Showing posts with label Central America. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Central America. Show all posts

01 March 2012

David P. Hamilton : Guatemala's Perez Molina Wants to Legalize all Drugs

Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina, left, with his Defense Minister Ulises Ansueto Giron, during a ceremony in Guatemala City in January. Photo from AFP / Tico Times.

Otto Perez Molina and the Drug War
Perez Molina surprised everyone by announcing that he was going to propose to his fellow Latin American leaders the complete legalization of drugs throughout Central America, Mexico, and Colombia.
By David P. Hamilton / The Rag Blog / March 1, 2012

GUATEMALA CITY -- On January 14, 2012, Otto Perez Molina was inaugurated as the new president of Guatemala. This justly inspired an outcry of anguish among leftists everywhere.

Perez Molina has a seriously marred resume. He is an ex-Guatemalan army general who specialized in intelligence and who was present in the Quiche Department during the massacres of the Ixil-speaking Maya. Survivors have identified him as having personally tortured them. He served in the notoriously brutal special forces known as the Kaibles as their director of intelligence. He is a graduate of the Guatemalan National Military Academy and the School of the Americas at Ft. Benning, Georgia.

In 1992, Perez Molina was the Director of Military Intelligence when guerrilla leader Efrain Bámaca Velásquez disappeared. Bámaca’s wife, American lawyer Jennifer Harbury, claims that Perez Molina gave the orders to torture and kill her husband.

There are also allegations that Perez Molina participated in the 1998 murder of Juan José Gerardi, the Roman Catholic bishop of Guatemala and a prominent human rights advocate.


How could such a ghastly individual be elected president of Guatemala, a country whose population is half Maya, in the midst of the leftist ascendancy in Latin America? To understand the answer to that question, one must consider other aspects of Perez Molina that appealed to voters and understand the current political climate of Guatemala.

To his credit, in 1983 Perez Molina participated in the coup that overthrew Efrian Rios Montt, the most egregious of all the Guatemalan military dictators during the civil war. That coup brought to power General Oscar Mejia Victorias. Both Rios Montt and Mejia Vitorias are still alive and both have been charged with genocide by Spanish courts. Rios Montt is currently on trial for the same offense in Guatemalan courts.

There are those in the human rights community who say that the only difference between Rios Montt and Mejia Victorias was that the former was a militant evangelical, whereas the latter was a nominal Catholic; that they followed the same counter-insurgency strategy. Others contend that there was a split in the Guatemalan army between the “dinosaurs” such as Rios Montt who wanted to “dry up the sea” in which the guerrillas swam by killing the Maya or relocating them to concentration camps, and the “constitutionalistas” who recognized the need for a political component in order to end the war.

Despite presiding over the killing of thousands more Maya after taking power, Mejia Victorias got rid of Rios Montt, reduced the level of violence, handed over power to the first elected civilian government in decades (albeit under a military thumb) and set in motion the process that eventually resulted in a peace treaty to end the civil war. As is typical in U.S. politics, at least he was better than the other guy.


This faction fight in the military remains a blood feud 30 years later. When Rios Montt’s protégé, Alfonso Portillo, became president in 2000, Mejia Victorias fled into exile in Spain and Perez Molina resigned from the military. Now Perez Molina shows no sign of interfering with the trial of Rios Montt who is under house arrest and being prosecuted by a militant woman attorney general. Meanwhile, his 81-year old mentor, Mejia Victorias, hangs out with old friends in Antigua’s delightful central park.

While serving as chief of military intelligence in 1993, Perez Molina “was instrumental” in stopping then President Jorge Serrano, who had tried to dissolve the legislature and reappoint a new supreme court so he could rule by fiat. Serrano was quickly forced to flee the country along with his vice-president.

His successor, selected by the Congress from a short list reputedly provided by Bill Clinton, was Ramiro de Leon Carpio, who had previously been Guatemala’s human rights ombudsman and had defended Rigoberta Menchu. Perez Molina became de Leon Carpio’s chief of staff and represented the Guatemalan military in the negotiations that eventually led to the 1996 Peace Accords.

Another facet of Perez Molina is his personal experience as a victim of political violence. In early 2000, he retired from the military in order to found a new political party to challenge the Rios Montt faction that held the presidency and had the largest party in the Congress.

In November of that year, Perez Molina’s son was attacked by gunmen while driving with his wife and infant daughter. Three months later, on the eve of Perez Molina’s announcing his new party’s formation, his daughter was wounded by gunmen on the same day that a woman was gunned down immediately after having left a meeting with Perez’s wife.

During his 2007 campaign for president, several members of Perez’s political party were murdered, including a 33-year-old Maya woman who was one of his principal aides.

Guatamelan president Otto Perez Molina. Photo from AP / The Telegraph.


Perez Molina’s predecessor as president, Alvaro Colom, had defeated him in 2007. Colom came into office as a moderate leftist, but he was a disappointment, considered weak and suspected of corruption. Because Guatemala’s constitution bars a president from running again, Colom tried to have his wife run instead. It was widely reported that she ran the government already.

In order to advance this ploy, they got a divorce. But the Guatemalan Supreme Court wouldn’t buy it and she wasn’t allowed to run. No other left-leaning candidate was successful in getting into the second round run off.

Perez Molina ran the most expensive campaign in the history of Guatemala. His opponent was Manuel Baldizon, described as a multimillionaire Christian populist and proponent of the death penalty who wants to fight crime by televising executions. Both ran with women as their vice-presidents.

Baldizon is a very rich man from the part of the country where the drug gangs are the strongest. Because the drug cartels are so rich and powerful in Guatemala, it is widely assumed that both candidates in the run-off were supported by drug money.

Perez Molina ran for president pledging a "mano duro” against crime. This term has rather sinister connotations in the context of Guatemala. It can be interpreted as somewhere between firm hand and iron fist. Presidents during the civil war used the same term to describe their approach to the insurgency.

Crime is overwhelmingly the consensus number one issue in Guatemala and everyone wants a government that will somehow reduce it. Guatemala’s largest industry is tourism, which has been severely hurt by the country’s reputation for violence. The U.S. Embassy reports that “Guatemala has one of the highest violent crime rates in Latin America.” Currently Guatemala has the seventh highest homicide rate in the world and the successful prosecution rate is negligible.

The bordering countries of Belize (6th), El Salvador (2nd) and Honduras (1st) are worse. In the first seven months of 2011, approximately 42 murders a week were reported in Guatemala City, a city of 2.5 million. Illegal drug money fuels this violence. Perez Molina won the presidency primarily because he was the only candidate who ran convincingly on this issue.


At the time of Perez Molina’s inauguration, critics were warning of the carnage to come. Indeed, his first move was to employ the army to back up the police. Then, a month into office, he surprised everyone by announcing that he was going to propose to his fellow Latin American leaders the complete legalization of drugs throughout Central America, Mexico, and Colombia.

We’re not talking here about the legalization of an ounce of pot for personal use or some other minimal measure. He’s talking about complete legalization -- possession, transportation, production, et al, of all illegal drugs. He has said that the evidence clearly shows that the long-standing effort to repress illegal drug use has failed and that different approaches must be considered -- such as employing market forces instead of military forces.

He says he will put this proposal on the agenda at the next meeting of regional leaders. However you might decide to interpret this, it was a very radical move, way outside the boundaries of previous discourse. Suddenly, the terms of debate are entirely different. Is he proposing to reduce crime by the simple procedure of making fewer things illegal?

This move has led to considerable speculation as to his motives, everyone having the idea that he’s actually angling for something else. In the The Atlantic magazine, Natalie Kitroeff, a research associate in the Latin America program of the Council on Foreign Relations, says he’s doing it to pressure the U.S. to lift the embargo on selling arms to Guatemala that has been in place since 1978.

But the logic of her argument is that Perez Molina is very publicly calling into question the whole rationale of the Drug War in order to extort the U.S. to give him more money and arms to fight the Drug War. In other words, its open season for speculation and no one really knows what this guy is up to, but everyone assumes that there is a separate agenda lurking somewhere.

Drug war violence in Central America. Image from Foreign Policy.


It might be appropriate here to consider the contrast between the neighboring cities of Ciudad Juarez in Mexico and El Paso, Texas, USA. The former has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. The latter, just across the dribble known on its north bank as the Rio Grande, has the lowest murder rate of any American city.

However you might choose to explain this phenomenon, some facts are obvious. The drug cartels exist inside the U.S. in large numbers, but they don’t fight there, clear evidence of an agreement to a truce among them. When was the last time you heard of Mexican cartels shooting it out in the streets of LA, a city with several million Mexicans and Mexican-Americans?

They also don’t fight in Mexico City, which has one-third the murder rate of Washington, DC. The heavy price for the Drug War is being paid in blood that flows almost entirely south of the border along the drug transit lanes -- the coasts of Mexico and Central America and the U.S.-Mexico border region.

In addition, the illegal drug industry is corrupting the political processes and judicial systems in the whole region. The resulting mayhem is ruining tourism and besmirching their reputations in general. This becomes very much a national security issue for a country like Guatemala and Perez Molina named his political party the Patriot Party.

On the other side of the border in the U.S., the Drug War remains useful to the power elite by providing an excuse to throw thousands of young, mostly-nonwhite men in prison, but generally folks up there are just gettin’ high and ignoring the carnage down south. The U.S. marijuana laws are in an advanced state of decay, the dam having been broken in numerous localities by the medical marijuana movement, most notably California.

Domestic production and consumption of pot in the U.S. have never been higher and there is no shortage. Principled potheads shun “cartel pot.” Although the U.S. remains the world’s largest consumer of cocaine, that market isn’t growing and the street price continues to decline due to oversupply. The market metrics point to declining profits.


Forces supporting legalization of now illegal drugs are gaining momentum throughout Latin America and beyond. Former presidents Vicente Fox and Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, and Cesar Gaviria of Colombia, have signed statements and written articles calling for the legalization or decriminalization of drugs. The current presidents of Mexico and Colombia say they are open to discussing the issue.

A recent report from The Global Commission on Drug Policy, backed by high-profile political figures (including former presidents of Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Switzerland, the incumbent Prime Minister of Greece, the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, the former European Union High Commissioner Javier Solana, and the British billionaire Richard Branson, among others) argues for a move away from the “zero tolerance” approach.

A conference of Latin American leaders last December in Mexico made “an unambiguous call” to legalize and regulate drugs. That conference was attended by the presidents of Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, the vice-president of Costa Rica, and the foreign ministers of El Salvador, Belize, and Colombia. Their closing statement was a clear acknowledgement that the war on drugs is fueling much of the violence and chaos in their countries.

Exacerbating their dissatisfaction with the U.S.’s lack of success at reducing consumption, the Obama administration is planning to reduce anti-drug trafficking funds to Latin America next year by 16%, including a 60% reduction in such aid to Guatemala. Latin Americans ask themselves, why should we put up our money to fight the U.S.’s drug war when they won’t pay their share or reduce consumption?


Supporters of legalization talk about the effects of allowing market forces to come into play. If currently illegal drugs were legalized in Latin America, they could be shipped north via normal means. The shippers wouldn’t need expensive private airplanes and submarines when DHL will take it as far as Nuevo Laredo. They also wouldn’t need a private army to protect it all along the way. Legitimate business people would become involved and the cartels would be forced to compete and move their money into other areas as the price for their product dropped and their profit margins shrunk.

As the Rand Corporation predicted relative to the possible legalization of marijuana in California in 2010, the price of the drugs on the street would collapse. Only illegality makes the product expensive. Removing much of the money from the industry is the heaviest blow that can be dealt to the drug lords.

As the history of the prohibition of alcohol in the U.S. might suggest, more and more Latin American leaders are thinking that the only way to reduce the violence that plagues their countries is drug legalization. This puts them on a collision course with the U.S. government, regardless of which party is in power.

If Perez Molina and other Latin American leaders do indeed take money from the cartels, Perez Molina’s recent moves would indicate that at least some cartel owners are willing to sacrifice their current mega-profits for peace and legitimacy. It was recently reported that Zetas were living in campers so that their mobility would impede their arrest. They might prefer a house instead.

In this context, the idea of dumping the whole problem in Washington’s lap has considerable appeal to Latin American leaders located between the sources in the south and the big consumer up north. They could free resources to repress violence instead of bothering about the drugs.

Much of the rationale for the violence disappears and much of the money is taken out of the market when these products are no longer illegal. And the inherent anti-Americanism of legalization might be an issue that unites Latin American leaders across the political spectrum. Indeed, the more conservative leaders are taking the lead on this, although ex-coca grower Evo Morales is doubtless on board.

Now Perez Molina has thrown the fat on the fire in a highly public manner. If he puts it at the top of the agenda of the next meeting of regional leaders in March, expect a major freakout in Washington. The U.S. news media, almost totally fixated on the machinations of a pack of Republican losers and the corrupt U.S. presidential race, has so far ignored these loud knocking sounds on our southern door.

It is not unlikely that the U.S. will soon find itself without allies in the war on drugs and thus be compelled to adopt a wholly new approach.

[Rag Blog contributor David P. Hamilton has been a political activist in Austin since the late 1960s when he worked with SDS and wrote for The Rag, Austin's underground newspaper. Read more articles by David P. Hamilton on The Rag Blog.]

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17 January 2010

Honduras : Micheletti Becoming 'Second Pinochet'?

'Congressman for Life' Roberto Micheletti. Art by Brazilian cartoonist Carlos Latuff / IndyBay.

Honduran coup consolidating power:
Micheletti named 'Congressman for Life'


By David Holmes Morris / The Rag Blog / January 17, 2010

As violent repression continues, the powers that be in Honduras have taken symbolic and substantive steps to consolidate the coup d’état that deposed President Manuel Zelaya last June 28.

The unicameral legislature has voted to name de facto president Roberto Micheletti congressman for life, thus granting him immunity forever from prosecution for crimes committed in connection with the coup. Micheletti was president of the legislature at the time that body named him to replace Zelaya in an act defenders of the coup insist was a constitutional presidential succession.

Bolivian President Evo Morales said the Honduran legislature has thus made Micheletti a “second Pinochet.” Augusto Pinochet, the bloody dictator who ruled Chile after the coup of 1973, had himself declared “senator for life” in 1989.

The legislature left consideration of the question of a general amnesty for actions taken in relation to the coup to the incoming government, thus avoiding the question of legal action against Zelaya for his alleged crimes, which the golpistas claim as justification for deposing him.

Meanwhile, the Honduran National Association of Industrialists held a private ceremony recently at the home of wealthy businessman Adolfo Facussé to honor Micheletti as a “true patriot” and “the first hero of Honduras in the 21st century.” As he accepted the plaque the group presented him, Micheletti told the audience, which included General Romeo Vásquez Velásquez and other military commanders, that he had never doubted he had the support of the armed forces and the police but “most importantly, God was with us.”

Vásquez Velásquez, head of the joint chiefs of staff, led the group of soldiers that abducted Zelaya on June 28 and delivered him to the airplane that flew him to Costa Rica. And Adolfo Facussé is widely thought to have instigated the coup and to have helped finance it. He and other members of the Honduran oligarchy are reported to have distributed sizeable cash payments to military commanders and other government officials immediately before Zelaya was kidnapped.

The legislature has further guaranteed Micheletti’s safety by providing personal body guards from the armed forces or the national police or, if government personnel become unavailable, from private security firms, for the rest of his life. Micheletti’s family will also have body guards. Some 50 other members of the golpista government will be given similar protection, including the attorney general, the six top commanding officers of the armed forces, 17 ministers of the Micheletti regime and their 17 vice-ministers, and the president of the supreme court, the body that provided the legal pretext for the coup.

Despite pressure from inside Honduras and outside the country, Micheletti has refused to relinquish office until January 27, when the legitimate president’s term officially ends and President-elect Porfirio Lobo takes office. In the meantime, Manuel Zelaya, the constitutionally elected president, remains in the Brazilian embassy, where he has been in refuge since entering the country secretly last September. Zelaya has rejected offers of political asylum, insisting he be treated as the legitimate head of the government.

The United States, Costa Rica, Colombia, Panama and Peru are the only countries in the world so far to pledge to recognize the Lobo presidency as legitimate.

In San Pedro Sula, the country’s second largest city, a new street leading to a branch of the National Autonomous University has been named Roberto Micheletti Boulevard.

In other actions, the legislature has voted to withdraw the country from the Alternativa Bolivariana de las Américas (ALBA – The Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas), proponents of the move arguing that it violates the principles of self-determination and non-intervention. Honduras’s membership in the regional affiliation was proposed by Zelaya and was initially approved by the legislature, including then legislative president Roberto Micheletti, but was attacked by conservatives adamantly opposed to the leftist governments of Latin America making up ALBA and particularly to the Venezuelan government and President Hugo Chávez, bête noire of the Honduran right. Membership in ALBA was one of the factors that brought about the coup.

Tiempo, the only mainstream newspaper in the country opposed to the golpista government, says withdrawal from ALBA will cost the country 100 million dollars in bonds purchased by Venezuela from the Honduran National Bank of Agricultural Development, 100 tractors, money to teach literacy, technical support for development of a government television channel, scholarships for medical training and funds to establish enterprises to produce generic drug.

And the minimum wage for Honduran workers, another sore point for the right, appears likely to remain at the level established in January 2009 when a 60 percent increase sponsored by Zelaya took effect, at 5,500 lempiras a month, about 290 U.S. dollars, for urban workers, and 4,055 lempiras, or $215.00 , for rural workers. After negotiations between union leaders and business owners broke down last week, the final decision will be left to the incoming president, Porfirio Lobo, who is more likely to decree a reduction than an increase. The unions had initially proposed a 30 percent increase.

[San Antonio native David Holmes Morris is an army veteran, a language major, a retired printer, a sometime journalist, and a gay liberationist.]

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29 December 2009

Corruption in Panama : Former President on the Lam

Panama's ex-President Ernesto Pérez Balladares earlier this year. Panama's 'Toro' is currently wanted by law enforcement, if not by Panama's voters. Photo from telemetro.com.

Panama's 'Toro' goes underground
Warrant issued for arrest of ex-President Ernesto Pérez Balladares for laundering money from gambling concession kickbacks...
By Eric Jackson / The Rag Blog / December 29, 2009

PANAMA CITY, Panama -- On December 28 -- ironically, the Day of the Holy Innocents, which is Panama's functional equivalent of April Fools Day in the United States -- prosecutors revealed that they had issued an order for police to arrest former President Ernesto "Toro" Pérez Balladares and bring him in for formal interrogation and possible preventive detention on charges that he laundered the proceeds of kickbacks he received from a gambling concession contract awarded by his administration. This was no joke.

The alleged crime is money laundering, arising from a 1997 no-bid gambling concession that the Pérez Balladares administration awarded to Lucky Games SA, a subsidiary of a mostly Spanish-owned investment group. It is alleged that a piece of that business went to a company controlled by Mr. Pérez Balladares, Shelf Holdings SA, and that from the concession's inception up until the middle of this year Toro received a steady stream of payments from Lucky Games through Shelf Holdings.

The transactions allegedly took place through a complicated network of companies apparently controlled by or in the names of the former president's close friends. Although a fairly damning paper trail has been published in some of the daily newspapers, Pérez Balladares denies that he has received anything from gambling concessions that his administration granted.

Rumors of the former president's imminent arrest had been circulating for several days, and a few days before the arrest order was revealed a spokesperson said that he had left the country for Nicaragua on a personal visit. Pérez Balladares's father was Nicaraguan, which could qualify him for Nicaraguan citizenship that could be an impediment to his extradition. But Migracion said that its records indicated that Toro was still in Panama.

On the afternoon of December 28 the National Police cordoned off part of the Panama Oeste residential area of Punta Barco, where the former president has his beach home. Meanwhile, Pérez Balladares' lawyers went to court to file a motion to have the arrest warrant quashed. (In Panama, unlike most countries, the courts will entertain legal proceedings by a fugitive from justice and in political corruption cases this is the usual procedure.)

Having served as president from 1994 until 1999, Pérez Balladares was eligible to run for the presidency again in 1999 but after a humiliating loss in the intra-party delegate races for control of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) he shelved his plans to run in the party's presidential primary, which in the end was narrowly won by Balbina Herrera. The PRD was routed in this past May's general elections by Ricardo Martinelli and has been embroiled in severe infighting since then.

One of Toro's great political liabilities is that he conspicuously flaunts great wealth but has never given any credible explanation as to its source. Over the years he has filed a number of criminal defamation charges and civil lawsuits against people who have suggested where he got his money.

In some diplomatic circles it is said that the fortune dates back to the times when General Omar Torrijos was dictator and Toro was not only a high-ranking economic policy maker but also reputedly the man who for the most part handled the general's personal finances. However, no diplomat will spell out any details of how the fortune was amassed or even state the theory about the time and circumstances of its origins to a journalist for attribution.

Pérez Balladares was president of Panama when Bill Clinton was president of the United States, and the Clinton administration did a number of things to enrich Toro's family, for example by incarcerating hundreds of Cuban rafters on an old US military firing range here where there was no water and giving a member of Toro's family the contract to supply bottled water.

However, during Clinton's time the U.S. government sought an extension of its tenure at some of the military bases in the old Canal Zone, under the guise of a multinational anti-drug center. Toro's diplomats negotiated such a deal, but the PRD delegation in the legislature refused to go along with it, and after that the U.S. government began to leak a series of allegations about corruption on Pérez Balladares's part.

These included participation in a scheme to provide Panamanian visas and passports to Chinese citizens seeking to illegally enter the United States and a scheme with American accomplices to obtain kickbacks in a concession to privatize the maintenance of Panama's buoys and lighthouses. In recent weeks there have been convictions of at least two of the U.S. citizens involved in the latter scheme in U.S. federal courts.

Shortly after Toro left office in 1999, the U.S. State Department canceled his visa. Stating that such information is confidential, the State Department has never openly publicized its reasons for taking the actions that it did. For years Pérez Balladares employed top Washington attorneys and lobbyists in fruitless attempts to get his U.S. visa back.

(The pattern of Washington playing along with corrupt Panamanian politicians up to the point that the latter can or will no longer deliver what the U.S. government wants, at which point the Americans turn on such officials, has a number of precedents in U.S.-Panamanian bilateral relations. The most infamous of these is the case of one Manuel Antonio Noriega.)

The prosecution of former President Pérez Balladares comes at a time when two former education ministers from the PRD administration of Martín Torrijos are in jail awaiting trial on charges of corruption in building maintenance contracts. The party is split between those who would allow prominent PRD members facing corruption charges to fend for themselves and those who would rally behind the accused, alleging a partisan-motivated political witch hunt.

A series of prosecutions that touches scandals from the Pérez Balladares and Torrijos administrations but ignores the many scandals of the Moscoso administration could give the PRD the political circumstances it would need to make its case to much of the public. Prosecution of Moscoso-era corruption, on the other hand, might drive the Panameñista Party away from its alliance with President Martinelli's Cambio Democratico.

Martinelli, however, has a fairly effective dodge -- it is the semi-autonomous Public Ministry, headed by Attorney General Ana Matilde Gómez, that decides which cases get prosecuted and which do not. The president does not give orders to prosecutors and he can thus stand aside and tell anybody who asks that he'll allow judicial processes to take their course without interference. This is what Martinelli is doing at the moment.

[Eric Jackson is editor of The Panama News.]

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24 November 2009

Colombian Invasion : Touching All the Bases

A sign in Caracas, Venezuela, denounces expanded U.S. military presence in Colombia. Photo by Thomas Coex / AFP / Getty Images.

Just the beginning?
The U.S buildup in Colombia


By Marion Delgado / The Rag Blog / November 24, 2009

CARTAGENA DE INDIES, Colombia -- Larandia Air Force Base, Departmento Caquetá, in southern Colombia, is shared by the Colombian National Army (COLAR), National Police (DAS), Colombian Air Force (COLAF), (see "U.S. taxpayers: know your Colombian investments," below) and numerous U.S. military and civilian personnel giving support and training to the Colombian forces. As a Forward Operating Location (FOL), the base has been primarily used since 2000 for counter-narcotics operations, as established in Plan Colombia, and as a training and base facility for helicopters and aircraft supporting the OMEGA Joint Task Force.

Larandia is thus an anti-drug and counterinsurgency operations center deep in the jungles of south-central Colombia. U.S. Special Forces troops have used Larandia for training Colombian Army anti-drug battalions. The base also has radar facilities to track smuggling flights and coordinate aerial spraying of drug crops with herbicides (poisons).

U.S. personnel are a near-constant presence at Larandia. The base has hundreds of U.S.-made helicopters. U.S. officers supervise and train anti-narcotics battalions, units also used against insurgents. The commanding officer of one anti-narcotics brigade there admitted he had trained at the U.S. Army’s School of the Americas, Fort Benning, GA.

In addition to regular military units in Colombia, paramilitary units, or paracos, are supported by you through open U.S. support of the Colombian Army and covertly by your C.I.A. They were loosely clustered under the banner of Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC; in English, United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) an umbrella organization of regional paramilitaries, each formed to protect different local economic, social and political interests by fighting insurgents in their areas. AUC, formed in April 1997, has been estimated to have more than 20,000 militants. It is considered a terrorist organization by many countries and organizations, including the U.S. and the European Union.

AUC claimed its primary objective was to protect its sponsors from the rebel Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia -- Ejército del Pueblo (FARC or FARC-EP; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-Peoples Army); and Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, (ELN; the National Liberation Army), the agrarian-based opposition to the Bogota government, because the Colombian state had failed to do so. Former AUC leader Carlos Castano Gil in 2000 claimed 70% of AUC's operational costs were financed with cocaine-related earnings, the rest with "donations" from sponsors.

Although it is claimed that AUC demobilized in early 2006, some units still exist openly and others continue to operate clandestinely. A recent report claims some units have relocated to Honduras, where they are paid to protect corporations from insurgents and unions.


The genesis of what’s happening goes like this: In 2003, shortly after Bush the W came into power, Congress approved Plan Colombia, funded with your taxpayer money to the tune of $16,000,000,000.00 (Sixteen BILLION dollars). For what, you wonder? Why, to “fight drugs”, of course. Plan Colombia ran into trouble early on. Four billion was transferred to Colombia to jump start the buildup. It was immediately stolen. Congress was incensed, although they steal that and more themselves through “earmarks” every year. The money pipeline was shut off.

Plan Colombia was done but the rip-off was not. Congress, short of memory, quickly approved a new Plan Uribe, named for Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, and funded with the $12,000,000,000.00 (Twelve BILLION dollars) not stolen from Plan Colombia; again, to “fight” drugs. Money flowed again, but this time the U.S. would keep better track of it. Lol!

The operational arm of Plan Uribe was given the name Joint Task Force Omega; this is the Central Command of the Drug War in Colombia, although the mission quickly came to also include fighting insurgent “narcoterrorists”: the FARC and ELN.

Let’s recap for a moment. Plan Colombia begat Plan Uribe which begat JTF Omega. Omega in turn begat Plan Patriota, a military offensive that sent 18,000 Colombian troops, with U.S. advisors, into a broad swath of supposed rebel territory from 2004 to 2006. Plan Patriota has begotten 2 million people who have fled the fighting and poison spraying of their farms.

These internal refugees, unemployed, living in squatters’ communities in the cities where they have fled, are the principal result of the war so far. Don’t get queasy now; it’s what you are paying for. Many Colombians believe these dispossessed persons are an intentional result; that the real aim of the war against insurgents and against drugs is to get small farmers off their land to make room for “development." Under Colombia’s rural coca fields, you see, there is oil.

You had to know there was oil in there somewhere. (See Iraq War.)

Besides “protecting” their bosses, paramilitaries also terrorize people into leaving their land. Labor organizers are the people most targeted for assassination. More than 1,000 have been killed in the past 12 years, 200 so far in 2009.

Plan Patriota is not discussed in the Colombian press. Battles and results are treated as separate incidents. Of course, the refugees know what is happening, and word leaks out.

Time for a switch! G.W. Bush re-branded Plans Colombia, Uribe and Patriota as the new, improved "Andean Regional Initiative." He kept JTF Omega as the Colombian arm of the “Initiative.”


As the term "Andean Regional" signals, Colombia is only one part of U.S. plans for a military buildup in South America. U.S.-run Eloy Alfaro Air Base in Manta, Ecuador, was being expanded. Ecuador, many suspected was being set up to function in South America as Honduras did in Central America in the 1980s: a place from which U.S. military involvement in other countries of the region could be coordinated. Unfortunately for this idea, Ecuador caught wise and unceremoniously dumped the U.S. from the airbase in June of this year.
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Forced withdrawal of the U.S. Southern Command (USSC) from Manta led the Pentagon to deepen and diversify its presence in Colombia. Under the original Plan Colombia, the U.S. would use the Tres Esquinas and Larandia bases in the south, as well as at least three other bases.

The two countries have now signed an agreement for U.S. use of additional air bases at Apiay, Malambo, and Palanquero, the Pacific naval ports of Tumaco and Malaga Bay, and perhaps others as well. This will distribute what previously existed at Manta throughout Colombia. With Palanquero (in the center of the country) alone, USSC more than recoups what was lost at Manta, with a runway 600 meters longer, room to host 2000 soldiers and 100 aircraft, and the capability to operate giant C-17s, a capability that did not exist at the Ecuadoran base.

Alfredo Molano, an exiled Colombian journalist in Barcelona, Spain, has raised the possibility of Colombia authorizing the stationing of a U.S. aircraft carrier in Caribbean waters or in the Pacific.


This broad U.S. deployment is not merely a military response to the loss of the Manta base, as some analysts argue. It aims to construct a comprehensive response, military, political, and economic, to the strategic decline of the U.S. superpower and the crisis it faces.

In South America, the main strategic threat to the U.S. is the China-Brazil (read China-South America) alliance that has as one of its pillars the joint Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA). IIRSA is a series of infrastructure projects designed to facilitate the flow of Pacific-Atlantic trade; hence, the importance of military bases in the Pacific

While public justification continues to center on drug trafficking and terrorism, the objective is to reposition USSC as the axis of U.S. control in the region. It is clear that the Manta air base was never really intended to combat drug trafficking. In fact, "Manta is now the number one port for export of drugs in Ecuador," according to Luis Angel Saavedra, director of the Ecuador based La Fundación Regional de Asesoría en Derechos Humanos (INREDH). “What [the new U.S.-Colombia pact] involves,” he says, “is the construction of a ‘military framework’ to allow rapid control from Mexico to Patagonia, as well as the integration of Plan Puebla Panama into the Andean Regional Initiative.”


Meanwhile, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is, according to Colombia’s Uribe, about to make war on his neighbors. Demonization of Chavez has had its effect in Colombia as well as in the U.S. The U.S. press, at the behest of its masters in the seats of power, continues to attack him relentlessly. He is described as a lunatic, a warmonger, paranoid, and the sworn enemy of the people of the U.S. His rhetorical style does little to soften this image.

(My brother’s widow up in the freezing cold of Maine gets some free heating oil each winter from the Venezuelan state’s oil company, CITGO. She appreciates it, although she doesn’t really understand the politics of it all and she doesn’t care.)

For his part, Chavez complains that the U.S. is surrounding him with military bases of which the most recent in Colombia are only a part. Some veracity might be gleaned from the fact that Venezuela has one of the largest oil fields in the world. The U.S. has been known to make war on a country just to capture its oil.

Let’s see if Chavez’s story holds water… er, oil. Let’s look at where the U.S. has military bases in the region.

Currently, 13 U.S. bases, strategically placed in countries allied to Washington, surround Venezuela. With the agreement in matters of “cooperation and technical assistance in defense and security,” endorsed by Colombia and the United States, U.S. soldiers can use seven new military bases in Colombia, bringing the total to 20 (see "Thirteen U.S. bases already surround Colombia," below).

The United States has surrounded Venezuela militarily. To the north in the Caribbean Sea it has bases in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Aruba, and Curacao. To the northwest in Central America it has bases in El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica, besides the old School of the Americas in Panama.

To the west, it has three allied bases in Colombia: Arauca, Larandia and Tres Esquinas. Though soon there will be 10 military facilities. To the south, the U.S. manages two bases in Peru and another in Paraguay. The U.S. hasn’t built any bases to the east only because that side of Venezuela borders with the Atlantic Ocean!


So, Latin America continues on fire throughout the Andean region and Colombia. What does Barack Obama offer by way of change? Some would say not even the gestures he has offered in other situations. In Colombia, militarism continues to grow, with the U.S. military presence escalating to virtually irreversible levels, and it is happening on his watch.

The Obama Administration’s priority was finding another place with the same characteristics as Manta to maintain air coverage of the region. The new era Obama promised will continue to be just words if the reality remains imperial control and open interference
U.S. taxpayers: know your Colombian investments!

Today’s featured base: Larandia Air Force Base

Colombian Army (COLAR) units stationed at Larandia AFB that are specifically mentioned in U.S. documents as receiving taxpayers’ money include:

Colombian Military Joint Task Force (JTF) Omega HQ-Larandia

Colar Div 02
  • Twenty Second Mobile Brigade (BRM22)-Larandia
  • 5th Counter Guerrilla BN (BCG05)-Larandia
  • 14th Counter Guerrilla BN (BCG14)-Larandia
  • 25th Counter Guerrilla BN (BCG25)-Larandia
  • 36th Counter Guerrilla BN (BCG36)-Larandia
Colar Div 04
  • 26th Service and Support Company (CPS26)-Larandia
Colar Div 05
  • Tenth Mobile Brigade (BRM10)-Larandia
  • 75th Counter Guerrilla BN (BCG75)-Larandia
  • 76th Counter Guerrilla BN (BCG76)-Larandia
  • 77th Counter Guerrilla BN (BCG77)-Larandia
  • 78th Counter Guerrilla BN (BCG78)-Larandia
  • 24th Combat Service Support Company (CPS24)-Larandia
Colar Div 06
  • Thirteenth Mobile Brigade (BRM13)-Larandia, Caquetá
  • 87th Counter Guerrilla BN (BCG87)-Larandia
  • 88th Counter Guerrilla BN (BCG88)-Larandia
  • 89th Counter Guerrilla BN (BCG89)-Larandia
  • 90th Counter Guerrilla BN (BCG90)-Larandia
  • 36th Combat Service Support Company (CPS36)-Larandia
Colar Forces (Tropas Ejercito)
  • Counter Narcotics Brigade (BRCNA)-Larandia
  • 1st Counter Narcotics BN (BACNA1)-Larandia
  • 2nd Counter Narcotics BN (BACNA2)-Larandia
  • 3rd Counter Narcotics BN (BACNA3)-Larandia
  • Counter Narcotics Service and Support BN (BASCN)-Larandia
That is a lot of soldiers.

-- md

Thirteen U.S. bases already surround Venezuela


Just to be sure, let’s count them:
  • Central America:
In the Republic of El Salvador there is the military base Comalapa, a Forward Operating Location (FOL.) In the Republic of Honduras there is base Soto Cano, in Palmerola. In Costa Rica the U.S. owns military base Liberia, while in Panama, though there is no military base, there is the former School of the Americas, now repositioned at Fort Benning, GA. The old school in Panama is now called the “Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation,” and it is where U.S. mercenaries are trained.
  • South America
In Colombia, the U.S. already has three military bases. The first is Arauca, devised to “fight” drug trafficking in Colombia. However, it is used in fact as a strategic point to monitor the oil producing areas, particularly Venezuela. The military base in Larandia is a U.S. helicopter base. It also has a landing strip for B-52 bombers. The base at Tres Esquinas works for terrestrial, tactical helicopter, and fluvial operations, besides being a strategic point from which to attack the FARC. This is a permanent base and receives U.S. weapons and logistics. It is also used to train combat troops.

The Republic of Peru has within its territory two U.S. military bases: Iquitos and Nanay. The government insists that these bases belong to the Peruvian armed forces. However, they were built by the U.S. and are used by U.S. soldiers who operate on the fluvial area of Nanay, at the Peruvian Amazon.

In the Republic of Paraguay, there is a base at Mariscal Estigarribia, Departmento Boquerón, in the Paraguayan Chaco region. It has existed since May 2005.
  • The Caribbean
The main base, and the oldest, is the Naval Base of Guantanamo, located near Santiago de Cuba, on the island of Cuba, existing due to a 107-year-old agreement with a former Cuban government.

In Puerto Rico, Free Associated State to the United States, there is the base at Vieques, with its own controversial history.

Aruba has a U.S. base at Reina Beatriz; Curacao’s base is called Hatos.

And there will be more! The U.S. aims to build in the future four additional Latin American bases: in Alcantara, Brazil; Chapare, Bolivia; Tolhuin, Departmento Tierra del Fuego, Argentina; and one in the area that is known as the Triple Frontier, at the borders of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay.

President Chavez, just because you’re paranoid, it doesn’t mean they aren’t out to get you and your country’s OIL!

-- md
  • For previous articles by Marion Delgado about the U.S. military presence in Columbia, go here.
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23 November 2009

Honduras : The 'Election' and the Resistencia

Above,“Golpistas: Here Is Your Vote.” Rebelión poster. Demonstration against electoral campaign, Intibucá. Photo from Indymedia Honduras.

Micheletti prepares for election;
Moves against boycott, resistance


By David Holmes Morris / The Rag Blog / November 23, 2009

With a nod of approval from the U.S. State Department, the de facto president of Honduras, Roberto Micheletti, has announced he will take a leave of absence from office beginning on November 25 and will return on December 2, the day the country’s legislature is scheduled to convene to decide whether Manuel Zelaya should be reinstated to the presidency.

State Department spokesman Robert Wood said at a press briefing on November 20 that Micheletti’s leave will “allow some breathing space for the process in Honduras to go forward” and will “allow for the people of Honduras to focus on the elections,” to be held on Sunday, November 29.

“Micheletti hasn’t resigned,” Zelaya declared. “This is a crude maneuver, a blunder of his that stains the electoral process, that stains Honduran democracy.” And Patricia Rodas, foreign minister in the Zelaya government, warned that the golpista regime may be planning covertly to incite disorder in the country during his absence so that Micheletti can return to office early in order to make a show of restoring order, thus saving the country from the violence of anti-coup forces.

“If there should be some general disturbance of order and security that threatens the peace of the nation and the security of the Honduran people,” Micheletti declared when he announced his leave, “let there be no doubt... that I will resume my duties immediately and will order vigorously and firmly whatever measures are necessary to guarantee order.”

In the meantime, resistance to the golpista government and rejection of the elections inside Honduras and elsewhere continue unabated. As announced by the Frente de Resistencia contra el Golpe de Estado, the umbrella organization opposing the coup government, demonstrators have hindered candidates from holding campaign rallies, especially in poor and working class areas, where opposition to the coup is strongest. In particular, in the towns of La Esperanza and Intibucá, in a mountainous area of western Honduras, anti-coup residents recently prevented altogether a rally for Partido Liberal presidential candidate Elvin Santos.

The golpista government has threatened proponents of a boycott of the elections with severe reprisals. Micheletti has said anyone advocating publically for abstention will be prosecuted and that “those who create or advocate or attempt to advocate disturbances at the polling places will be dealt with seriously and severely in accordance with the law.”

Micheletti has also attempted to silence Zelaya. “Instead of inciting violence and threatening the electoral process and its results,” he warned publicly, “I urge don José Manuel Zelaya Rosales to reflect as a Honduran and I invite him to observe a prudent silence between now and December 2, during the electoral process and the vote in Congress.”

A number of candidates for local offices, including many aligned with the Partido Liberal, the party of both Manuel Zelaya and Roberto Micheletti, have withdrawn from the race in protest of the coup. The leftist Partido Unificación Democrática, which has opposed the coup consistently, nevertheless decided recently not to withdraw from the race as a party, although a number of individual candidates have done so.

Honduran human rights groups report that employers are threatening to fire workers who do not vote.

In anticipation of the elections, the government has reportedly added 5,500 army reservists to the 12,000 military personnel and 14,000 members of the national police already patrolling the streets and has increased its public displays of military force, particularly in those residential areas where opposition to the coup government is strongest.

The government has instructed hospitals to prepare for an increase in patients in the next few days by emptying the wards of patients who can be discharged safely and by postponing elective surgeries.

According to La Jornada of Mexico City, the Honduran armed forces have been instructing mayors throughout the country to report leaders of the resistance living in their towns.

Outside Honduras, the United States and Panama appear to be the only countries willing to recognize the elections as legitimate, with suggestions that the U.S. will send election observers now that Micheletti has announced his leave of absence. On the continent, in addition to the Organization of American States, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Ecuador have all denounced the elections as illegitimate.

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21 November 2009

Val Liveoak : Remembering the 'Tope' in El Salvador

Mural at the University of Central America in San Salvador depicts martyred Jesuit priests and suggests complicity of the nation’s business and political leadership.
Slain Jesuit priests honored in El Salvador

In El Salvador, six Jesuit priests are being honored twenty years after their murders by the U.S.-backed Salvadoran military. On Monday [November 16, 2009], the priests were bestowed the nation’s highest civilian award, marking the first time the Salvadoran government has honored the priests since their deaths. In a ceremony attended by the priests’ families, Salvadorian President Mauricio Funes said his country is “pulling] back a heavy veil of darkness and lies to let in the light of justice and truth.” -- Democracy Now (see story below)
Twenty years later:
Remembering the 'Tope'
A time of fear in El Salvador


By Val Liveoak / The Rag Blog / November 21, 2009

I lived in El Salvador from August 1986 to September 1990. I worked on a Catholic parish team in a small town in the eastern part of the country, training village health promoters.

Our town in northern Usulatán was very isolated, literally the end of the road, with nothing beyond it but mountains and the unpatrolled border with Honduras. But in November 1989 we joined the whole country in the time of fear and danger called the “Tope” -- the “final offensive” of the FMLN, the rebel guerrillas.

Most of the fighting was in the larger cities, with street fighting especially in San Salvador’s poor neighborhoods. The guerrillas expected that the population would rise up in support of their offensive, and that they would thus win the long civil war against the government. As it turned out, that didn’t happen in numbers sufficient to turn the tide, and the war continued for another two years.

We had little news, and being far from most of the action, were spared the worst of the struggle. We’d get some radio news, from the FMLN’s clandestine station, and occasionally from Voice of America or BBC. We knew about the simultaneous U.S. attack on Panama City as the army went in to arrest the then president, Manuel Noriega. But all the highways were shut down by a paro, a traffic blockade enforced by the guerrillas on a national level. And phone and electric lines were cut, too. There was no way to know what was happening to our friends in other places, nor to let them know how we were doing.

The offensive went on for many days. We could hear sporadic artillery in the next town over, but our town remained quiet, although government soldiers from a large garrison in town were out patrolling. We probably continued our visits to outlying villages 2-3 times a week since we went on foot anyway. But mainly we hunkered down and waited it out.

On the morning of Nov. 16, the news came that the six Jesuit priests and their housekeeper and her daughter had been found shot execution style at their house at University of Central America, the UCA. We struggled with fear since we also lived in a parish house, beside the church. Would more priests, nuns and lay workers be targeted? Would there be men who would come in the night for us?

During that time we had a young Salvadoran man from the capital working with us. He had been an active member of popular organizations in his poor neighborhood. He became filled with fear for his safety when the radio announced the death of a near relative in the fighting. He quickly decided to flee the country, and began the perilous trip by land to exile in the U.S. The last we heard, he was living as an undocumented worker in Los Angeles.

After over two weeks of fighting, things finally calmed down and the guerrillas went back to the hills. After the traffic blockade was lifted, we went into the capital to see how others in our program were doing, to call home and let people know we were ok.

Our friends had had to flee the house where our volunteers stayed since it was in the crossfire when people in the house next door began firing at soldiers in the streets. To find safety, they went to the Hilton where the international press stayed, and we shared the room there with four or five other volunteers for a few days. (The Hilton may not have been all that safe—one journalist found rifle shells pressed under his door, a not so subtle threat.)

On the TV there we watched CNN tell the story of our colleague who had been arrested by the Salvadoran police and charged with having weapons buried in her yard, which she denied. Senator Christopher Dodd and other from the U.S. intervened, and after more than a week, she was released from jail and deported. But as an aside to that story, then Undersecretary of State Elliot Abrams said, “Well, we know that some of the U.S. citizens who claim to be missionaries support the guerrillas.” I’ll never forget my outrage -- I shouted at the TV, ”Why not just paint targets on our backs!”

After the fighting, the destruction and the killing, things settled back into an uneasy calm in the city. Soldiers and police patrolled the streets, arms at the ready. Cleanup began, and the last of the burials took place. Death threats and oppression of the opposition continued. There were sporadic battles in the rural area. In our town, the soldiers patrolled and noisily trained in the early mornings right outside the church. Everyone kept their heads down a little lower. The memorial chapel for the Jesuits was built and regular services were held there. Life, such as it is during a war, went on.

[Texan Val Liveoak is a nonviolent activist, currently living in El Salvador and San Antonio. She coordinates Peacebuilding en las Americas, the Latin American Initiative of Friends Peace Teams that also has programs in the African Great Lakes region and in Indonesia.]

Demonstrators in San Salvador in 2008 hold banners depicting six Jesuit priests massacred in 1989 in El Salvador. Photo by Edgar Romero / AP.
In Landmark Ceremony,
El Salvador Honors Slain Jesuit Priests


November 18, 2009

In El Salvador, six Jesuit priests are being honored twenty years after their murders by the US-backed Salvadoran military. On Monday, the priests were bestowed the nation’s highest civilian award, marking the first time the Salvadoran government has honored the priests since their deaths. In a ceremony attended by the priests’ families, Salvadorian President Mauricio Funes said his country is “pulling] back a heavy veil of darkness and lies to let in the light of justice and truth.” El Salvador’s defense minister also announced the military is ready to ask for forgiveness and open its archives to a long-sought investigation. The Jesuits had been outspoken advocates for the poor and critics of human rights abuses committed by the ARENA government. They were killed on November 16, 1989, when a military unit entered the Central American University campus and shot them to death. The priests’ housekeeper and her daughter were also killed in the attack. The current head of the university, Priest Jose Maria Tojeira, welcomed the posthumous recognition.

Priest Jose Maria Tojeira:
Many people from all parties—of course, ARENA, as well—said the priests were great men who helped to end war before, because their martyrdom pushed to accelerate peace talks. But never in twenty years has there been an official word of recognition for these people’s dignity. This is the first time, and I think it’s a very important symbol that should be opened to all victims from El Salvador.
The order to kill the priests is widely believed to have come from senior ARENA party and military leaders, but no high-ranking official has ever been charged

Source / Democracy Now
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17 November 2009

U.S.-Colombia Treaty : Yanks Prepare to Party Down

Top, Chiva party bus Cartegena: Party down. Below, "The Yanks are Coming!"

The new Colombian war:
Nature of U.S. incursion still unclear

The new U.S. air base in Palanquero... will 'expand expeditionary warfare capability' and 'improve global reach' for 'conducting full spectrum operations...'
By Marion Delgado / The Rag Blog / November 17, 2009

CARTAGENA DE INDIES, Colombia -- THEY’RE HERE! A scant nine days after the U.S. and Colombia signed a new military pact, I saw the first of Gawd-knows how many U.S. troops assigned to this country, right in front of my pad. I had gone to the local corner store to sit at one of the couple of tables out front, watch the street life, and sip an Aguila, the local Budweiser type of beer.

I saw them coming fifty meters up the block, four of them, with a local young lady who I recognized in tow. They wore U.S. casual clothes, three had well-shined military footwear, and all had the appropriate haircuts. As they drew closer I could hear their hometown English. They were looking for something, swiveling their heads, searching up and down the block. They stepped into the tienda to ask directions. One of them spoke language school Spanish, devoid of idioms, slang or any discernible accent. He asked where they could catch the Chiva bus.

The Chiva is a “party bus." For 30,000 COP (about $15) one can board, get a bottle of cheap rum and a Coca-Cola, a drum or set of maracas, and be toured around the city, accompanied by very loud music and a lot of drunken yelling, for about an hour. The clerk pointed across the street and advised them that the bus comes every half hour. The troops looked like they were enjoying their new status. The newly-inked treaty gives U.S. military personnel diplomatic immunity from arrest by Colombian authorities.

While the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá says the new agreement, providing for expanded U.S. access to Colombian military bases, goes into force immediately, a Colombian court ruling finds the agreement is "broad and unbalanced" in favor of the U.S. Indeed: the agreement puts no limits on the number of U.S personnel to be deployed in Colombia or the number of military bases they could use.

The Colombian State Council said in its ruling that the agreement gives the U.S. the power to decide what operations will occur, gives immunity to U.S. troops, allows access to bases beyond the seven named in the agreement's text, and defers other important questions about military operations to future "operational agreements." The Council reviewed 15 prior treaties and declarations cited by President Alvaro Uribe’s government as the foundation for the new base pact, and found that none offer a basis for stationing U.S. troops or US. use of Colombian bases.

It concludes that the agreement is a treaty, and therefore must be approved by the Colombian Congress and reviewed by the Constitutional Court. Foreign Minister Jaime Bermúdez, in signing the deal, had said the government would bypass such formalities.

The new U.S. air base in Palanquero, 120 miles north of Bogota, will "expand expeditionary warfare capability" and "improve global reach" for "conducting full spectrum operations,” according to a newly disclosed Pentagon document submitted to the U.S. Congress. The document describes South America as "a critical sub-region of our hemisphere where security and stability is under constant threat from narcotics-funded terrorist insurgencies, anti-US governments, endemic poverty, and recurring natural disasters." The document seemingly contradicts well-publicized claims by U.S. Ambassador William Brownfield that soldiers based in Colombia will "never, never, never" participate in armed operations, and that the base agreement doesn't allow operations outside Colombian territory.

The embassy uses the guise of the discredited “drug war” in all of its statements, as if that would add legitimacy to this invasion of Colombia.

President Evo Morales of Bolivar recently criticized this tactic. Morales spoke of his experiences as a coca grower and union leader facing the brunt of U.S. militarization. "I witnessed this," he said, when describing the repression. "So now we're narcoterrorists. When they couldn't call us communists anymore, they called us subversives, and then traffickers, and since the September 11 attacks, terrorists," Morales said. "The history of Latin America repeats itself."

Meanwhile in this country, the war heats up. In Departamento Valle del Cauca, whose principal city is Cali, the ARC Pacific Naval Base at Malaga is one of the bases where the U.S. will build its naval port. On the afternoon of November 10, a firefight broke out in the area between a unit of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and troops allied with the Bogotá government. Nine Bogotá troops were killed and three wounded. There was no report of FARC casualties. This morning, November 12, the army announced a movement of 2,500 troops to the area. They claim that FARC killed three women and a child as well as nine soldiers.

Also today, Uribe claimed that Venezuela had declared war on Colombia! A check with Venezuelan and international television sources produced no confirmation of such a declaration; perhaps it was just a figure of speech on Uribe’s part.

The army also announced the capture of 19 FARC members in the departmentos of Santander, Antioquia, and Meta. Such announcements are an almost daily occurrence.

Taxpayers: Know your U.S. Columbian properties!


Today’s Featured Base: Palanquero

Palanquero is already one of the major air fields in Colombia. The US is spending $46,000,000ºº right this minute to develop it as a fully functioning 135,000 square meter airfield with runways 10,000 feet in length. It will be administered by the U.S. Southern Command. The Colombian Air Force (COLAF) will base high tech communications intercept airplanes there, paid for, of course, by U.S. taxpayers.
  • For previous articles from Columbia by Marion Delgado, go here.
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15 November 2009

Furor in Colombia : The Yanks are Still Coming

Venezuela Pres. Hugo Chavez addresses rally in Caracas, Friday, Nov. 13, 2009, protesting U.S.-Columbia military agrement. Photo by Fernando LLano / AP.

The U.S. Invasion of Colombia:
Touching all the bases


By Marion Delgado / The Rag Blog / November 15, 2009

CARTEGENA DES INDIES, Colombia -- The furor over a newly-signed agreement between the U.S. and Colombian governments continues, with denunciation of what was signed on Oct. 30 from all sides.

I must say “what was signed” because as of now it is being called many different things. There is a category four bullshit storm blowing across most of South America. “What it is” seems as much in doubt as “what is in it.” At various times it is described as a U.S. pact, an agreement, the pact, security pact, or as an addendum to an existing agreement; each description is then negated by a critic or a supporter and a substitute term inserted.

Last August, U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton said, “The United States does not have and does not seek bases inside Colombia." Maintaining that line this week, State Department spokesman Ian Kelly told reporters the agreement "doesn't provide us with any kind of bases in Colombia. It provides us with an opportunity to cooperate with Colombia in some issues related to counternarcotics and interoperability in that regard."

However, that doesn’t quite jibe with a U.S. Defense Department document that stated the U.S. military will not only have access to Colombian military bases, but also be able to use major international civilian airports. While we will attach to existing bases, we will build our own sections. This is already started with a $46 million dollar expansion of a runway at Palanquero Air Base in Puerto Salgar, Cundinamarca. June 15th the U.S. State Department authorized a contract worth almost a half million dollars to expand warehouses at Tolemaida.

According to reported provisions, U.S. military personnel and defense contractors will also enjoy diplomatic immunity in Colombia. But President Alvaro Uribe's conservative government says there will be "no impunity" for any crimes committed by the U.S. military, insisting the agreement commits Washington to investigate and punish such cases. "The agreement includes such important things [as]… no U.S. jurisdiction or courts martial in Colombia, or that Colombia may participate in investigations conducted against American officials," added Colombian Foreign Minister Jaime Bermudez.

Immunity for U.S. soldiers in Colombia raises hackles because a U.S. soldier and contractor reportedly raped a 12-year-old Colombian girl inside Tolemaida military base in 2006, dumping her outside the gates in the morning. The two alleged rapists remain free and returned to the U.S. without facing any charges. U.S. soldiers in Colombia reportedly committed 37 acts of sexual abuse from 2006 to 2007.

U.S. Ambassador to Colombia William Brownfield, one of the signatories, said the pact "updates" and "modernizes" agreements already in place between the two countries, signed in 1952, 1962, and 1974. The new 10-year deal allows the U.S. military to use seven bases in strategically located Colombia, which shares borders with Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, and Panama, and boasts both Pacific and Caribbean-Atlantic ports.

The agreement caused early concern not only among neighboring countries, but among inhabitants of Colombia, because its details were not known, nor was the Colombian Congress consulted. An August meeting of concerned South American countries called the previous U.S.-Colombia agreement “extra-regional interference” and an act of imperialism. The Colombian government refused to give details of the agreement because it was not signed yet and because it was “a reserved matter according its sovereignty.”

After the signing, Bermudez said the exact text of the agreement would be announced in one week, in a letter to foreign ministers of the nations concerned. Well, that was last week’s news; it didn’t happen. Now Bermudez promises to release it to the countries “involved,” this week.

As of November 9, 2009, four Colombian bases had been confirmed as part of the new deal. They are:
  1. Apiay Air Force, assigned to Colombian Air Force Aerial Combat Command 2 also hosts members of the Colombian Army and Colombian Navy; it is located near the city of Villavicencio, Departmento (state) Meta, in central Colombia;
  2. Malambo Naval Airbase, near Puerto Salgar, Departamento Atlántico, on the Caribbean Coast; South of the city of Baranquilla in Departmento Atlantico;
  3. Palanquero Air Base in, Departamento Cundinamarca; half way between Bogotá and Medellín; and
  4. The Pacific Naval Base at Bahía Malaga, Departamento Valle del Cauca, equidistant from the borders of both Panama and Ecuador. It is home to the Colombian Pacific fleet.
Three bases yet to be confirmed but strongly suspected by this writer to be included are:
  1. Tolemaida, the Army training base at Nilo, Departamento Cudinamarca. You can Google-Earth it and take a look for yourselves 4 degrees 14’ 38” N and 74 degrees 38’ 43” W;
  2. Larandia Air Force Base, located in Caquetá, southern Colombia, shared by the Colombian National Army, the Colombian National Police (DAS), and the Colombian Air Force; and
  3. The naval base in Cartagena, Departmento Bolívar, home to the Armada Republica de Colombiana (ARC) Atlantic fleet.
The U.S. and Uribe both say the agreement will help Colombia deal more effectively with drug gangs and left wing rebel groups. One problem with that is that Hugo Chavez’ neighboring Venezuela and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are characterized (FARC by the U.S. government; the Venezuelan government in Congress; and both, routinely, by Uribe’s government) as both terrorists and drug dealers.

The FARC has responded to the newly-inked agreement. In a communiqué to Colombian military of honor and the people in general, FARC urges them to defend Colombia’s sovereignty and Latin American dignity, both "deeply tarnished with disgrace, blood, corruption and servility by President Alvaro Uribe."

The group says that, without even blushing, since he lacks any dignity, Uribe accepted the installation by the Empire of seven military bases in Colombia in an act of high treason, “a poisoned dagger plunged into the body of the Latin American Homeland, with its tip hurting the very heart of [the continent].”

The guerrillas add that the only objective of the agreement is to thwart the democratic, pro-integration process of the peoples who, led by the Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA), have continued the unfinished liberation project started by Simon Bolivar, South America’s Liberator.

Asi es en Colombia hoy...

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08 November 2009

Surprise! : Betrayal in Honduras as 'Golpistas' Ignore Accord

Manuel Zelaya closes a window at the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa. Photo from AFP.

Celebration was premature;
United States expresses 'disappointment'
...negotiating with the golpistas for reinstatement of the democratically elected president is like negotiating with thieves for the return of stolen property.
By David Holmes Morris / The Rag Blog / November 8, 2009
See David Morris' translations of articles by Arturo Cano and Pablo Ordaz, Below.
Within a week of the signing of the agreement that was to end the four-month political crisis in Honduras, the de facto government has betrayed its purpose and the constitutional government has given it up as one last failed attempt to undo the coup d’état.

The Tegucigalpa/San José Accord, signed on October 29, was the result of three weeks of negotiation between representatives of de facto president Roberto Micheletti and democratically elected President Manuel Zelaya. It appeared at first to solve the thorny issue of Zelaya’s restitution by approving it in principle and leaving final approval to the country’s unicameral legislature, thus confirming, symbolically at least, that Zelaya had been removed from office in a coup d’état and not as punishment for criminal acts, as the coup government had claimed.

But delaying resolution of the crisis until after the November 29 elections has been the golpistas’ plan all along and the congressional leadership was more than willing to further the plan. It decided to consult with the Supreme Court and several other institutions before calling a special session of the legislature to consider restitution, a process that could easily stall any action until the next president is elected three weeks from now. The Accord did not establish a deadline for restitution.

In the meantime, Micheletti ceremoniously fulfilled the letter of another provision of the Accord by forming, unilaterally, a government of “national unity and reconciliation” by the deadline established in the Accord. Zelaya refused to submit names for the new government because, he argued, the spirit, if not the letter, of the Accord called for him, as constitutional president, to preside over such a government. Zelaya calls Micheletti’s move crass manipulation, dismisses the Accord as a failure and calls for boycotting the elections and for protests in the streets to continue.

What is left unsaid in official circles is that negotiating with the golpistas for reinstatement of the democratically elected president is like negotiating with thieves for the return of stolen property.

Journalist Arturo Cano has been reporting on events in Honduras for La Jornada of Mexico City since the crisis began. The following is my translation of an article of his published on November 6. Following that is an article from El País of Madrid by Pablo Ordaz about ordinary people in Honduras struggling to survive in bad and worsening circumstances.

Zelaya declares that 'the Accord is now worthless'
TEGUCIGALPA, Nov. 6, 2009 -- The golpistas say everybody condemns them because nobody knows what was really going on in Honduras before June 28. Last week, when everybody thought they knew, as they celebrated the signing of an agreement that, according to news media all over the world, would end more than four months of crisis, it turned out that the golpistas were right: nobody knows what is going on in Honduras.

How else can we explain why, a week after the Tegucigalpa/San José Accord was signed, the United States feels “disappointed” and the Organization of American States “deplores” the “disruption” of compliance with the Accord?

From Washington, OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza urges Roberto Micheletti and Manuel Zelaya to reach an agreement on the government of “unity and reconciliation,” which “should be presided over, naturally, by the person the Honduran people elected to carry out the duties of the president of the republic.”

The Union of South American Nations demands the “immediate restitution” of Zelaya and the foreign ministers of Latin America and the Caribbean condemn golpista Micheletti’s unilateral appointment of a cabinet of “national unity.”

The de facto president doesn’t even lose his composure. Night falls in the midst of warnings of the “imminent” appointment of the new cabinet and of threats against anyone daring to organize a boycott of the electoral process.

In practical terms, the only opinion that matters to the de facto government is broadcast time and again on the official television channel: an interview with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shannon, who says Zelaya’s restitution, or otherwise, is the “business of Hondurans.” News shows on the private channels also play it over and over again.

Micheletti appears on television with renewed vigor, happy, accompanied by all his officials, those who are leaving and those who are staying, since even his own office has leaked the names of the ministries in which there will be no change: the ministries of the presidency, foreign affairs, finance, agriculture, defense and security.

Twenty-three days before they are to occur, the elections are the topic of the headlines and of most of the space in all the news media. The golpista government and the media owners who support it don’t doubt that the United States will recognize the elections. By their priorities, the rest of the countries of the world are in a distant second place.

The zelayistas and all those who celebrated the Accord a week ago had placed their trust in the existence of “two Accords, one written and one understood,” Marvin Ponce of the Partido Unificación Democrática explained three days after the signing. “The businessmen and the politicians who orchestrated the coup accepted Zelaya’s restitution because otherwise they would be back at point zero. Now we’ll see whether there is the political will.”

Demonstrators supporting Manuel Zelaya shout slogans in Tegucigalpa, Nov. 2, 2009. Photo by Eduardo Verdugo / AP.

Congress received the document, which had been signed on October 30, on Monday, November 2. Its governing board, controlled by Micheletti’s congressmen, decided on its own to consult the Supreme Court and three other institutions. The justices didn’t receive the petition until Thursday the fifth. “We have acted with the greatest diligence,” says congressional chairman José Alfredo Saavedra.

“The measures agreed to in the Accord are clear and were endorsed freely by all the parties. I would hope that they will be implemented without further evasion in order to re-establish democracy, institutional legitimacy and harmony among Hondurans,” Insulza declared in a statement issued from the U.S. capital.

They don’t see it that way here. “I don’t know why they signed that. They left their flanks exposed,” says a leader of the resistance, his head bowed, his face revealing the mood of the zelayistas, still in the streets for the 131st day since the coup d’état.

The Frente de Resistencia meets again in front of Congress, which isn’t meeting, and then more than 500 people march to the area of the Brazilian embassy, where President Zelaya is in refuge.

“I don’t want Afghan elections for my country,” the constitutional leader tells Radio Globo. “I’m not willing to legitimize fraud or to legitimize the imposition of power or to whitewash this coup d’état.”

His followers in the streets radicalize the discourse: “It’s not a simple matter of not voting. Just as they took the ballot boxes from us (for the poll on the Constituent Assembly) on June 28, we must take the ballot boxes from them as well,” says indigenous leader Salvador Zúñiga.

Although some of the zelayistas, particularly those who are members of the Partido Liberal, hold to the idea of “not leaving the whole cake for the golpistas,” the more active organizations in the resistance have decided not to endorse “the electoral fraud.” From this day forward, “politicians are forbidden from entering our neighborhoods and communities and we are going to forbid them from setting up polling places,” Zúñiga says.

Zelaya, for his part, declares that “the Accord is now worthless” and he rejects it as a failure. His representatives nevertheless still hold meetings with OAS officials, although without much hope for a solution.

The president reaches out again to the continental community. “Let them reach the decisions they consider suitable,” he says of the members of the OAS.

But the voice that matters most sticks with the talks, which favor the golpistas. Ian Kelly, spokesman for the State Department, urges the parties to return to the negotiating table to work out their differences.

“A unilaterally decided government is not a government of unity,” he says of Micheletti’s move. “They have to sit down and start talking again. They need to stop making dire statements that the agreement is dead,” he blurts out against Zelaya. “We’re disappointed that both sides are not following this very clear path which has been laid out in this accord.”

He confirms for certain that Washington is giving technical assistance for the November 29 elections, which will continue as long as “the paties respect and implement this accord, step by step.”
And Pablo Ordaz, a correspondent in Tegucigalpa for the Madrid daily El País describes how the coup has changed the lives of one family. Below is my translation of his article for November 7.

Ángel David’s life, which hadn’t been good, began to get worse

Angel David and his mother show scar from police gunshot wound. Photo from El Pais.
TEGUCIGALPA, Nov. 5, 2009 -- Since before the coup, Ángel David has lived in this neighborhood in Tegucigalpa where the only green, level ground is in the cemetery, so the kids take advantage of a hole in the wall to play soccer or hide-and-seek among their grandparents’ graves. Ángel David’s outlook wasn’t very promising. He shared eight square meters in a wooden shanty with his father, an out-of-work gardener, his mother, newly pregnant with her fifth child, and his brothers, the oldest 16 and the youngest two. They hadn’t had a bathroom since the last storm washed it down the hill, but they did have electricity and a telephone, a good upbringing and miraculously clean clothes.

But the coup came along and Ángel David’s life, which hadn’t been good, began to get worse. His country, the second poorest in Latin America, became the object of sanctions by the international community and its 70 percent poor (40 percent getting by on less than a dollar a day) became even more helpless. Ángel David’s father found ever less work. His mother, ever less money to juggle. And he, ever fewer hours in school. As though that were not enough, on the days when Roberto Micheletti’s government declared a curfew, they all had to take off running for fear of the police. They got home on time every day, until September 21.

On that day a rumor spread throughout Honduras that President Manuel Zelaya had managed to return in secret to his country. To celebrate, his supporters called for rallies in different areas of Tegucigalpa and Ángel David’s father decided to attend the one in the February 21st Colonia, next to his own neighborhood. On the way home, as the hour of the curfew approached, they took a shortcut through an alley. They were startled by the noise of a motorcycle approaching them. They turned around. There were two policemen riding it. The one in back aimed at them.. Five shots were heard. Ángel David, 13 years old, fell to the ground. With a gunshot wound in his back.

A month and a half has gone by. The taxi driver makes his way into the June 23rd Colonia. The vehicle can hardly move along among the rocks -- the only paved street is long gone -- and for fear of the groups of boys hanging out on the corners. At a certain point we can’t go on by car. His mother, Nelly Rodríguez, invites us into her only room, which is orderly and clean, and proudly introduces her sons, who are well brought up and well dressed. Her account of what happened is exact and concise and it portrays with no embellishment the reality of Honduras since the coup. “My husband and my sons were walking along, and the police could see that there were two children, but even so they shot at them. The bullet injured his intestine, his colon, his spleen, his liver and part of his lung too. Show the gentleman the scar.”

Ángel David stands up obediently. He has the mark of the gunshot on his back and a large scar from the surgery. What did you feel at that moment? “Agony, sir.” And pain? “That too.” And did you lose consciousness? “Yes.” What is agony? “Thinking that you’re going to die.” And were you afraid? “Yes.” And did you cry? “No.”

Nelly Rodríguez continues her account. “They performed an emergency operation. He almost died. The operation lasted three hours and he was in a coma for about five days. Until finally he opened his eyes and began to talk to me. He had oxygen and many drugs that they gave him at the teaching hospital. But since they didn’t have all the drugs he needed, we had to buy them ourselves. They didn’t even have needles or adhesive tape or cotton. Not even plasma.”

What followed reveals the degree to which defenders of the coup have persecuted those who resist. “One day a public prosecutor came and told me, ‘Look, I work for the rights of minors and you are at risk of losing your children because it wasn’t the policeman who shot at him who is to blame for what happened to your son, it is you.’ She told me I was the guilty one.” Nelly begins to cry, a slow and quiet sobbing that is touching. The kids around her pay attention. “And she told me that while my son was in a coma, right there, by his bed. Yes. She told me the policeman wasn’t guilty, I was.” Nelly was threatened with the loss of her son until the organization COFADEH, which is concerned with the families of the detained and disappeared in Honduras, came to her assistance.

Ángel David’s story is one of hundreds of dramatic cases. According to UNICEF, “1,600 Hunduran children under the age of five have died since June 28, 2009, at the rate of 13 children a day.” Malnutrition and very poor attention to health conditions in the face of epidemics like haemorrhagic dengue are some of the causes. Every day, some 60 children are taken to the Tegucigalpa hospital afflicted with that disease. But there is no means of treating them. All of this in the midst of a wave of violence that leaves 14 dead every day and an endless number of illegal detentions.

It is true that life in Honduras before the coup was not good, but now it is worse. Right, Ángel David?
[San Antonio native David Holmes Morris is an army veteran, a language major, a retired printer, a sometime journalist, and a gay liberationist.]
  • For previous Rag Blog coverage of Honduras, go here.
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