Coltan in Venezuela : Chavez Putting Chips on War?

Above, image from Intimidad Violada. Below, capacitor made with coltan.
Valuable electronics ore mixes with oil
To produce rumbles of war with Colombia

By Marion Delgado / The Rag Blog / December 26, 2009

WARS. There are so many of them that foreign correspondent and world traveler Marion Delgado runs into them from time to time as he wanders the earth.

He was in Nicaragua during the Contra war, survived a Guatemalan coup, and was living in San Cristobol de la Casas that New Year's Eve when the Zapatistas came to town to issue their declaration of war against the corrupt government of President Carlos Salinas in Mexico. He was briefly a prisoner of some sort of renegade armed group in El Salvador. When Colombia invaded Ecuador Marion and his companera Sylvia Avery were on the last plane out before the borders were closed.

Now, once again, he is uniquely positioned to watch the beginnings of a South American war up close. In Colombia he has had face-to-face encounters with Colombian Army (COLAR) anti-guerrilla units, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo, (FARC-EP,) and some paramilitary (paracos) each of which usually costs him a few thousand pesos. So, what is coltan and why might it interest Delgado, American taxpayers, and anti-war activists?]

CARTAGENA DE INDIES, Colombia -- Coltan is the industrial name for columbite -- tantalite, a dull black metallic ore containing the elements niobium (formerly "columbium") and tantalum. The niobium-bearing mineral is columbite, hence the "col" half of the term. The mineral concentrates dominated by tantalum are called tantalite.

Tantalum from coltan is used in consumer electronics products such as cell phones, DVD players, video game systems and computers; in hearing aids and pacemakers, airbags, GPS, ignition systems and anti-lock braking systems in automobiles; in laptop computers, mobile phones, video game consoles, video cameras and digital cameras.

Niobium is used mostly in alloys, the largest part in special steel such as is used in gas pipelines. Although alloys contain a maximum of 0.1% niobium, that small amount improves the strength of the steel. The temperature stability of niobium-containing super alloys is important in jet and rocket engines.

Export of coltan from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo to European and American markets has been cited by experts as helping to finance the present-day conflict in the Congo. An estimated 5.4 million people have died since 1998 in the Congo conflict.

The upsurge in electronic products over the past decade resulted in a price peak in late 2000 with inflated high demand and price increases for the mineral, which lasted a few months. In 2005, the price was still at early 2000 levels.

Thanks to this mineral, the world has witnessed a reduction in size of all electronic devices. Tantalum is an ideal high-temperature superconductor, can temporarily store an electrical charge and release it when needed, and resists corrosion.

What does that have to do with a South American War? Well, a significant reserve of coltan was discovered in 2009 in western Venezuela. In 2009, the Colombian government announced that coltan reserves had been found in eastern provinces of Colombia.

In the minds of most Colombians, coltan came into existence only a couple of weeks ago, when the president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, announced the discovery of a giant coltan field near Venezuela’s border with Colombia. On Nov. 5, Chavez ordered a militarization of the Orinoco region to protect this strategic mineral because, he said, Colombian traffickers continue to cross the border, running through the Orinoco River basin, to extract the mineral. In what is titled Operation Blue Gold, 15,000 Air Force, Army, and Navy personnel will protect the coltan reserve, which straddles the Venezuelan states of Bolivar and Amazonas.

Vice President and Defense Minister Ramon Carrizalez visited the site of the reserve in an indigenous community called El Paloma, and said the troops would help combat drug trafficking and illegal armed groups in the region, in addition to protecting the reserve. "

We have more than 15,000 men deployed along our western border, combating all the crimes that occur along the border, as you know, crimes which come from another country and are not ours.

It is a mineral of strategic character, and therefore it stimulates the imperial appetite and the appetite of the business people who seek to obtain maximum profit without giving importance to environmental damage or the destabilization of countries.

He made specific reference to the civil war-plagued Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the world’s largest known coltan reserves lie, and where Belgium and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) collaborated to overthrow the first democratically elected prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, in 1964.

Called "blue gold," "oil from the mud," or "the new manna," coltan has been found, besides in the Congo, in Australia, Brazil, China, and, more recently, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Colombia. Evidence of coltan deposits in the Orinoco region, especially in the Departments of Vichada, Guainía, and Vaupés, has generated a wave of traders, speculators, and armed groups around a business that this year alone could move more than $40 million USD. And that is only the tip of the iceberg.

For four years, coltan has been mined in eastern Colombia for export to international traders. A couple of months ago it was leaked to news media that a company had asked permission (licenses) to remove coltan in 35,000 hectares between Vichada and Guainía. Another four licenses are underway.

Coltan's downside is violence spawned by greed. In Africa, the coltan bonanza -- the mineral can bring between $60,000 and $100,000 USD a ton -- has become fuel for multilateral conflict (often called the "world war of Africa") which has killed hundreds of thousands of people. As many more have been displaced, and the accompanying environmental disaster of strip mining also involves the water sources of neighboring countries. Warring militias fight each other for control of coltan and other minerals in an endless spiral of violence.

There has been so much bleeding that for three years it has been prohibited to buy coltan from the Congo. However, Congo ore smuggled out from countries such as Rwanda and Uganda finds anxious buyers, especially in the U.S., Germany, Holland, Belgium, and Kazakhstan.

About three years ago, a handful of traders came to Vichada and Guainía to promote the exploitation of coltan near the Orinoco River and its tributaries. Mining of coltan is not regulated, and traders used false records to disguise the fact that some extraction sites are on Indian reservations. By the rivers and hillsides, traders collect the mineral, which is taken to Bogotá and sold. Some say traders pay a tax of $2,000–2,500 per ton to the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, (AUC) or to the rebel guerrillas in some coltan mining areas.

While Chavez has ordered militarization of Venezuela's coltan area and declared it a national resource, authorities in Colombia just know theirs exists.

Meanwhile, in Venezuela, reserves of coltan and other strategic minerals were found south of the Orinoco River -- in eastern Venezuela -- as part of an aerial survey carried out with Iranian cooperation. Iranians, oh no, in Venezuela, what is that crazy Chavez up to now? Venezuelan Industries and Mining Minister Rodolfo Sanz didn't reveal the amount of the coltan reserves spotted or their precise location, but added that diamond, phosphate, titanium, and lead deposits also were found.

Separately, Science and Technology Minister Jesse Chacon, who accompanied Sanz at a press conference on November 13. 2009, confirmed that important deposits of kaolinite have been found and are being developed with assistance from Russia. The Russians, too, ¡O dios mio! He said Russia will also provide technological assistance to treat Venezuela's recently discovered uranium deposits. Chacon, who said uranium will be used for energy production “because oil will run out,” ruled out using the mineral for military purposes. Do I smell "weapons of mass destruction"?

There’s nothing particularly evil about coltan the substance itself, of course, it’s just this decade’s whale oil, and woe betide the cavorting cetaceans who might get in the way of the harpoons, as the corporate greed fest sends out its Ahabs. Venezuela, where there is not only oil in abundance but a new-found supply of coltan, is simply a bigger Moby Dick.

Forcible annexation of the Venezuelan people into corporate serfdom has therefore been marked onto PowerPoint agendas and is proceeding apace. Annoyingly, the Venezuelans are the difficult sort, and have yet to succumb to a pro-corporate dictator, at least for the past few years.

To make things worse, they've diverted some of the profits from the oil industry as it drains away their subsoil bonanza, and have bought tanks and planes. This means that a quick takeover by, say, Aegis, Executive Outcomes, or Xe is quite a bit more difficult; the coltan industry will have to get together with the oil industry, and hire the Big Dog to get the job done.

That’s Uncle Sam, of course, and though he is already drooling with bloodlust to crush the life out of those unprofitable humans there in Caracas, he can’t be properly unleashed without a lengthy and expensive propaganda campaign directing the U.S. population to snarl with hatred and fear at Venezuela.

That’s where you and I come in, and some of the cue-cards are already available, so let’s get cracking with our chants, to be delivered at every television-led Hate Minute:

"Chavez is a dictator!" "Chavez is in league with Ahmedinajahad!" "Chavez is a Communist in league with FARC!"

Of course the pros will come out with shorter versions of these chants, as they currently have too many syllables for Fox news watchers. Have no doubt that it will be done, however, because we’re talking about oil and coltan, and that means profits. No, not profits for you, silly, profits for our betters, who have the sense to put those profits into Euros and gold and hide them in the Cayman Islands or the Lesser Antilles, brass plate operations generally. Otherwise they’d turn into tax money and the blood -- I mean profit -- would get spread around rather than properly piling up with the super-rich.

For you and I, the blood can only spill from our children’s bodies as we send them in uniform to get the job done. The worse the horror, the more the corporate media polls will show we approve. The more who die pointlessly, the more we will support the troops. Support the troops! Support the troops! You support the troops, don’t you? What kind of un-American monster wouldn’t support the troops?

In Mérida, on Nov. 10, 2009, President Chavez declared that Venezuela is prepared to defend itself against an act of aggression from Colombia or the United States, countries which recently signed a military pact to allow the U.S. to use Colombian bases to increase its military and intelligence operations across Latin America.

[Colombia and the U.S. signed a military pact on October 30th to expand U.S. military presence at seven Colombian air, naval, and army bases, grant U.S. personnel diplomatic immunity for crimes they commit in Colombia, and facilitate the movement of the U.S. military throughout the country.]

Chavez called on commanders of the Venezuelan Armed Forces to “lose no time; we are going to form militias of revolutionary students, workers, women, everyone ready to defend this sacred homeland.

“Don’t make the mistake, President Obama, of ordering an overt aggression against Venezuela utilizing Colombia,” Chavez continued. “We are ready for anything, and Venezuela will never, never be a Yankee colony again.”

If the U.S. and Colombia start a war with Venezuela, he warned later on his weekly television talk show, “It would be the start of a hundred year war, and this war would extend across this entire continent.”

At the United Nations on Nov. 11, Colombia brought what it called threats of war from Venezuela to the Security Council. A letter to all members of the Security Council was seen as a move to gain U.N. approval for war on Venezuela. However, Chavez spoke of a defensive war, not invading Colombia. For months he has warned that a military pact between Bogotá and Washington could set the stage for a U.S. invasion of Venezuela from Colombia.

The U.S. and Colombia dismiss the charge, saying the pact will combat drug traffickers and Marxist insurgents in Colombia. Meanwhile, however, the U.S. is setting up the same armed drone capability that is currently bombing Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Recriminations have increased recently, with Colombia accusing Chavez of not helping combat drug-running rebels hiding on Venezuela's side of the border and Chavez calling Colombia a lap-dog of the U.S. Empire.

• For previous reports from Colombia by Marion Delgado, go here.

.The Rag Blog

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Colombia and FARC : Six Long Decades of Fighting for Peace

Andres Pastrana, President of Colombia from 1998-2002, in peace negotiations with FARC leader Manuel Marulanda Velez. Photo from Latin American Studies.
A Promise of Peace:
Colombia, the guerrillas, and the paracos

By Marion Delgado / The Rag Blog / February 20, 2010

Part One: Peace and the FARC

[The phrase “peace process” has been heard throughout the country of Colombia for years. It refers to a way to end the violence, now more than a half century old that, has involved many different groups and many different governments of this war-torn country. This is the first of a three part series from our man in Cartegena, Marion Delgado.]

CARTAGENA DE INDIES, Colombia -- In October 1997, in a non-binding ballot accompanying municipal elections, the vast majority of voters -- 10 million Colombians in all -- voiced support for a peaceful end to Colombia's conflicts.

That was not the first time that the people of Colombia have voiced their desire for peace. Votes, marches, petitions, commissions, promises; in every way imaginable Colombian citizens have for 60 years, since El Bogotazo of 1948, called for an end to the Bogota government's war against the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia -- Ejército del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia -- People's Army), also known by the acronym of FARC or FARC-EP. This war has killed, and is still killing, hundreds of thousands, and has displaced millions.

This time, their wish got some traction.

After the vote, the people kept up the drumbeat for peace, and the media joined in. Even the ruling class, forgetting for a minute how much the war had benefitted them, joined the outcry. In May 1998, on the one-year anniversary of the murder of two human rights workers, thousands of Colombians took to the streets to demand peace. The peaceful protests were the largest in Bogotá in decades.

1998 was a presidential election year, and on June 15, with popular clamor growing for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, peace became a key issue in Colombia's presidential campaign. Candidate Andrés Pastrana revealed that his emissary, future High Commissioner for Peace Victor G. Ricardo, had met with FARC leader Manuel Marulanda Velez (alias "Tirofijo," or "Sureshot").

Pastrana’s cooptation of the desire for peace worked. He was elected president. By October 1998, one year after the “Vote for Peace,” the government and guerrilla representatives were discussing a FARC proposal to pull all security forces out of five municipalities in southern Colombia, creating a temporary "clearance zone" for holding peace talks. The municipalities were Vistahermosa, La Macarena, Uribe, and Mesetas in Meta department and San Vicente del Caguán in Caquetá department.

The guerrillas' clearance plan required that the "Cazadores" Infantry Battalion vacate their headquarters in San Vicente del Caguán, Caquetá. The government, however, insisted that the 130 troops stationed there be allowed to remain.

Eventually, the government and the FARC agreed to demilitarize the five municipalities, except for the Cazadores Battalion. In November, the first 90-day demilitarization period officially began in the five municipalities where talks were to occur. Except for those stationed in the Cazadores Battalion, all soldiers and some police in the newly demilitarized zone were recalled.

(Colombia has several types of police. Those recalled, sometimes referred to as "housed" or "domiciled" police, live in barracks, usually in a compound, as opposed to ordinary street cops that live at home.)

The FARC conditioned the start of official talks on the removal of the Cazadores Battalion and added a new condition. They wanted the government to agree to a controversial prisoner exchange.

Finally, on December 14, FARC leader "Tirofijo" and Ricardo agreed to hold talks on January 7, 1999. Ricardo agreed to withdraw the Cazadores Battalion, apparently without consulting the Colombian Army (COLAR).


Peace talks begin

On January 7, 1999, formal peace talks began between the government and FARC.

Things got off to a rough start when Victor Julio Suarez Rojas, aka "Jorge Briceño Suarez" or "Mono Jojoy", the number two man in the FARC, threatened to begin kidnapping congress people and other politicians if the government refused to agree to the proposed prisoner exchange.

Pastrana responded that the peace process would end immediately if the FARC carried out Briceño's threat. By the end of the week, citing an upsurge in paramilitary activity, the FARC "froze" the peace dialogue until April 20. Talks would not continue, a guerrilla communiqué stated, until the government acted against right-wing paramilitary groups (paracas) and military officials believed linked to them.

Though talks with the FARC remained frozen, on February 6 the Pastrana government announced a 90-day extension of the demilitarized zone in southern Colombia. The "clearance" was then set to expire on May 7.

Indigenous-rights activist Ingrid Washinawatok was kidnapped and murdered by FARC forces. Photo from El Pais.
With FARC talks frozen the “hot” war resumed. Three U.S. indigenous-rights activists, Terence Freitas, Lahe'ena'e Gay, and Ingrid Washinawatok, were abducted on February 25 by FARC guerrillas in the northeastern state of Arauca. Their bodies were found on March 6. The three had been working with the U'wa, an indigenous ethnic group in the region. After conducting its own investigation, the FARC admitted responsibility for the murders, asking forgiveness and blaming the act on a low-ranking field commander in the area.

The Colombian government, however, alleged that higher-ranking FARC commanders ordered the killings, including the chief of one group operating in the area, German Briceño ("Grannobles"), the brother of Mono Jojoy.

In early May, President Pastrana visited FARC rebels in the "clearance zone" for the second time since becoming president. Pastrana met with FARC leader Marulanda for six hours, convincing him to agree to formal peace talks with the government starting May 6. In a statement, Pastrana mentioned the "unwavering political commitment of both sides to find a political solution to the conflict."

Although the size of the clearance zone was not expanded, its expiration date was postponed. The two leaders also agreed to form an international commission to verify agreements and monitor FARC actions in the clearance zone.

FARC and government officials met again on May 6 and agreed on a joint Twelve-point Agenda for formal negotiations, a stage that past talks with the FARC were unable to reach. The formal talks were to begin in approximately three weeks.

Just as talks were about to begin, the respected Minister of Defense, Rodrigo Lloreda, threw a hissy-fit and abruptly resigned, citing disagreements over the peace process with the FARC. Lloreda protested statements made on May 21 by government Peace Commissioner Ricardo that the "clearance zone" might be extended indefinitely. The defense minister also cited Pastrana's failure to return a phone call asking about Ricardo's statements.

Lloreda's resignation was accompanied by the alarming resignations of at least 50 other high-ranking officers, including 18 generals. While President Pastrana accepted Lloreda's resignation, he refused to accept the others. The head of the armed forces, Gen. Fernando Tapias, offered Pastrana a public show of support.

Luis Fernando Ramirez was named as the new Defense minister.

In June, the government announced that the formal negotiations with the FARC would begin on July 7. But on July 6, the government and FARC postponed peace talks until July 19. Reasons given for the postponement were (1) the inability of three members of the FARC negotiating team to arrive at the clearance zone on time, and (2) the need for more time to define "the rules of the game" for the international commission, agreed upon by Pastrana and Marulanda, that would verify conditions in the clearance zone. Things seemed to be back on track, until...

Two days later, the FARC launched a five-day offensive throughout Colombia which one army official called "the largest and most insane guerrilla offensive in the past 40 years." The attacks occurred in 15 towns, one only 35 miles south of the capital, Bogotá. The guerrillas bombed banks and blew up bridges and energy infrastructure; they blocked roads and assaulted police barracks.

The Colombian military successfully countered the offensive, thanks in part to U.S. intelligence that enabled government aircraft to bomb FARC transports en route to target areas. Government reports claimed that over 300 combatants lost their lives in the fighting, over 200 of them FARC guerrillas. The FARC said the government exaggerated FARC losses.

The Associated Press called a FARC attack on the town of Nariño, Antioquia, "one of the most deadly guerrilla assaults on civilians in memory," with 300 guerrillas going up against a police station guarded by 35 police officers. The guerrillas' use of inaccurately launched bombs made from gas canisters destroyed the downtown area and killed 17 people, including eight civilians, four of them children.


On October 24, between six and 12 million Colombians mobilized in the streets to demand an end to the fighting. Several peace and human rights groups, among them País Libre, Redepaz and Viva la Ciudadanía, organized this nationwide protest against kidnappings and the armed conflict.

This same date also saw a restart of talks between the FARC and the government.

In November, a FARC offensive -- believed to be in response to President Pastrana's call for a holiday cease-fire -- dealt the peace process another setback. Colombian armed forces turned back a FARC attempt to take Puerto Inírida, the capital of remote Guainía department.

FARC leaders and Colombian government officials held a televised meeting at Los Pozos, Meta, on December 5, asking the Colombian people for suggestions or questions via e-mail, fax and phone. The event, however, was plagued by technical difficulties which prevented many Colombians from viewing it or contacting participants.

Beginning on December 9 and lasting until December 20, the FARC carried out another offensive, with combat in seven different departments. The greatest casualties resulted from an attack on a naval post in Juradó, Chocó, near the border with Panama, and from a military air attack on FARC fighters outside Hobo, Huila.

On December 20, the FARC announced a holiday cease-fire, calling off military operations until January 10, 2000. Peace talks were to resume on January 13.

On January 14, 2000, FARC leader Marulanda paid a surprise visit to the site of the talks in Los Pozos. Marulanda voiced optimism, stating that talks were near the point at which substantive negotiations, following the Twelve-point Agenda agreed to in May, could begin.

In spite of the imminent peace talks, its Christmas truce over, the FARC carried out attacks again in Nariño department and southeast of Bogotá on the day of the announcement.

With Colombia's economic model the first topic on the agenda, Finance Minister Juan Camilo Restrepo traveled to Los Pozos in February to meet Marulanda and seven other FARC leaders. He stayed two weeks. The purpose of the meeting was to evaluate the cost of making peace and other economic issues, particularly unemployment

FARC leader Manuel Marulanda Velez, center, with number two man Mono Jojoy in San Vicente del Caguan, southern Colombia, April 29, 2000. Photo from AP.

International efforts

At the same time, Peace Commissioner Ricardo and a delegation of FARC negotiators traveled to Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Italy, France, and Spain on a "tour" facilitated by Jan Egeland, the special representative for Colombia for UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

The trip's primary purpose was to inform the negotiations' discussion of Colombia's economic model by familiarizing participants with the mixed economies of Scandinavia and Western Europe. An unstated secondary goal was to increase the FARC's exposure to a changing world and international expectations.

In March 2000, America Online co-founder James Kimsey traveled to the FARC demilitarized zone for a meeting with Marulanda. The meeting's purpose was to educate the guerrillas about the changes in the world economy wrought by new technologies and international investment.

A group including some of Colombia's most important businessmen (known colloquially as "los cacaos") traveled to the zone to meet Marulanda and the FARC leadership.

Even as the peace process showed progress, the war went on. The FARC earned widespread condemnation by carrying out a brutal attack in Vigía del Fuerte, Chocó, killing 21 policemen and several civilians.

In April, the FARC and Colombian government hosted a "public audience" in Los Pozos, inviting Colombian organizations and citizens to the demilitarized zone for an open discussion on "the generation of employment." Though the meetings were marked by tensions between representatives of unions and business groups, both called on the FARC to implement a cease-fire, a halt to kidnappings, and respect for international humanitarian law in the conflict.

Government and FARC negotiators announced that a possible open-ended cease-fire agreement was "on the table." Cease-fire discussions would take place behind closed doors, with confidential proposals. According to reports, the FARC's proposal foresaw a temporary cessation of hostilities for a fixed period that could then be extended. A bilateral government-FARC commission would verify the agreement. The most difficult condition in the FARC proposal was a demand that the cease-fire apply to all parties to the conflict, including right-wing paramilitary groups.

Mono Jojoy then announced that any person whose net worth exceeded $1 million would be "taxed" by the FARC.

Peace Commissioner Ricardo, in apparent response, announced his resignation. While Ricardo said he was leaving because the peace process had reached "a point of no return," there was speculation that frequent death threats influenced his decision.

Camilo Gómez, the president's private secretary and a member of the government negotiating team, replaced Ricardo as high commissioner.

On May 17, 2000, President Pastrana suspended peace talks with the FARC for several days after a woman in Boyacá department was killed by a bomb placed around her neck. It was the first time since the peace process began that the government had suspended the talks. A few days later, the Colombian government acknowledged that evidence did not implicate the FARC in this crime and peace talks resumed.

June came and went with little movement on either side. More than 20 diplomats from Europe, Canada, Japan, and the United Nations meet in San Vicente del Caguán with Colombian officials and FARC leaders to talk about alternatives to drug production. This was the first discussion of drug policy since peace talks began.

On July 3, FARC and government negotiators exchanged cease-fire proposals in sealed envelopes. Though the proposals were to be discussed after a one-month analysis period, no progress was made.

September saw more war than peace. A FARC guerrilla named Arnubio Ramos hijacked a commuter airplane and forced it to land in San Vicente del Caguán, in the FARC demilitarized zone. Government officials insisted that the guerrillas turn Ramos over to show their commitment to the peace process. The guerrillas refused to hand him over, arguing that Ramos hijacked the plane on his own account and "the FARC bears no responsibility."

The FARC called an "armed strike" in the southern department of Putumayo, where the U.S.-funded anti-drug offensive is very active. Demanding an end to Plan Colombia's military component, the guerrillas prohibited all vehicular traffic in Putumayo. As a result, isolated towns and hamlets suffered severe shortages of food, gasoline, and drinking water. The prohibition lasted until early December, when the FARC unilaterally lifted it.

October brought more peace initiatives and voting. More than 300 people met in Costa Rica for a three-day gathering known as "Paz Colombia." The meeting was designed to increase civil-society participation in peace efforts and to come to agreement on alternatives to "Plan Colombia."

The meeting brought together representatives from the Colombian government and civil society. More than six weeks after the Arnubio Ramos hijacking, government and rebel representatives resumed talks. Discussions of a possible cease-fire led the agenda.

Four FARC units then launched attacks in Dabeiba, Antioquia, and Bagadó, Chocó. The upsurge in fighting came right before nationwide elections for both municipal and departmental posts. Officials said that, aside from isolated fighting between members of the FARC and army troops in the outlying provinces, the election was carried out with no major disruptions.

On October 15, the FARC declared a unilateral "freeze" on the peace process. The guerrillas said they were suspending talks until the government took firmer measures against paramilitary groups. On October 29, Carlos Julio Rosas, mayor of Orito, Putumayo, was assassinated; the seventeenth Colombian mayor killed that year.

At the end of 2000, Camilo Gomez met with Manuel Marulanda, though the talks remained officially "frozen." President Pastrana announced that the guerrillas' despeje (demilitarized) zone was extended until January 31, 2001.

COLAR chief Gen. Jorge Mora declared that the Army was prepared to reclaim the demilitarized zone whenever it was called upon to do so.

On the eve of the New Year, Diego Turbay, a Colombian legislator who headed a congressional peace committee, was assassinated along with his mother and five other people on a highway in southern Caquetá, not far from the demilitarized zone. The assassination was widely attributed to the FARC, casting further doubt on the future of peace talks.

James Monaghan, Martin McCauley, and David Bracken, alleged to be members of the Irish Republican Army, were arrested and accused of training the FARC. Photo from Latin American Studies.


Year three

The two-year anniversary of the FARC peace talks passed in a moment of pessimism, with dialogue frozen since mid-November. Reports indicated that the FARC might release 100-150 soldiers and police officers in its custody by the middle of February.

On January 23, the FARC rejected a Colombian government proposal for re-starting the talks, which had called for an end to kidnappings and the guerrillas' use of homemade bombs. With a January 31 deadline for renewal of the demilitarized zone approaching, the COLAR announced that 600 counter-guerrilla troops had been airlifted to sites near the zone. "If Manuel Marulanda wants an extension of the safe haven, he has to sit at the negotiating table," President Pastrana said.

On the eve of the deadline, Pastrana extended the zone for four more days, asking for a face-to-face meeting with FARC leader Marulanda. Marulanda agreed to meet on February 8-9.

President Pastrana stayed overnight in the FARC demilitarized zone between the two days of meetings with Marulanda. The two emerged with a deal to revive peace talks, the 13-point "Pact of Los Pozos.” Pastrana and Marulanda agreed to extend the demilitarized zone for another eight months, and to negotiate a prisoner exchange and a possible ceasefire.

The Pact created a 3-panel advisory group to report on the paramilitary and guerrilla terrorism problem, side issues that could threaten the peace process, and conditions in the demilitarized zone. The pact, while often ambiguous, increased optimism about the peace talks' future.

Under a June 2 accord, the FARC agreed to free 42 sick military and police personnel in exchange for 15 ailing guerrillas in government prisons. On June 5, FARC released police Col. Alvaro León Acosta and three other officers, a beginning of compliance with the exchange agreement.

But on June 23, FARC militias attack La Picota prison in southern Bogotá, freeing 98 prisoners, including several FARC members.

Later that week, the FARC unilaterally released 242 soldiers and police agents it had held prisoner, in most cases for years. The group threatened more kidnappings, however. Jorge Briceño told prisoners he released, "We have to grab people from the Senate, from Congress, judges and ministers, from all the three branches (of the Colombian state), and we'll see how they squeal."

The public-relations impact of the prisoner release was further dulled by the group's kidnapping of Hernán Mejia Campuzano, vice-president of the Colombian Soccer Federation. Mejia was not kidnapped because of his position; in fact, the guerrillas released him unharmed on June 29 so that the Copa America tournament, scheduled to begin in mid-July in Colombia, wouldn't move elsewhere.

Queen Noor of Jordan and America Online founder Kimsey visited the demilitarized zone for a meeting with Marulanda and Gómez in July, but two more FARC kidnappings angered the international community and slowed the peace talks.

On July 15, FARC guerrillas in Meta kidnapped the department's former governor, Alan Jara, while he was traveling in a clearly marked United Nations vehicle. A FARC statement later accused Jara of paramilitary ties, criticized the UN for transporting him, and promised to submit the former governor to a "popular tribunal."

Then, on July 16, the FARC kidnapped three German development workers in Cauca department, demanding an end to U.S.-driven aerial spraying of coca plants in the zone (which had started the day before). The UN and European Union issued strong protests.

The Pastrana government named a new team of negotiators (now called "consultants") for the peace talks: Manuel Salazar, the president's advisor for social policy; Ricardo Correa, secretary-general of the National Association of Industries (ANDI, one of Colombia's main business associations); Reinaldo Botero, coordinator of the government's human rights program; and Luis Fernando Criales, assistant high commissioner for peace for the FARC peace talks.

In August, the Colombian government arrested three suspected members of the Irish Republican Army in the Bogotá airport. James Monaghan, Martin McCauley, and David Bracken were accused of spending five weeks in the FARC demilitarized zone, offering training in urban terror tactics.

Finally, in September, a "notables commission" created on May 11 to find solutions to the paramilitary problem issued a report recommending that government-FARC talks proceed under a six-month cease-fire. Under this proposal, the FARC would abstain from kidnappings and extortion, while the government would pay for the FARC members' basic needs and refrain from herbicidal spraying of small-holding coca-growers.

On September 29, Liberal Party presidential candidate Horacio Serpa was forced to give up an attempt to lead a protest march into the FARC demilitarized zone. FARC fighters at the zone's entrance fired warning shots with rifles and mortars, calling into question the status of the zone just over a week before its renewal deadline.

Soldiers then found the body of Consuelo Araújonoguera, a popular former minister of Culture and the wife of Attorney-General Edgardo Maya. Araujonoguera had been kidnapped September 24 by the FARC at a roadblock near Valledupar, Cesar. The FARC admitted the kidnapping but denied the murder, though witnesses say Araujonoguera's guerrilla captors shot her at pointblank range while being pursued by COLAR.

Days before the FARC demilitarized zone’s next expiration deadline of October 10, FARC and Colombian government negotiators signed the "San Francisco de la Sombra Accord," renewing the zone until January 20, 2002. (FARC negotiators expressed disappointment that it was not renewed until August, when President Pastrana's term would end.)

The accord committed both sides to focusing talks on conditions for a cease-fire, and the FARC pledged to cease its practice of "miracle fishing," staging roadblocks and kidnapping travelers for ransom. The government pledged to increase anti-paramilitary efforts.

In a letter to his negotiators, dated November 7, Marulanda listed demands for the stalled peace talks' resumption. These included, among other items, suspension of government over-flights of the demilitarized zone, a government affirmation that the FARC are not terrorists or narco-traffickers, an end to military incursions in the zone (COLAR denied any such episodes had occurred), and suspension of the government's ban on unauthorized foreigners in the zone.

If these demands were not met, Marulanda said, "it will be necessary to agree upon a day... to officially hand over" the demilitarized zone to the government. President Pastrana and other government officials rejected Marulanda's "ultimatum."

Residents of the indigenous community of Caldono, Cauca, resisted an attempted FARC takeover of their town by assembling nonviolently in the town center. Similar examples of nonviolent resistance to incursions followed in several indigenous towns in southwest Colombia. FARC fighters killed some nonviolent resisters in Purace, Cauca, on December 31, 2001.

FARC leader Marulanda invited Pastrana, leaders of business groups, Colombia's Congress, judiciary, and the Catholic Church to a January 15 meeting in the demilitarized zone. The meeting, Marulanda indicated, would seek to determine "what is negotiable" among a list of concerns, among them Plan Colombia, drug crop eradication, prisoner exchanges, and paramilitarism. The meeting would occur five days before the January 20, 2002, deadline for expiration of the demilitarized zone where talks were taking place. The Colombian government declared it would "study" Marulanda's proposal and respond in writing.

Presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt was kidnapped by the FARC on Feb. 26, 2002. Photo from Latin American Studies.


Year four

The third anniversary of the beginning of peace talks rolled by. The FARC and Colombian government agreed to hold talks, for the first time since mid-October, on January 3 and 4, 2002. According to a January 3 FARC communiqué, the talks' purpose was "to find formulas to get the process moving and to allow for discussion" of the talks' common agenda, a cease-fire, subsidies for the unemployed, the September recommendations of the "notables commission," and the previous October's San Francisco de la Sombra accord.

No progress was made in two days of talks. The FARC continued to insist that the government lift the control measures it had implemented in the area surrounding the group's demilitarized zone, such as border controls and air patrols that the guerrillas viewed as tantamount to a blockade. Arguing that the control measures had brought a reduction in kidnappings, the government, particularly armed forces Chief Gen. Fernando Tapias, made clear its intention to keep them in place.

On January 8, another meeting between the FARC and the government failed to make progress. The FARC continued to cite government controls on the demilitarized zone as the chief obstacle to progress and to the guerrillas' compliance with the San Francisco de la Sombra accord. In a letter, Marulanda left the talks' future up to Pastrana. He also proposed a timetable, should the present difficulties be overcome: discussion of a subsidy for the unemployed in February and March, and discussion of a ceasefire in April and May. The FARC released a series of open letters to officials and sectors of society.

The next day, the Colombian government announced the suspension of peace talks. The military was to enter the demilitarized zone 48 hours after Pastrana issued an order. The U.S. State Department blamed the FARC for the talks' collapse.

As troops massed on the fringes of the demilitarized zone, Pastrana granted the United Nations time to find a solution to the stalled dialogues with the FARC. If no agreement was reached, the 48-hour countdown for the guerrillas' exit from the zone would begin the evening of Saturday, January 12.

UN representative James LeMoyne arrived in the demilitarized zone in early afternoon of January 11 for last-ditch talks with the FARC. The two sides had until 9:30 pm the following day to find a way to save the peace process.

After two days of talks with LeMoyne, the FARC released a proposal for re-starting the peace talks, just before the 9:30 deadline. The guerrillas' draft re-affirmed the commitments of the San Francisco de la Sombra accord, but left out the question of government controls in the area surrounding the demilitarized zone. The FARC had demanded that these measures be lifted in order for talks to continue.

To most observers, the statement tacitly acknowledged that the FARC had yielded on the issue of the control measures, though the guerrilla proposal would create a commission to investigate complaints about the measures.

At midnight, Pastrana rejected the guerrillas' proposal and ordered COLAR to re-take the zone at 9:30 pm on Monday, January 14. Pastrana offered one last hope: that the guerrillas clearly state that the dialogues may continue even with the control measures in place. The UN's Lemoyne and FARC negotiators continued meeting on January 13.

The FARC announced that they would hand over the demilitarized zone's town centers, officially ending the three-year-old peace process.

In late afternoon on the 14th, after a day of efforts from the UN, international, and church representatives, the FARC announced that guarantees existed for the peace process to continue, complying with President Pastrana's demand. The January 20 deadline for the demilitarized zone's renewal remained in place, Pastrana said, unless both sides could agree on a strict timetable for cease-fire discussions. Future talks would include international representatives in a more formal fashion.

FARC offensives on February 5, much of it sabotage of infrastructure and bombings of urban areas, further increased skepticism about the peace process. The Colombian government issued a proposal for a six-month cease fire.

Shortly before the February 14 deadline for expiration of the guerrilla demilitarized zone, the FARC and the Colombian government agreed to a timetable for cease-fire discussions. The main issues to be discussed were cease-fire terms, kidnapping, and paramilitarism. The document, drawn up in the presence of UN, foreign embassy, and church representatives, laid out a brisk schedule that would bring a cease-fire by April 7. President Pastrana extended the demilitarized zone until April 10.

As time ran out on the FARC peace process, several presidential candidates, including Horacio Serpa, Luis Eduardo Garzón, and Ingrid Betancourt traveled to the demilitarized zone for a meeting scheduled as part of the peace talks' timetable. All candidates sharply criticized the guerrillas' ongoing offensive against civilian targets.

FARC and government representatives exchanged cease-fire proposals. The government proposal called for maintaining guerilla fronts in small zones to keep them separate from the armed forces.

February 20, 2002. Last call.

The end of the FARC peace process

The FARC hijacked a domestic airliner, forcing it to land on a stretch of highway in Huila department. All passengers were freed but one, Colombian Senator Jorge Gechem Turbay, the fifth member of Colombia's Congress to be kidnapped by the guerrillas since June 2001.

President Pastrana responded by announcing the end of the three-year-old talks with the FARC. Aerial bombardment, the first phase of military operations to re-take the demilitarized zone, began at midnight.

It should be noted that this declaration was signed in Washington, D.C., where Pastrana had gone to receive orders from his masters of war.

Senator and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt was kidnapped three days later by FARC while traveling to the former demilitarized zone on a mission to advocate respect for the rights of the zone's residents.

The FARC gave the Colombian government one year to negotiate the exchange of Betancourt and five other kidnapped legislators for FARC prisoners in Colombian jails. She was freed by the COLAR six and a half years later.

Presidential elections were held on May 20, 2002. Alvaró Uribe Velez won. That was the end of the “peace process” as it relates to the FARC.

Under the Uribe regime, a new and different kind of “peace process” would take place.

Next: Colombian peace process, Part two: the AUC. (This very different peace process, between the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia [AUC], [United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia] and the government of Alvaro Uribe Velez, began even as the previous one with the FARC failed.)

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Caracas : Bolivar is Inspiration for New Peoples' Movement in Latin America

The founding congress of the Movimiento Continental Bolivariano (MCB) in Caracas, Dec. 7, 2009. Photo from kaosenlared.net
Movimiento Continental Bolivariano:
'Take the open road of hope'

By Marion Delgado / The Rag Blog / December 14, 2009

CARTAGENA DE INDIES, Colombia -- Students, workers, peasants, indigenous movements and leftist groups from 30 countries gathered at Caracas last week to found the Movimiento Continental Bolivariano (MCB), seeking a "union of the peoples of the Americas" to oppose "imperialist encroachment," according to organizers.

Under the motto, "Take the open road of hope," a quote from the Liberator, Simón Bolívar, the founding congress of MCB on Monday, December 7, expressed determination to "defend the Venezuelan Revolution against imperialists threats," and "strengthen the fight against the military bases the Yankees have established in Colombia"; this last refers to a recent agreement between Bogotá and Washington allowing U.S. troops to operate in seven military bases in the South American country.

During the meeting, which ended Wednesday, a video of "Alfonso Cano," the nombre de guerra of a leader of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia -- Ejército del Pueblo, (FARC or FARC-EP; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia -- Peoples Army) was shown. In it, Cano said that adopting a constitution for MCB is a "duty that cannot be postponed," and reiterated that the pact between Colombia and the U.S. will "destabilize" democratic processes in Latin America.

"[MCB] constitutes a continental political movement of Bolivarian essence, just when the American empire has deployed its military strength in Colombia and is threatening democracy. The U.S. now has its equipment of war and terror deployed against the Latin America and Caribbean peoples. Formation of the new group and adoption of its constitution is a historical necessity” wrote the fugitive guerrilla leader.

He added that MCB's formation signals a new dawn of South Americans' defense of their dignity, independence, history, values, culture, territory, human resources, and a "natural and inalienable right to a sovereign design of our rich future."

The Venezuelan Continental Movement (VCM), born more than five years ago, will provide a founding structure, expanding to include a Bolivarian Continental Coordinator (BCC) to represent MCB, as a platform for Latin American anti-imperialism.

The Commander of the armed forces of Colombia, General Freddy Padilla de León, requested the group to publicly reject the greeting message and accusations of the FARC.

Reaction in Colombia

Colombia has formally asked Venezuela to clarify its position towards the MCB. "The Government and the people of Colombia consider the recognition made by the Bolivarian Continental Coordinator (BCC) of the narcoterrorista organization 'the FARC' an affront to democracy and human rights," the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said. Colombia stated that the MCB is guaranteeing, by its acceptance of the FARC, the murders, kidnappings, and atrocities against civilians committed by the rebel group in a civil war that has lasted over 45 years.

"Faced with this recognition, the Government of Venezuela should clarify to the international community if it recognizes, adopts, or tolerates the existence of movements or parties that support terrorism and that make apologies for organized crime," the Colombian government said.

Colombia registered its protest while diplomatic relations with Venezuela are already in crisis, following the latest U.S. military pact.

The current diplomatic crisis is considered the worst since 1987, when the two countries, sharing a land frontier of 2,219 kilometers, were on the brink of war after a Colombian warship was intercepted by the Venezuelan army in a disputed maritime border area.

Previously, Colombian military and political leaders have asked the international community to refrain from giving credibility to FARC in forums such as the meeting in Caracas.

"We cannot accept that, after we have achieved significant success in the tranquility and peace among Colombians, these organizations of pseudopolíticans should give exposure to terrorist organizations," said General Padilla.

The President of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, the leading regional critic of Washington, denounced the U.S. as building a platform on Colombian foundations to invade his country and curb his so-called "Bolivarian revolution" that favors the poorest members of society.

Chávez, in the past has denied links with or support for the guerrillas, charged by his opponents, and denied that they use Venezuela as a sanctuary.

In the FARC video shown in Caracas, Cano rejected the military accord of Bogotá and Washington and announced FARC's support for the newborn pan-South American organization.

The video is the second from Cano, who assumed the position of maximum FARC leader in 2008 after the legendary Manuel Marulanda Velez, died of a heart attack.

In recent months, guerrilla forces have intensified their attacks in an apparent attempt to demonstrate military power and political force. An offensive (Plan Patriota), launched by the Uribe government in 2003, that forced the FARC into a strategic retreat to remote mountainous and forested areas. In that offensive, several important guerrilla leaders such as Raúl Reyes, Martin Caballero, and Tomás Medina Caracas were killed, while thousands of FARC combatants defected, according to the Colombian Government.

• For previous reports from Colombia by Marion Delgado, go here.

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Colombia : Rebels Accused in High Profile Political Assassination

Above, Governor Luis Francisco Cuellar of Caquetá state in Colombia, who was kidnapped Monday and killed by alleged rebels. Below, relatives and friends carry coffin containing his body as people wave white flags during his funeral service in Florencia, southwestern Colombia, Wednesday. Photo by William Fernando Martinez / AP.
Assassination of Governor Cuellar Carvajal
Believed to be work of Colombian rebels

By Marion Delgado / The Rag Blog / December 24,2009

CARTAGENA DE INDIES, Colombia -- Armed men kidnapped and killed the governor of the south Colombian Departamento (state) of Caquetá on Monday evening. Authorities think the rebel group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) is behind the most high-profile political assassination in many years.

According to local media reports, a group of 10 heavily armed men attacked Governor Luis Francisco Cuellar Carvajal’s home in the center of Florencia, the capital of Caquetá. Cuellar was taken out of his home and pushed into a car.

Late Tuesday, the getaway vehicle was found in an isolated area a few miles from Florencia. It had been driven off the road and burned. In a nearby field the body of the Governor was found, his throat cut. There was some delay in recovering the body as the field had been mined with explosive devices.

One policeman, part of the governor's security detail, was also killed, in the initial attack at Cuellar's home, authorities say.

The state's Secretary of Government, Edilberto Ramon Endo, told reporters that the governor had felt threatened by the FARC, and had requested increased government protection against possible attempts to kidnap or kill him. Although no group has yet to take responsibility for the attack, Endo was quick to blame the FARC. "There is no other group active here but the FARC, it is highly likely it was they who kidnapped him," he told newspaper El Tiempo.

According to television station Caracol, President Alvaro Uribe has sent National Police director Oscar Naranjo to Caquetá to coordinate the kidnapping investigation. The national government had offered a reward of $500,000 (U.S. dollars) for information leading to his safe return before the grim discovery on Tuesday.

According to Defense Minister Gabriel Silva, the army sent 300 troops to look for the kidnapped governor. Silva also told the press on Tuesday that the kidnapping seems to be the work of the FARC, specifically the mobile Teofilio Forero column. "This illustrates how narco-terrorists are looking to show their strength and how they want to disturb democracy, but the state is ready to confront them," Silva said. There were unconfirmed reports that "heavy fighting" had broken out between state troops and guerrillas in Caquetá.

Assassinations are commonplace in Colombia. Just this year 25 union leaders have been killed, as have human rights activists and indigenous leaders, and there have even been wholesale massacres of suspected FARC sympathizer. However, this is the highest profile murder in recent history. The assassinations and massacres are carried out by all sides, paracos, police, Colombian Army (COLAR), FARC, M-19 and others.

The FARC had not kidnapped any high-profile politicians since 2002, when they were able to kidnap presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, former Defense minister Gilberto Echeverri, and twelve deputies from the state of Valle del Cauca. The rebels had released the last politician in their captivity, Sigifredo Lopez, exactly one year ago.

Caquetá is in the Amazonas region of Colombia. The capital, Florencia, is in the north, bordering on the state of Huila. It lies on the steppes of the Cordillera Oriental mountain range, part of the Andean chain. To the south of the city lie the Amazon jungle and the departmentos of Putumayo and Amazonas.

The FARC's Southern bloc operates about 16 fronts along the borders with Ecuador and Peru it. It covers the Colombian departments of Caquetá, Huila, Putumayo, and parts of Cauca.

Up to 90 specialized Southern bloc militants form the Teofilio Forero Mobile Column, operating mostly in Huila and Caquetá, with a lot of urban activity. In the FARC organization, a column consists of two or more companies, commanded by a Captain, in this case by “El Paisa” (the raisin), whose real name is Oscar Montero. A front is two or more columns and is commanded by a Lt. Colonel.

Oddly, the Teofilio Forero Mobile Column had been reported as dismantled by the previous Minister of Defense, Juan Santos, in 2005, as a result of Plan Patriota.

At the same time the 3rd and 14th Fronts were also reported as dismantled.

It has been believed that the remnants of the Column were later melded into the 3rd and 14th Fronts to become the Yesid Ortiz Mobile Column. The 14th Front was a command Front, and included the Southern Bloc commander, a Brigadier General. Why the Teofilio Forero Mobile Column has been named as the perpetrator of Monday's assassination is unclear at this time.

Uribe vows state troops will continue to fight the FARC and find those who are responsible for the kidnapping and death of Cuellar.

The governor's son, Luis Fernando Cuellar, told Caracol Radio he also believes the FARC is guilty of his father's assassination, criticizing the government for failing to protect him, despite his already having been kidnapped four times since 1987. He was held for 2-7 months on each of those occasions and released when a ransom was paid. Cuellar’s wife, Himelda Galindo, claimed she couldn’t remember the amount of the ransoms paid. According to the governor's son, the victim was protected by only three policemen when he was kidnapped.

• For previous reports from Colombia by Marion Delgado, go here.

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U.S.-Colombia Treaty : Yanks Prepare to Party Down

Top, Chiva party bus Cartegena: Party down. Below, "The Yanks are Coming!"

The new Colombian war:
Nature of U.S. incursion still unclear

The new U.S. air base in Palanquero... will 'expand expeditionary warfare capability' and 'improve global reach' for 'conducting full spectrum operations...'

By Marion Delgado / The Rag Blog / November 17, 2009

CARTAGENA DE INDIES, Colombia -- THEY’RE HERE! A scant nine days after the U.S. and Colombia signed a new military pact, I saw the first of Gawd-knows how many U.S. troops assigned to this country, right in front of my pad. I had gone to the local corner store to sit at one of the couple of tables out front, watch the street life, and sip an Aguila, the local Budweiser type of beer.

I saw them coming fifty meters up the block, four of them, with a local young lady who I recognized in tow. They wore U.S. casual clothes, three had well-shined military footwear, and all had the appropriate haircuts. As they drew closer I could hear their hometown English. They were looking for something, swiveling their heads, searching up and down the block. They stepped into the tienda to ask directions. One of them spoke language school Spanish, devoid of idioms, slang or any discernible accent. He asked where they could catch the Chiva bus.

The Chiva is a “party bus." For 30,000 COP (about $15) one can board, get a bottle of cheap rum and a Coca-Cola, a drum or set of maracas, and be toured around the city, accompanied by very loud music and a lot of drunken yelling, for about an hour. The clerk pointed across the street and advised them that the bus comes every half hour. The troops looked like they were enjoying their new status. The newly-inked treaty gives U.S. military personnel diplomatic immunity from arrest by Colombian authorities.

While the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá says the new agreement, providing for expanded U.S. access to Colombian military bases, goes into force immediately, a Colombian court ruling finds the agreement is "broad and unbalanced" in favor of the U.S. Indeed: the agreement puts no limits on the number of U.S personnel to be deployed in Colombia or the number of military bases they could use.

The Colombian State Council said in its ruling that the agreement gives the U.S. the power to decide what operations will occur, gives immunity to U.S. troops, allows access to bases beyond the seven named in the agreement's text, and defers other important questions about military operations to future "operational agreements." The Council reviewed 15 prior treaties and declarations cited by President Alvaro Uribe’s government as the foundation for the new base pact, and found that none offer a basis for stationing U.S. troops or US. use of Colombian bases.

It concludes that the agreement is a treaty, and therefore must be approved by the Colombian Congress and reviewed by the Constitutional Court. Foreign Minister Jaime Bermúdez, in signing the deal, had said the government would bypass such formalities.

The new U.S. air base in Palanquero, 120 miles north of Bogota, will "expand expeditionary warfare capability" and "improve global reach" for "conducting full spectrum operations,” according to a newly disclosed Pentagon document submitted to the U.S. Congress. The document describes South America as "a critical sub-region of our hemisphere where security and stability is under constant threat from narcotics-funded terrorist insurgencies, anti-US governments, endemic poverty, and recurring natural disasters." The document seemingly contradicts well-publicized claims by U.S. Ambassador William Brownfield that soldiers based in Colombia will "never, never, never" participate in armed operations, and that the base agreement doesn't allow operations outside Colombian territory.

The embassy uses the guise of the discredited “drug war” in all of its statements, as if that would add legitimacy to this invasion of Colombia.

President Evo Morales of Bolivar recently criticized this tactic. Morales spoke of his experiences as a coca grower and union leader facing the brunt of U.S. militarization. "I witnessed this," he said, when describing the repression. "So now we're narcoterrorists. When they couldn't call us communists anymore, they called us subversives, and then traffickers, and since the September 11 attacks, terrorists," Morales said. "The history of Latin America repeats itself."

Meanwhile in this country, the war heats up. In Departamento Valle del Cauca, whose principal city is Cali, the ARC Pacific Naval Base at Malaga is one of the bases where the U.S. will build its naval port. On the afternoon of November 10, a firefight broke out in the area between a unit of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and troops allied with the Bogotá government. Nine Bogotá troops were killed and three wounded. There was no report of FARC casualties. This morning, November 12, the army announced a movement of 2,500 troops to the area. They claim that FARC killed three women and a child as well as nine soldiers.

Also today, Uribe claimed that Venezuela had declared war on Colombia! A check with Venezuelan and international television sources produced no confirmation of such a declaration; perhaps it was just a figure of speech on Uribe’s part.

The army also announced the capture of 19 FARC members in the departmentos of Santander, Antioquia, and Meta. Such announcements are an almost daily occurrence.

Taxpayers: Know your U.S. Columbian properties!


Today’s Featured Base: Palanquero

Palanquero is already one of the major air fields in Colombia. The US is spending $46,000,000ºº right this minute to develop it as a fully functioning 135,000 square meter airfield with runways 10,000 feet in length. It will be administered by the U.S. Southern Command. The Colombian Air Force (COLAF) will base high tech communications intercept airplanes there, paid for, of course, by U.S. taxpayers.

• For previous articles from Columbia by Marion Delgado, go here.

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Furor in Colombia : The Yanks are Still Coming

Venezuela Pres. Hugo Chavez addresses rally in Caracas, Friday, Nov. 13, 2009, protesting U.S.-Columbia military agrement. Photo by Fernando LLano / AP.
The U.S. Invasion of Colombia:
Touching all the bases

By Marion Delgado / The Rag Blog / November 15, 2009

CARTEGENA DES INDIES, Colombia -- The furor over a newly-signed agreement between the U.S. and Colombian governments continues, with denunciation of what was signed on Oct. 30 from all sides.

I must say “what was signed” because as of now it is being called many different things. There is a category four bullshit storm blowing across most of South America. “What it is” seems as much in doubt as “what is in it.” At various times it is described as a U.S. pact, an agreement, the pact, security pact, or as an addendum to an existing agreement; each description is then negated by a critic or a supporter and a substitute term inserted.

Last August, U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton said, “The United States does not have and does not seek bases inside Colombia." Maintaining that line this week, State Department spokesman Ian Kelly told reporters the agreement "doesn't provide us with any kind of bases in Colombia. It provides us with an opportunity to cooperate with Colombia in some issues related to counternarcotics and interoperability in that regard."

However, that doesn’t quite jibe with a U.S. Defense Department document that stated the U.S. military will not only have access to Colombian military bases, but also be able to use major international civilian airports. While we will attach to existing bases, we will build our own sections. This is already started with a $46 million dollar expansion of a runway at Palanquero Air Base in Puerto Salgar, Cundinamarca. June 15th the U.S. State Department authorized a contract worth almost a half million dollars to expand warehouses at Tolemaida.

According to reported provisions, U.S. military personnel and defense contractors will also enjoy diplomatic immunity in Colombia. But President Alvaro Uribe's conservative government says there will be "no impunity" for any crimes committed by the U.S. military, insisting the agreement commits Washington to investigate and punish such cases. "The agreement includes such important things [as]… no U.S. jurisdiction or courts martial in Colombia, or that Colombia may participate in investigations conducted against American officials," added Colombian Foreign Minister Jaime Bermudez.

Immunity for U.S. soldiers in Colombia raises hackles because a U.S. soldier and contractor reportedly raped a 12-year-old Colombian girl inside Tolemaida military base in 2006, dumping her outside the gates in the morning. The two alleged rapists remain free and returned to the U.S. without facing any charges. U.S. soldiers in Colombia reportedly committed 37 acts of sexual abuse from 2006 to 2007.

U.S. Ambassador to Colombia William Brownfield, one of the signatories, said the pact "updates" and "modernizes" agreements already in place between the two countries, signed in 1952, 1962, and 1974. The new 10-year deal allows the U.S. military to use seven bases in strategically located Colombia, which shares borders with Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, and Panama, and boasts both Pacific and Caribbean-Atlantic ports.

The agreement caused early concern not only among neighboring countries, but among inhabitants of Colombia, because its details were not known, nor was the Colombian Congress consulted. An August meeting of concerned South American countries called the previous U.S.-Colombia agreement “extra-regional interference” and an act of imperialism. The Colombian government refused to give details of the agreement because it was not signed yet and because it was “a reserved matter according its sovereignty.”

After the signing, Bermudez said the exact text of the agreement would be announced in one week, in a letter to foreign ministers of the nations concerned. Well, that was last week’s news; it didn’t happen. Now Bermudez promises to release it to the countries “involved,” this week.

As of November 9, 2009, four Colombian bases had been confirmed as part of the new deal. They are:

1. Apiay Air Force, assigned to Colombian Air Force Aerial Combat Command 2 also hosts members of the Colombian Army and Colombian Navy; it is located near the city of Villavicencio, Departmento (state) Meta, in central Colombia;
2. Malambo Naval Airbase, near Puerto Salgar, Departamento Atlántico, on the Caribbean Coast; South of the city of Baranquilla in Departmento Atlantico;
3. Palanquero Air Base in, Departamento Cundinamarca; half way between Bogotá and Medellín; and
4. The Pacific Naval Base at Bahía Malaga, Departamento Valle del Cauca, equidistant from the borders of both Panama and Ecuador. It is home to the Colombian Pacific fleet.

Three bases yet to be confirmed but strongly suspected by this writer to be included are:

1. Tolemaida, the Army training base at Nilo, Departamento Cudinamarca. You can Google-Earth it and take a look for yourselves 4 degrees 14’ 38” N and 74 degrees 38’ 43” W;
2. Larandia Air Force Base, located in Caquetá, southern Colombia, shared by the Colombian National Army, the Colombian National Police (DAS), and the Colombian Air Force; and
3. The naval base in Cartagena, Departmento Bolívar, home to the Armada Republica de Colombiana (ARC) Atlantic fleet.

The U.S. and Uribe both say the agreement will help Colombia deal more effectively with drug gangs and left wing rebel groups. One problem with that is that Hugo Chavez’ neighboring Venezuela and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are characterized (FARC by the U.S. government; the Venezuelan government in Congress; and both, routinely, by Uribe’s government) as both terrorists and drug dealers.

The FARC has responded to the newly-inked agreement. In a communiqué to Colombian military of honor and the people in general, FARC urges them to defend Colombia’s sovereignty and Latin American dignity, both "deeply tarnished with disgrace, blood, corruption and servility by President Alvaro Uribe."

The group says that, without even blushing, since he lacks any dignity, Uribe accepted the installation by the Empire of seven military bases in Colombia in an act of high treason, “a poisoned dagger plunged into the body of the Latin American Homeland, with its tip hurting the very heart of [the continent].”

The guerrillas add that the only objective of the agreement is to thwart the democratic, pro-integration process of the peoples who, led by the Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA), have continued the unfinished liberation project started by Simon Bolivar, South America’s Liberator.

Asi es en Colombia hoy...

Also see:

• Columbia Military Pact : The Yanks are Coming by Marion Delgado / The Rag Blog / November 4, 2009

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Colombia: Six Decades of Fighting for Peace : Paramilitary Reemerges

A Promise of Peace:
Colombia and the paramilitary successor groups

By Marion Delgado / The Rag Blog / March 11, 2010

Part three: Resurgence

In my last posting I looked at the demobilization of Colombia’s paramilitary blocs in an agreement with the government of Álvaro Uribe Velez, overseen by the OAS (Organization of American States) that took place in 2003-2006. The government estimated that there were between 7,000 and 9,000 paracos when the process began. By February 2006 they claimed 17,000 were “demobilized”; now it appears, according to Human Rights Watch, that 31,671 persons participated in the demobilization process.

For the most part this peace process was Uribe’s gift to the paramilitaries that he and his cousin, Mario Uribe, helped to create when Alvaro was a senator, a sort of “get out of jail free card” with many benefits. Besides a few dozen leaders of the blocs who were extradited to the U.S. to stand trial for drug trafficking and money laundering, the paracos were shuffled through a loose process and sent out to become good citizens again. Now it appears that it didn’t happen that way.

The Colombian Attorney General has said repeatedly that the paramilitars no longer exist. Only recently has the government taken notice of two social phenomena that the Colombian people have known about all along. First, in many cases, the paracos, although going through a demobilization ceremony, never really demobilized at all, but continued to maintain control over vast areas of Colombia, and specifically over the cocaine trade.

Second, there are a growing number of successor groups, new paracos, if you will, that have organized and stepped up to fill the power vacancies left by the demobilization process. A third phenomenon combines both of these. Middle level leaders from the old blocs are back in business as organizers and controllers of “new” successor groups.

There are differences between the successors of the paramilitary groups and the demobilized Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). First, the successor groups seem to operate relatively independently of each other; apparently they have not yet formed a coalition to articulate common goals and interests, coordinate their criminal activities, and, in some cases, their military-type operations.

Second, leaders have less visibility than some of the leaders of the AUC -- for example, AUC founder Carlos Castaño. Most of the successor groups seem less focused on fighting guerrilla insurgents than was the AUC. What they have in common with the AUC is a strong involvement in Mafia-type criminal activity, including drug trafficking, as reported not only by the government but also by the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia of the OAS (MAPP/OE).

According to police reports about the structure of the successor groups, most are led by former mid-level leaders of the AUC who never demobilized or simply continued to operate after a supposed demobilization. This is the case with Pedro Oliverio Guerrero (“Cuchillo”), leader of ERPAC (El Ejército Revolucionario Popular Antisubversivo de Colombia), several leaders of groups operating in Medellin, and Ovidio Isaza in the Magdalena Medio region, among others.

Daniel Rendon (see below), who directed the Urabeños bloc until his capture in 2009, also was a member of the AUC and a brother of Freddy Rendon, leader of the Elmer Cardenas Bloc. The main exception is the group Rastrojos that reportedly originated as an armed drug cartel in the North Valley and was not allowed to participate in the demobilization process.

As with the blocs of the AUC, the successor groups are deeply involved in crime, including drug smuggling, extortion, and money laundering. Early AUC blocs were formed from the group “Muerte a Secuestradores” (MAS; Death to Kidnappers), an alliance formed in the eighties by drug lords Pablo Escobar, Fidel Castano, Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, and others, in order to free traffickers or smugglers who had been abducted by guerrilla groups.

In Norte de Santander, for example, even though the Catatumbo Bloc of the AUC participated in horrific massacres of civilians who were identified as "guerrilla sympathizers," sources report that seldom did they have direct combat with the guerrillas. Its main activity was to control lucrative drug running and smuggling operations along the border with Venezuela, as well as extortion and other criminal activities.

Many paramilitaries, such as "Don Berna" and "Macaco," were simply drug traffickers who were presented before the world as paracos.

A senior officer of the police said that he saw a clear continuity between paramilitary groups and successor groups, in the sense that some AUC blocs "were not paramilitaries but were drug mafias who grabbed the paramilitary identity during demobilization. [The successor groups] are the product of a deception for demobilization. These guys tricked us all. They recruited displaced children. Then they killed some of the demobilized."

Emergence and development of the successor groups

Demobilization of the AUC officially ended on August 15, 2006. Subsequently, many successor groups closely linked with the AUC appeared.

MAPP/OAS, relying on official information from the Colombian police, reported in early 2007 that it had identified "22 structures in which there is participation of mid-level demobilized [persons], recruitment of former combatants of the AUC, and control of illicit economies." MAPP/OAS said that such groups then had approximately 3,000 members.

Since then, numbers of members of these groups and areas in which they operate have grown steadily. Estimates of the number of successor groups and their membership vary significantly according to the source, but in some cases reach 10,200 members.

In mid 2008, MAPP/OAS expressed concern that "these factions continue and even increase, despite the actions taken by the security forces. This shows a significant capacity for resistance and renewal, with resources that allow for constant recruitment and maintenance of corruption at the local level."

According to police, who produce the most conservative figures, the total number of groups has declined, as many have merged or been absorbed within each other, and some have disappeared or been defeated. However, membership has grown and continues to grow. As of July 17, 2009, police said that the successor groups had 4,037 members, an increase over the 3,760 that they had estimated a few months earlier, in February 2009. Successor groups operate in 24 of the 32 departments of Colombia.

Police figures also show that during the same period, groups began to operate in 21 new municipalities, and went from having a presence in 152 municipalities to 173.

Paramilitary leader Edwin Mauricio Gómez luna was extradited in 2008. Photo by Raul Arboleda / AFP / Getty Images.

The main successor groups

In mid-2009, police records indicated there were nine successor groups in business. According to police sources and the Attorney General, four are significantly stronger than the rest, and are the main focus of the authorities.

• The Urabá or Urabeños: Previously, this group was led by Daniel Rendon (also known as "Don Mario"), who was demobilized from the AUC and is the brother of Freddy Rendon Arias (“The German"), former leader of the Elmer Cárdenas Bloc that supposedly demobilized in 2006. After the capture of Don Mario in early 2009, police documents indicated that the group came under the command of Juan de Dios Usuga David, also known as "Giovanni."
  
  However, in October 2009 police arrested another man, Omar Alberto Gomez, known as "El Guajiro,” who they identified as the group’s leader. According to police records, this group, that had previously used other names such as "Castaño’s Heroes" (referring to the late AUC leader Carlos Castaño) and "Self-Defense Forces of Colombia Gaitanistas," has extended its area of operations from the Urabá region of Chocó and Antioquia to nine departments and 79 municipalities. It is reported that the group has 1,120 members.


• The Stubble: According to multiple reports received by Human Rights Watch, Stubble was the armed drug cartel “Valle Norte” (North Valley), that historically was linked to Wilber Varela (also known as "Jabon"), a drug dealer murdered in Venezuela in January 2008. It is believed that they had links with the demobilized paramilitary leader Carlos Mario Jimenez Naranjo (also known as "Macaco"). The group attempted to participate in the demobilization process, but ultimately it was not allowed because the government considered them a criminal organization.


• Paisas: Paisas are the heirs of paramilitary leader Don Berna, and have links with their "Office of Envigado," a criminal organization operating in Medellin. According to multiple sources, Don Berna continued to control these groups from prison. It’s been reported that, since his extradition, there have been many internal struggles and possible splits of the group. Official documents indicate that Paisa operates in seven departments and 45 municipalities with 415 members. It is said that their current leader is Fabio Velez (also known as "Nito").


• Popular Revolutionary Army or ERPAC: This group is led by Pedro Oliverio Guerrero Castillo (also known as "Cuchillo"). Cuchillo is a longtime paraco leader who first operated in the private army of drug trafficker Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, and then joined the Centaurs Bloc of the AUC. It is said that Miguel Arroyave (aka “Arcangel”) led the Centaurs Bloc. He participated in the demobilization process as leader of the Heroes of Guaviare, but continued his illegal activity. The ERPAC operates mainly in the plains east of Bogota, in the departments of Meta, Casanare, Guaviare and Vichada, although police reports indicate that it also has a presence in Arauca and Guainía. Police estimate that it has 770 members.

In addition, the police say that they have identified the following groups:

• Renacer: Police say the group operates in 11 municipalities in Chocó department under the command of Jose Maria Negrete (also known as "Raul"), and has 100 members.


• New generation or “n”: Human Rights Watch has received credible information that this group was created by members of the Bloque Libertadores del Sur of the AUC almost immediately after their supposed demobilization. Police say they operate in three municipalities of Nariño, under the orders of Omar Grannobles (also known as "El Tigre"), with 114 members.


• The Middle Magdalena: Police report that this group operates in eight municipalities in four departments, with 80 members. Its leader is Ovidio Isaza (also known as "Roque”). Isaza is a former leader of the AUC in the Magdalena Medio region. He is the son of Ramon Isaza, one of the earliest and most prominent leaders of the AUC. After their supposed demobilization, although they were never involved in the process of Justice and Peace, Ramon was released by the authorities for lack of evidence.


• Males: Like the Stubble, it is said that this group is the armed wing of a drug cartel that existed previously. Police say it operates in two municipalities of Valle del Cauca department and has 44 members.


• Rastrojos: The Rastrojos operate in 10 departments and 50 municipalities, have 1394 members, and are under the command of Antonio Calle Javier Serna (also known as "The Doctor").

Interviews with victims and local authorities across the country suggest that police figures underestimate the number of members and the number of successor groups. In some areas, Human Rights Watch received information about the existence of groups that the police did not recognize.

For example, in an interview with Human Rights Watch, a senior member of the police forces said the group Black Eagles of Narino is "more myth" that reality. However, on several occasions, Human Rights Watch received matching information from inhabitants of Nariño about the operations of the Black Eagles, who control various parts of the territory, threatening civilians and, apparently, waging a bloody battle against Rastrojos for control of Tumaco.

Less than two months after denying the existence of the Black Eagles, police announced the capture of 36 members of the group in Nariño. Similarly, although the police indicate that the ERPAC has only 770 members, news reports have quoted data from the Army and the Technical Research Office estimating that it has 1,120 members and is growing rapidly through active recruitment.

"Masacre en Colombia." Painting by Fernando Botero.

Who are the Black Eagles?

In many parts of the country, witnesses who contacted Human Rights Watch said that people who ordered crimes of murder, forced displacement, rape, and threats of the same were identified as members of the Black Eagles. Leaflets and written threats against human rights defenders often bear the signature of Black Eagles.

Police told Human Rights Watch that the Black Eagles were not a single group, but merely a name that had been appropriated by various groups, including local gangs, to instill fear among the population.

However, Nariño Human Rights Watch received similar complaints from several residents and authorities in that region indicating that the Black Eagles are actually a single successor group with a high degree of coordination which operates in many respects like a Bloc of the AUC.

In Urabá, Human Rights Watch received reports that local successor groups (the Urabeños) have sometimes been identified as Black Eagles, and have used this name interchangeably with others. These groups are not merely local gangs. But Human Rights Watch received no solid information that the various groups using the name Black Eagles were a single national group.

Successor groups actively recruit members by offering very high salaries and, sometimes, using threats to force people to join their ranks. They often seek potential members among the demobilized population.

According to a former paraco from Sucre, when he was demobilized in 2005, his boss told the group, "Whoever… wants to return, can return" to their area of operations in Antioquia. "They're there. The story is not over," he said.

Another demobilized paraco said, "There are people who go to the new groups... There are guys who ask me if I would be ready to go again. You feel afraid to speak. Many people have been killed for talking. The AUC has not been dissolved... There are others who go, new people. [Payment] is never less than half a million pesos ($250 U.S.). It's easy to enter, but it's hard to leave."

As reported by Human Rights Watch and officials of MAPP, it is estimated that over 50% of successor group members are recently recruited individuals. Mission members say the groups often use threats and deception to persuade new members to join.

So, it appears that the “AUC peace process” was just a sham perpetrated from the very beginning by Álvaro Uribe to pay off his friends and to cover up his and his government’s complicity in the unspeakable crimes of the AUC.

This should be enough reporting on the indignities the Colombian people suffer at the hands of criminals and the criminal government that bring suffering to every aspect of life here in Colombia. But it isn’t, there is one more atrocity to add. Read this story from The Colombian newspaper:

Up to 14,000 Colombian children recruited by armed groups

Friday, 12 February 2010

There are between 8,000 and 14,000 children involved in Colombia’s ongoing conflict, working for gangs and armed groups, according to figures released by an NGO on Friday to mark the International Day Against the Use of Child Soldiers.
The Humanitarian Diplomatic Mission, a Medellin-based NGO, reports that Colombia has the fourth-highest number of child soldiers in the world, behind Burma, Sudan, and the Congo.

“In the last two years, the conflict in Colombia has changed, and there are now children in the intermediate structures of these armed groups doing intelligence work and drug trafficking,” their report says.

Children as young as six are involved in the conflict, either carrying arms or doing intelligence work.

The level of violence against children in Colombia is “very high,” according to the report. Sergio Tapia, the NGO’s president, told Caracol Radio that, “We suspect that 10% of victims of paramilitaries are children,” and that thousands of these deaths have not been reported to authorities.

The International Day Against the Use of Child Soldiers, February 12, commemorates the UN protocol which came into force on this date in 2002, banning the recruitment of minors under the age of 18 into armed groups.

The report supports remarks made by Colombian Vice President Santos on Wednesday, in which he called the [Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia] FARC’s recruitment of minors “a disgrace," and expressed the government is very concerned about this phenomenon, the recruitment of children.

There was no mention of his friends and supporters, the paramilitars.

Also see:

• "Colombia and FARC : Six Long Decades of Fighting for Peace, Part one, Peace and the FARC" by Marion Delgado / The Rag Blog / February 20, 2010
• "Colombia and FARC : Six Long Decades of Fighting for Peace, Part two, The Paramilitary Warlords" by Marion Delgado / March 3, 2010

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