricultural crop, cocaine. It admits that it taxes those who do. It taxes all commerce in the territory ceded to it by the former Pastrana government in a peace agreement, territory that the Uribe government is now trying to retake by force of arms.

Aware of these roadblocks to legitimacy, FARC one year ago released the last of its civilian hostages. Those captured in battle, however, are still held.

On December 21, 1997, COLAR was building a communications station in Patascoy, in the state of Nariño, close to the border of Putumayo, when the construction unit was attacked by the FARC. Twenty-two COLAR soldiers were killed and 19 were captured, among them Corporal Moncayo, almost as low as you can get on the military totem pole. FARC causalities were not reported.

In 2007, Pablo’s father, Gustavo Guillermo Moncayo Rincon, a teacher popularly known as "El caminante por la paz" ("the walker for peace"), walked 1,186 km from his hometown, Sandoná, in the department of Nariño, to the capital, Bogotá, seeking an agreement for the release of his son, who had by then been a prisoner of the guerrilla group for 10 years.

On June 17, 2007, Father's Day in Colombia, Moncayo began walking from Sandoná accompanied by his daughter, along the Pan-American Highway, stopping in every town along the way to rest and to collect signatures for a petition to President Álvaro Uribe, asking him to conduct a prisoner exchange.

When he arrived in Cali, he was received by Governor Angelino Garzon, who offered him a place to stay. Days after, in Pereira, he was received by the mayor, who decorated him as a “citizen of honour." He walked across the highest pass of the Andes, and on August 1, 2007, Moncayo walked the last stretch to the historic downtown of the capital city. When he arrived in the Plaza de Bolívar he was cheered by thousands of people. His arrival led to a public exchange of views in the press between him and Uribe, who blamed Pablo Moncayo's long captivity on the FARC.

After this fruitless exchange, Moncayo said, “Sadly, our children, our loved ones, remain there in the jungle... We are in the middle of this political game between the government and the FARC.” He also criticized Uribe for “making empty offers to the guerrillas in exchange for the captives.”

According to the Washington Post, Fernando Londoño, a far-right former interior minister, criticized Moncayo in an opinion column for El Tiempo, the country's main daily. (El Tiempo is owned and operated by the family of Colombia's recent Minister of Defense, Juan Santos, and is a frequent source of government propaganda.) He accused Pablo Moncayo of being an "incompetent soldier," and wrote that his father was spreading "Marxist venom through Colombia's veins."

Gustavo Moncayo continued to work for his son’s release, collecting petitions, visiting politicians, and talking with anyone who would listen. Early in 2009 his work seemed to pay off. An international outcry began to take hold and in April, responding to a call from Hugo Chavez, the president of neighboring Venezuela; President Rafael Correa of Ecuador; Senator Piedad Córdoba, known as the “peace senator”; Amnesty International; the Catholic church; and the International Red Cross, the FARC announced they would “unilaterally” free the soldier they had held hostage for over 11 years as they look for ways to start peace talks with the government.

It looked like Pablo was coming home. Senator Córdoba and the Red Cross were named as intermediaries. Still Uribe was reluctant and dragged his feet over arrangements, all the while keeping up a steady stream of vile and unhelpful statements.

Army corporal Pablo Emilio Moncayo, Age 31, October 9, 2009. Photo from Agencia EFE.

The FARC said it would unilaterally free Pablo Moncayo and turn him over to his father and the left-wing Córdoba, who has brokered hostage handovers in the past, and that it wanted the release to begin the start of peace talks with the government. Uribe responded by insisting that the rebels “first must cease bombing, kidnapping, and drug smuggling.” At every turn he seemed to be trying to derail Pablo’s release.

On December 22, 2009, he saw his chance to nix the deal once and for all. That was the day 10 heavily armed men in civilian clothes kidnapped and murdered the governor of the state of Caquetá, Luis Francisco Cuellar. Without any proof at all, Uribe immediately announced that the perpetrators were the FARC.

In his usual hate-filled rhetorical style the president announced that the assassination of Cuellar gives him great "pain" and "desperation." Uribe said the crime was the work of the "same bandits who want to make the release of the hostages a show." The president was referring to a statement that FARC made several months ago about their readiness to free two soldiers (including Pablo Moncayo), and return the remains of a policeman who died in captivity.

Uribe stated that he has done everything required by the FARC and therefore no longer believes in the promises of "these bandits," insisting that the military will rescue the hostages.

But Uribe has not done anything FARC has asked. He refuses to take this release as an opening for peace talks. He would not even sign an agreement guaranteeing the safety of the people involved in the release, including the senator and Red Cross representatives.

In 2002, when peace talks were initiated; Uribe loosed paramilitary thugs who used the occasion to kill some FARC negotiators. He put an end to that peace process and insured more years of “dirty war” and billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars to fill his and his cronies’ coffers.

The FARC website had this to say:
“Because Uribe and his gang did not sign the decree which guarantees security for guerrillas and guests, you can not believe anything. The only thing stopping this humanitarian act has its own name: Uribe Velez.” The website added, “The FARC knows that the Colombian oligarchy and its transitional form, Uribe, are tráfugas and not 'a tantico to be trusted'."
According to information obtained by ANNCOL, the FARC remains ready to fulfill its word, freeing the two soldiers and returning the remains of the policeman.

Meanwhile, Pablo Emilio Moncayo's father, Gustavo Moncayo, charged that Uribe's statements "continue to insist on preventing" the release of his son and asked him not to endanger the lives of the hostages with a military type rescue.

Uribe was not to be deterred by the father’s pleading. "The instruction is to rescue," Uribe said. "I have asked all military and police efforts to rescue the other hostages that were retained from these bandits."

Uribe got what he wanted. On December 24, the Red Cross announced it had suspended negotiations to release the hostages. A representative of the organization in Colombia (ICRC), Pascal Jequier, told the BBC that the decision was made after President Uribe ordered a military rescue of the governor of Caquetá, Luis Francisco Cuellar, and other hostages. Uribe issued the "rescue" order before Cuellar's death was known, placing other POWs in danger.

"As long as the order is in force to act through military means to rescue the hostages, there will be no release sponsored by the ICRC," Jequier said, adding that,”Efforts to seek the release of Corporal Pablo Emilio Moncayo and the soldier Joshua Daniel Calvo remain 'frozen' at the moment.”

Somewhere in the Amazon jungle tonight, Pablo sleeps chained to a tree stump, his release prevented by the government he served all these long years in order to continue the class warfare that U.S. taxpayers pay for.
“He's only a pawn in their game.” -- Bob Dylan
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30 December 2009

FARC in Colombia : A History of Armed Resistance

“Por la nueva Colombia, la patria grande y socialismo.”(“For the new Colombia, the greater fatherland, and socialism.") -- FARC motto. Photo from HubPages.
Armed struggle for land reform and justice:
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia


By Marion Delgado / The Rag Blog / December 30, 2009

CARTAGENA DE INDIES, Colombia -- In May 2003 a leak from the Bush Treasury Department indicated that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) was about to add to its extensive narcotics traffickers list. This time it would add someone in Colombia.

OFAC would be using one of the enlightened Republican Congress’s new drug war laws, the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. I was pretty sure who the new addition would be. The word "kingpin" was a dead giveaway.

It had to be the guy who had attained high office; whose brother had organized 20 or more death squads and maintained a couple of them out at the family hacienda; whose cousin in the Colombian Congress was the mouthpiece for those death squads as well as a close friend and promoter of various well known narcotrafficantes, including the legendary Pablo Escobar; someone whose own father was wanted by the Colombian police and the U.S. DEA for cocaine trafficking when he was killed in an abortive kidnap plot; and who himself was removed from his position as mayor of Medellín for having well-known ties to drug runners.

Who else could it be, but master criminal and El Presidente himself, Alvaro Uribe?

Imagine my surprise when it was announced the next day, that it was not Uribe after all, but the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia -- Peoples Army (FARC or FARC-EP) and 15 of their known or suspected leaders, even though I already knew they had to be a bad bunch of hombres. Five years before, in 1997, they were named a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. Department of State.

It couldn't have been easy to make it to the top of two government lists at the same time (the terrorist list and the narcotrafficantes list) and be the defining designees of a whole new hyphenated word, "Narco-terrorist"! That should keep them from gaining credibility with anyone with media access in the U.S.! I started wondering who these FARC guys were. Somebody needed to check them out, find out where they came from, and why.

The roots of FARC-EP

The current civil war in Colombia has been characterized by gross human rights violations, increasing dramatically over the past two decades. International human rights organizations have repeatedly singled out right-wing paramilitary groups (paracos) as being the principal perpetrators of human rights abuses.

The paracos are intertwined with the Colombian Armed Forces as they wage war against, not only the guerrillas, but anyone suspected of being a guerrilla sympathizer: union members, peasant organizers, human rights workers, and religious activists. Some paracos leaders have extended the parameters of the war against the guerrillas and their suspected fellow travelers to include drug addicts, alcoholics, prostitutes, petty criminals, and the homeless, in an attempt to “cleanse” Colombian society. Social cleansing is different from ethnic cleansing only in the presumed reasoning, it has the same results.

Over the years, several Colombian presidents have attempted to address the social, political, and economic injustices that are the principal causes of the conflict. However, these efforts have been repeatedly thwarted by the U.S. and its war on drugs, and by the Colombian political, economic, military elite, who are desperately trying to preserve a “democracy” that has disenfranchised much of the population.

News accounts often label the conflict a “35-year-old civil war,” counting its origin from the official formation of several guerrilla groups in mid-1960. However, the roots of Colombia’s largest guerrilla group, the FARC, date back to peasant armed self-defense movements formed between 1948 and 1958.

The National Front

During the 19th and early 20th centuries, Colombia's Liberal and Conservative parties, whose influence reached from Bogotá to virtually every village in settled regions of the country, dominated politics. Ideological differences between these elites reverberated throughout society, often resulting in outbreaks of violence that repeatedly pitted loyal Liberal and Conservative factions, both peasant and elite, against each other.

In the late 1940s, dissident Liberal Jorge Eliécer Gaitán emerged from the Liberal and communist-led agrarian and labor reform movements as the leading presidential candidate. On April 9, 1948, Gaitán was assassinated on a Bogotá street. The killing triggered a popular uprising by the Liberal lower classes that resulted in massive destruction and looting in the capital. This uprising, known as the Bogotazo, was the opening act of a 10 year period in Colombian history recalled as La Violencia.

Liberal peasant uprisings occurred throughout the country, pitting rural Liberals and Conservatives against each other. Fearing a peasant-led social rebellion, the elite Liberal leadership supported repression used by the Conservative government to quell the uprisings and preserve the elite oligarchy. But after two high-ranking Liberals were assassinated in 1949, the Liberals boycotted the 1950 presidential election, won uncontested by Conservative Laureano Gomez.

Although rebellion had been effectively quelled in Bogotá, sporadic armed peasant uprisings continued in several rural departments. Gomez, who considered Liberal peasants kin to Communists, responded to these with violent repression. Many Liberal members of the national police force were dismissed and replaced with peasants from the Conservative Boyacá district of Chulavista. The chulavistas became infamous for their brutal tactics in repressing rebellious Liberals and communists.

In the early 1950s, the Gomez regime, supported by the Catholic Church, which had been left out of the various negotiations during the uprisings, and by the U.S., which viewed Communist support for peasants in a Cold War prospective, elevated expression to new heights. Chaotic violence pitted rural Liberals and Conservatives against each other, and resulted in battles between the oligarchy and land-starved peasants. Many large landowners abandoned their properties, fleeing to the relative safety of the cities.

In 1953, Gomez was overthrown by a military coup that brought General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla to power. Rojas Pinilla immediately dispatched the military to reclaim the property of the large landowners still in the cities. In response, armed peasant groups called for agrarian reform.

In June, 1953, in an attempt to end the violence, Rojas Pinilla issued an amnesty to all the armed peasants and responded to their call for agrarian reform by creating the Office of Rehabilitation and Relief. In reality, this office did little to address the agrarian problem, yet the Liberal and Conservative elite felt that Rojas Pinilla was using it to build popular support for himself. To quell their suspicions, in June 1954 Rojas Pinilla extended the amnesty to right wing thugs imprisoned for acts of terror on behalf of the ruling Conservative elite and the Gomez regime.

Many of the Gomezistas released from jail immediately began killing peasants, forcing those that had accepted amnesty to again take up arms. Rojas Pinilla responded in 1955 by launching a major military offensive against the rearmed peasants that became known as La Guerra Villarica. It was in the department of Tolima during this offensive that the armed self-defense movements that would later evolve into the FARC came into existence. The Conservative and Liberal elite blamed the renewal of La Violencia on Rojas Pinilla, and in 1957 organized a general strike and street protests in the capital that forced him to resign.


Following the ouster of Rojas Pinilla, the Conservative and Liberal elite agreed on a power-sharing agreement, the National Front. Beginning in 1958, the parties alternated four-year terms in the presidency (no need to rig elections), and distributed all public positions evenly between the two parties. The formation of the National Front brought an end to the 19th century aspect of La Violencia: conflict between factions of the ruling class. However, the new government still had to contend with armed peasants, whose demand for land reform was being denied.

A FARC is born

According to a 2000 book by Alfredo Molano, Violence and Land Colonization, Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective, many peasants, mostly Liberals and Communists, survived the military offensives of the 1950s by undertaking long marches, under the protection of armed self-defense groups, to the mostly uninhabited eastern departments of Meta and Caquetá.

They cleared and worked new lands in areas they declared “independent republics," in an attempt to regain subsistence land and free themselves from a national government they distrusted due to “personal experience with social and economic partisanship and... the double value system upheld by the ruling classes.”

However, the colonists soon discovered they had not found the autonomy they so desperately sought. Large landowners, intent on increasing their own holdings, soon began laying claim to the newly cleared lands. Furthermore, the government had no intention of leaving the colonists alone.

“In defining these republics as gangs of communist bandits, the government had an excuse to launch military attacks against them, condemn them politically, and blockade them economically… The only possible outcome was war. One by one the republics fell to the army, and once they were under government control the land became concentrated in the hands of the large landowners,” Molano wrote.

The peasants, forced deeper into the jungle, realized their only chance of achieving social justice lay in their ability to wage war against the government on a national level. As a result, the armed self-defense movements dispersed units to various regions of the country to fight the army on several fronts simultaneously under a central command structure. On July 20, 1964, the various fronts of the armed self-defense movements issued their agrarian reform program. Two years later, they officially became known as the FARC.

Guerrilla groups begat guerrilla groups

In 1960, an independent political party, National Popular Alliance (ANAPO), formed by supporters of Rojas Pinilla was contending in congressional elections. ANAPO’s popularity increased steadily throughout the 1960's as it appealed to many who had been left out of the National Front alliance. Rojas Pinilla ran as ANAPO’s candidate in the 1970 presidential election and, after holding an early lead, was narrowly defeated by National Front candidate Misael Pastrana Borrero. Many ANAPO supporters accused the government of manipulating the vote count, and in response to perceived electoral fraud; socialist members of ANAPO formed the M-19 guerrilla movement in 1972.


M-19 gained notoriety through a series of daring urban raids that included the occupation of the Dominican Embassy in Bogotá in 1980 and an ill-fated takeover of the Palace of Justice in 1985. The latter resulted in the deaths of more than 100 people, including 11 Supreme Court judges, in a two-day battle in which the army leveled the massive courthouse. In 1989, M-19 guerrillas decided to lay down their weapons in return for a full government pardon. The ex-guerrillas formed a political party, the Democratic Alliance M-19, to participate in the upcoming elections; however, right-wing death squads soon assassinated many of the party’s leaders, including presidential candidate and former M-19 commander Carlos Pizarro.

M-19 had been formed as a response to the National Front, which successfully reserved positions of power for members of the Conservative and Liberal elite. This “limited democracy” spawned other guerrilla movements in the 1960’s. Other factors also came into play.

The Cuban Revolution influenced many radicals in Latin America, as it did in the U.S., convincing them that Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s foco theory of armed insurrection was the revolutionary road to follow. The Colombian Communist Party’s support of resolutions passed by the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, calling for a peaceful road to revolution, led many young Colombians to split from the Party in order to follow the Cuban model.

The Ejército Popular de Liberacion (Popular Army of Liberation, EPL) was thus formed in the department of Antioquia in the mid-1960’s. Following the Soviet-Chinese split, the EPL espoused the Maoist theory of a “prolonged popular war.” But after 1980 it began to distance itself from the goal of prolonged war and in August 1990 many members laid down their arms in order to participate in the political process, while a small dissident faction continued to fight in northern Colombia.


In 1964, university students who had recently returned from Cuba formed Colombia’s second-largest guerrilla group, the Army for National Liberation (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), in the department of Santander. The ELN adhered strictly to Che’s principles of rural guerrilla warfare and, in contrast to the M-19 and EPL, has so far refused to lay down its arms and participate in the political process. Sociologist Eduardo Pizarro says that, “In recent years the ELN has focused its activities almost exclusively on efforts to disrupt and destroy the oil industry, attacking with great success the pipelines of the north.”

In fact, between 1986 and 1997 the ELN was responsible for 636 pipeline bombings that resulted in $1.5 billion in lost revenue for the state-owned oil company, the oddly named Ecopetrol. For many years, the FARC and EPL denounced the ELN for pursuing a strategy of economic sabotage that has failed to increase its popular support. However, by the end of the 1990s, the FARC was also targeting pipelines used by multinational corporations to transport oil from remote drilling fields to coastal ports.

The FARC is the only Colombian guerrilla group with peasant roots that pre-date both the National Front and the Cuban Revolution. In contrast, the ELN, EPL and M-19 were all movements led by urban intellectuals, typical of many Latin American guerrilla groups that evolved in the 1960s, Cuban-inspired armed reactions to domestic political, social and economic situation.

FARCing cocaine…

The 1974 presidential election brought an end to the National Front alliance as Liberal and Conservative candidates again ran against each other. Sixteen years of National Front rule had reduced the number of killings -- in contrast with the 200,000 Colombians who died during La Violencia -- but had failed to address the agrarian issue and a dramatic increase in poverty.

During the National Front years, the percentage of the nation’s work force living in absolute poverty more than doubled, from 25% to 50.7%. Figures were even worse for the rural labor force, where the rate of absolute poverty soared from 25.4% to 67.5%. It is no surprise that when the coca boom began in the late 1970s, the lure of drug profits brought a massive migration of urban jobless and landless peasants to the predominantly FARC-controlled colonized regions.

Initially, the FARC was concerned that the new mass migration would undermine the political and social status quo in areas it controlled. At the same time, its income, from war taxes imposed on the local population in return for maintaining social order, increased dramatically.

New revenue enabled the rebel group to vastly improve its military capabilities, modernizing its weapons and improving the guerrilla fighter’s standard of living. In addition, the FARC was able to offer social and economic services “in the areas of credit, education, health, justice, registry, public works, and ecological and cultural programs.”

During the early years of the coca boom, the guerrillas and the drug lords worked together. Guerrillas controlled many of the coca growing regions while the cartels managed much of the cocaine production and trafficking.

However, this informal alliance collapsed when the leaders of drug cartels in Medellín and Cali began investing their new found wealth in property, primarily large cattle ranches, placing themselves firmly in the ranks of the guerrillas’ traditional enemy. The new narco-landowners soon began organizing their own paramilitary armies in order to fight the guerrillas and those they saw as guerrilla sympathizers.

Until today...

For 50 years the FARC and its predecessors have claimed to be fighting for agrarian reform and social justice for Colombia’s peasant population. The FARC has evolved into a powerful military force of 15,000 to 20,000 fighters who now control approximately 40% of the country. A U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report issued in November 1997 found that "the Colombian Armed Forces could be defeated within five years unless the country’s government regains political legitimacy and its armed forces are drastically restructured.”

U.S. President Bill Clinton’s bizarre Drug Czar, Gen. Barry McCaffrey, echoed these findings when he claimed that Colombian democracy is seriously threatened by the growing military strength of the guerrillas.

Such statements lead one to believe that McCaffrey’s concept of “democracy” involves social order being “maintained” under a military state of siege, impunity for paramilitary forces who regularly massacre the civilian population, political candidates in opposition to the Conservative and Liberal elite being routinely assassinated, a judicial system paralyzed by fear, rigged and stolen elections, and thousands of peasants whose only economic means of survival is illicit coca production.

Indeed, if the ruling political, economic and military elite, aided by the paracos, continue to stifle truly democratic reform, the demise of Colombian “democracy” may well be inevitable.

For its part, the U.S. appears intent on “Salvadorizing” the conflict. Colombia, as was the case with El Salvador in the 1980’s, is today the hemisphere’s leading recipient of U.S. military aid. And it appears that Washington, in its attempt to prevent a guerrilla victory, is once again intent on supporting a repressive military closely allied to right-wing death squads. Such a policy will inevitably result in the continued suffering of the Colombian people, who are routinely subject to massacres, torture, disappearance, kidnapping, and forced displacement.

Any possibility of achieving a peaceful resolution to the conflict depends on the government’s ability to dismantle the paramilitary organizations and create a climate conducive to negotiations between the government and the guerrillas. Then, and only then, will it be possible to address the political, social, and economic causes of the conflict. So far the government has made little headway in eliminating the paracos.

The FARC is absolutely necessary to the survival of the large agrarian class of Colombia. Only land reform, justice, and true democracy will make it unnecessary; this is the only route to the elimination of FARC. Pointless and brutal alternatives, which will not result in the elimination of FARC-EP, is the way chosen by Hillary Clinton, Gates and Obama, sending more arms and U.S. troops, paid for with your money, to maintain civil war within Colombia and perhaps spread it to neighboring countries.

Note: Much research for this article came from various reports produced by the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA); my thanks to them for keeping track of all this stuff over these many years. -- md
  • For Marion Delgado's previous reports from Colombia on The Rag Blog, go here.
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15 July 2008

A Special Report : Colombia's Bloody Civil War


A Rag Blog exclusive report...
War and poverty in today´s Colombia

July 15, 2008

The following analysis was presented by a Conscientious Objectors´ group, and edited and translated by The Rag Blog’s Val Liveoak. The presenter´s name is withheld to protect him. Val Liveoak was on the staff of The Rag in Austin from 1972-1975. She works with Friends Peace Teams on peacebuidling in Colombia. Val has worked on projects in Colombia since 2000, and lives in San Antonio.
Colombia is a rich country, with abundant natural resources and occupying a strategic geopolitical position on the South American Continent. Its biodiversity is remarkable: 10 per cent of all the earth’s flora and fauna are found in Colombia, and 22.4 per cent of the planet’s fresh water. This abundance of water alone makes it attractive to transnational and national businesses that need water to produce their products. Colombia has a very youthful population--of the total 43 million inhabitants, 46.5 per cent are younger than 19 years old.

Additionally Colombia has great mineral wealth. Its largest product is coal -- 1,183 metric tons have been mined, about one sixth of the known reserves. Gold is also a major product. The companies which exploit these resources, along with petroleum, nickel, uranium, magnesium, zinc, copper and many others, are mainly US or Canadian owned.

In gold production, for example, Gulf Crown, a Canadian company, takes around 80 per cent of the income generated by its mines. Workers, using 18th century technology and little safety equipment, enter dangerous mineshafts, dig with pickaxes and then carry out ore which they treat with an acid despite having no protective equipment. Then they then transport it by mule-back to the mine’s office and are paid under two cents per gram for partially refined gold, while gold sells on the world market for up to $2.50/gram.

“Despite Colombia’s natural wealth of mineral and biologic resources and our geopolitical importance, or to be exact, because of these interests, it is ironic that Colombia is also a place with great poverty and human suffering.”

For more that 50 years, Colombia has suffered one of the most prolonged and bloody civil wars of the century. The past four administrations in Colombia have tried to diminish or even deny that a war is happening, but there have been over 2,500 military actions annually and deaths of over 3,000 combatants, so it is undeniable that there is a real war in process. (International standards consider an annual total of 1,000 casualties as defining a war.) In the June 6, 2008 issue of El Tiempo, a national newspaper, a survey showed that around 20 per cent of Colombians do not believe there is a war going on, and the other 80 per cent believe there is.

The human consequences of this ongoing war are innumerable. It would not be feasible to try to document in this article all of the effects on Colombians during nearly four generations of war. But we will outline a few of the effects.

Most noteworthy as having affected nearly 10 per cent of the Colombian population is internal forced displacement. Colombia has the second largest population of internally-displaced people (IDPs) in the world, over 3,500,000 according to the UN High Commission on Refugees. And even this figure is considered low, due to IDPs’ fear of reporting their displacement because the report might put themselves or their families at further risk of violence. Both paramilitary and guerrilla groups cause displacement, although paramilitaries are responsible for the majority of displacements.

In addition to the people who have suffered displacement, thousands have been assassinated, kidnapped or have disappeared. To cite one statistic, from 1993 to the first quarter of 2006, the Self Defense forces of Colombia (known in Spanish as the AUC), only one of a number of paramilitary groups, have perpetuated 1,517 massacres of a total of 8,386 victims. According to the Association of Families of the Disappeared, more than 7,000 people have been disappeared since 1977, and we know that the actual total might be much higher because not all disappearances are reported because of the fear of further violence. During the process of demobilization, begun in January, 2007, former paramilitary members´ confessions have led to the discovery of around 800 common graves with 2-18 cadavers each.

In Colombia, according to the Fiscal General (a Cabinet position similar to Attorney General), there were “…more victims of paramilitaries than there were in Chile during the military dictatorship of Agosto Pinochet and in Argentina under Rafael Videla together.” Paramilitary groups are blamed for the majority of disappearances. (Note: Paramilitary groups began appearing in Colombia around the mid 1970s, when Colombian officers began receiving counterinsurgency training at the US School of the Americas -- now known as the Western Hemisphere Institute of Security and Cooperation. They were taught to form groups that could do things the Army was forbidden to do by law. Additionally, large landowners and other business owners began around that time to hire armed groups to “protect their interests” including displacing small farmers from desirable land, and suppressing unions, journalists and judges.)

Kidnapping is common in Colombia, with over 21,000 known victims in the last 12 years, 3,167 of whom remain in captivity. Massive protests of kidnapping, and public demand for the liberation of the victims have received worldwide publicity. During this month, there have been very few days when the media did not mention a victim of kidnapping, or his/her release. The guerrilla groups, the FARC and the ELN, use the ransoms to help finance their programs. (Additionally these groups also blockade and rob travelers on highways—a tactic known as “miraculous fishing,” and are involved in the drug trade.) Other groups also kidnap people for ransom, but kidnapping by guerrilla groups is most loudly denounced.

The psychosocial implications of the impact of constant and innumerable deaths, disappearances, tortures, kidnappings, threats of violence, displacements and aggressions against the civilian population throughout the length and breadth of the country, in addition to the grave implications of entire generations marked by violence are compounded by the economic effects of the war economy that has created the terrible phenomenon of impoverishment throughout the Colombian population.

Currently, according to CEPALC (The Peoples’ Communication Center of Latin American), 63 per cent of Colombians live in poverty on less than $2 a day and of that group, 32 per cent live in absolute poverty on less than $1 daily. At the same time 1.8 per cent of the richest Colombians control approximately 68 per cent of the wealth and capital of the country. (Compare to the US where the richest one per cent controls about 55% of the national wealth.) 6,000 of the largest landowners control 50 million hectares of land while 3 million small farmers (campesinos, literally, “country people”) share around 7 million hectares, an area which is constantly being reduced by the difficulties of agricultural production, violence and the threats of armed groups.

At the same time the current administration is spending record breaking amounts on the war, deepening the critical problems of the country and creating a dangerous economic dynamic around “national security,” which in addition to being onerous is also ineffective at fulfilling the government’s own goals.

Increases in military spending directly correspond to the increases in the rates of poverty among the population. A recent year’s defense budget of over $9.7 billion makes Colombia the country with the third highest military budget (by percentage of GNP) in the world, at 6.3 per cent. (The US, even with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, spends around 4.04 per cent of GNP.)

This increase in military spending is obviously one cause of decreases in spending for health, education, housing, pensions, public services, infrastructure, sports and other vital elements for development. As a comparison, consider that there are five Colombian soldiers for every 1,000 civilians but only one doctor for every 3,800 persons. (“And that doctor is limited to serving only paying patients, so most of us use herbal medicines and other home remedies to keep well. This may be like the US medical system.”) If we take into account that not only members of the armed forces are involved in efforts to ensure “national security,” we also note that of 556,000 public employees, 460,000 are working in the area of defense, security or as police. By the account of the Colombian Defense Department, each soldier costs $7,900 each year (up from $3,500 in 1999) while the Ministry of Education says that each student in public school is budgeted to receive a little less than $900/year.

The US government is supporting this onerous war machine, too, with $320 million as a part of the Patriot Plan (the successor to the first and second phases of Plan Colombia that gave the Colombian government $580 million over the last ten years of both Democratic and Republican administrations.) Additionally, the US has provided over $150 million in technological and logistical assistance and in military equipment (“mostly obsolete”). There are large amounts of military supplies being stored in depots, far more than the Army can currently use.

Why then, cannot the 415,000 members of the Colombian Armed Forces (aided by an estimated 21,000-30,000 paramilitary members) defeat the guerrilla groups FARC (15,000 members) and the ELN (7,500 members)? Paraphrasing Noam Chomsky, “Winning a war is not good business.” Recent events also seem to indicate that the US is nudging the Uribe government into a proxy war with Venezuela. (See below.)


What are (some) Colombians afraid of?

Colombian friends have spoken often of the desire to end the “culture of violence” they experience daily. Although in the capital, Bogotá, life seems pretty normal to most people who do not have contact with the hordes of displaced people who have fled to the slum neighborhoods around the city, there are many reminders of the ongoing war, not to mention the other effects outlined in the article above.

In Colombia, all men between the ages of 18 and 50 (!) are obliged to serve in the military. Most expect to serve around the ages of 18-20, when those who have access to higher education complete their bachillerato, a degree similar to an AB from a junior college in the US. Young men studying for this degree or in seminary, heads of households, handicapped, and some others are legally entitled to deferment, if not exemption from military service, although conscientious objection for religious or moral reasons is not recognized. The Colombian Mennonite Church has led efforts to achieve recognition of CO’s for many years.

One event that affected the group of Conscientious Objectors was a massive roundup of young men for military service in February of this year. While some young men volunteer for military service (daily during the evening news there is a Colombian version of the “Be all you can be” advertisement), most are forcibly recruited -- swept up by the authorities outside movie theaters or in parks, on their way to work, or even outside schools. On February 12, 2008, over 30,000 young men were taken, in the largest dragnet in the history of the country. Some, like a CO we spoke to, had received draft notices to report to a center. When he and some 3,000 others arrived they were processed and immediately sent to an Army camp. He had the assistance of the CO group, and was able, after 12 hours of protesting, to be let go with a citation to return in a few months. Others were not so fortunate, and the CO groups are still fighting in the courts for the release of youths entitled to legal exemptions as well as COs.

But those are not the only concerns the COs expressed. They have heard that these new recruits -- some of whom should never have been taken -- have been sent after brief training to the border areas with Venezuela and Ecuador where many troops are being massed. Although relations with Ecuador have improved after Colombia´s raid on guerrilla camps across the border in March, saber-rattling on both sides of the Colombian-Venezuelan border continues. News stories of Venezuela´s efforts to increase its military might, including its display of newly acquired missiles, are added to the coverage of President Chavez´ defiant statements opposing US military aid to Colombia. “I think there’s a propaganda campaign preparing us to wage a proxy war against Venezuela,” said one CO, “and the troop buildup on the borders seems to point to a possible war as well, not to mention the stockpiling of military equipment.”

While much of the US peace movement’s attention is (rightly) focused on the Middle East, we should remember that US interests are strong in Latin America and that Colombia is the third largest recipient of US military aid. On Sunday (June 8) President Chavez called for an end of the guerrilla war in Colombia and a unilateral release of all the kidnapped hostages. “You in the FARC should know that the war has become the excuse for the Empire to threaten us all. The day there is peace in Colombia, there will no longer be any excuse for a US Empire.” It seems he is also concerned about a possible proxy war.

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