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31 January 2013

Roger Baker : Can TxDOT Avoid Financial Disaster? / 2

Is a change of direction in order? Image from Cypress Creek Mirror.

Agency in denial:
Can TxDOT avoid financial disaster? / 2

By Roger Baker / The Rag Blog / February 1, 2013
"Denial isn't just a river in Egypt." -- Mark Twain
Second of a two-part series.

A glaring example of the Texas Department of Transportation's (TxDOT) denial of financial reality is that they view their roads in a way that confuses their assets with their financial position. This is made clear from TxDOT's 2012 Annual Financial Report (AFR), p 15, where we see this key statement.
Over time, increases and decreases in net assets measures whether TxDOT’s financial position is improving or deteriorating. Overall, the net assets of governmental activities increased by $710.7 million or 1.1 percent from fiscal 2011, primarily due to TxDOT’s continued efforts to maintain, improve and expand the state’s infrastructure network.
This characterizes TxDOT's financial viewpoint of highways as being financially beneficial assets, rather than as maintenance-demanding liabilities. By using construction costs to evaluate TxDOT's financial condition, the more it costs to build a road, the sounder TxDOT's finances are said to be. As we can see elsewhere in the AFR, TxDOT is claiming that the value of all its roads as assets is now about $64 billion, based on construction costs. They are public assets only so long as the public can afford to keep driving; otherwise they become a growing public maintenance burden.

TxDOT's roads are not marketable goods; few if any of its roads are marketable assets. This means that TxDOT appears to have nothing much to offer as collateral, to backstop its growing debt burden, to shield TxDOT against default on their $14 billion accumulation of road bond debt.

Is it possible to regard TxDOT's most traveled roads as collateral; as assets that TxDOT could plausibly sell to someone or some group willing to take them over and to manage them as private toll roads? We know that this is probably not the case because of TxDOT's inability to find a buyer for its CTTP group of Austin area toll roads, which are big money losers.

It is true that a few years back, TxDOT managed to sell the future tolling rights for the southern extension of their SH 130 toll road to a Spanish toll road operator named CINTRA, but those days are past. Freeways have become "costways."


TxDOT's toll roads are big money losers

Under Gov. Rick Perry's first appointee and close political ally, TxDOT Chairman Ric Williamson, TxDOT's philosophy was to try to attract money to build state roads supplemented with private funding as toll roads whenever possible. Williamson's slogan was that henceforth it was to be "toll roads, slow roads, or no roads."

This reflected an early approach to dealing with TxDOT's financial problems, stemming from the refusal of an anti-tax Texas Legislature to raise gas taxes. A decade ago, it was relatively easy to get private bond investors to supplement TxDOT's limited revenues by tolling and collecting fees; it was then anticipated that state toll roads could be profitable when operated as toll roads partially funded with gas taxes.

TxDOT first got into the toll road business with an initial group of toll roads, called the Central Texas Turnpike Project or CTTP. This was subsidized not only with direct TxDOT contributions, but also with a lot of Austin city money for ROW. The latter was demanded by the road lobby as the price to pay for the failure of Austin's 2000 light rail election.

Later on, after TxDOT became aware that its own toll roads were becoming management headaches, TxDOT and the Texas road lobby started actively promoting the establishment of newly authorized outside agencies termed "regional mobility authorities," such as the Austin area's CTRMA. These governmental bodies are able to wheel and deal and promote "public-private partnerships," partially supplemented with TxDOT contributions, but operating with fewer legal restrictions than TxDOT itself. They offer the additional benefit that TxDOT can't be held responsible whenever a RMA's toll road bonds default.

A July 2011 article by Austin American Statesman transportation reporter Ben Wear, reveals that TxDOT's own CTTP toll roads are big money losers, ones that TxDOT would like to sell if they could find a buyer. TxDOT's rather far-fetched selling point is to maintain that better marketing might somehow turn around their toll roads' current losses. TxDOT's "assets," if converted into toll roads, will probably always be money-losing liabilities.
Tolls and other revenue have fallen more than $100 million short of covering debt and operating costs of the state's three-road Central Texas Turnpike System since the highways opened about four years ago. Texas Department of Transportation subsidies almost 70 percent more than originally predicted have made up the difference. Those subsidies, covered primarily by state gasoline taxes that otherwise would be available for other road spending, should average about $38 million a year over the next decade and total about $750 million by 2042, according to TxDOT documents...

"Any dollar that we support that system with is a dollar that is taken out of the state of Texas to build and support other roads," said [TxDOT] Commissioner Ted Houghton of El Paso, who has served on the commission since 2003 and has long advocated such agreements with toll road companies. "We need to get out of that business. Find someone who knows how to market those roads, to operate them and collect the tolls. We do it as a sort of side business."
More recently, TxDOT's refusal to publicly reveal the revenue data on SH 130 , the most prominent of the CTTP toll roads, indicates that the lack of ridership is probably seen by TxDOT as a source of public embarrassment and an impediment to privatization. TURF, an active San Antonio-based anti-tolling group, has publicly announced a boycott of SH 130.


Total Texas and U.S. driving are both in decline, 
with little prospect for recovery

TxDOT doesn't want to admit it, but another important aspect of their institutional denial is the assumption that driving on Texas roads will someday resume its past growth. The reality is that Texans are driving less than they did just a few years ago. The author has already documented this problem and the link to rising energy costs in considerable detail.

Global oil prices have recently been rising rapidly, with little relief in sight. Despite the recent spate of publicity about increasing U.S.energy independence, the reality is that rising oil prices continue to haunt both the U.S. and global economies.

Nationally, an important factor leading to less driving is that the lower income third of the population is struggling to afford to drive at all because of rising fuel prices. We see this from a recent Brooking Institute study showing a strong correlation between car ownership and income level. Likewise, the U.S. population is aging, and older drivers drive less. Meanwhile, the young have become less interested in owning and driving cars.

When driving declines, so do Texas state and federal fuel tax revenues. Fuel taxes are TxDOT's major stable source of road funds, akin to TxDOT's financial oxygen supply. In his introduction to the 2012 AFR, TxDOT Director Wilson, notes that fuel taxes are up: "Motor fuel taxes, TxDOT's primary state funding source, shows a slight increase in fiscal year 2012 over 2011."

However, even this 2.8% increase in TxDOT's fuel tax revenue looks smaller when compared to TxDOT's total budget.

We know that Texas driving is currently decreasing because the FHWA documents total driving on roads in every state. Here are the final revised travel numbers in millions of vehicle miles on all Texas roads for the past six Septembers (the latest month available in 2012).
  • 2007.....19,422
  • 2008.....18,838
  • 2009.....19,730
  • 2010.....20,023
  • 2011.....19,386
  • 2012.....19,377
It is true that driving in Texas has decreased somewhat less than in the rest of the country recently. This is quite likely due to the hydrofracturing (or fracking) boom to the southeast of San Antonio. While the fracking may increase fuel revenue slightly, it is tearing up Texas state and county roads, and these damages on its state roads are being greatly underfunded by TxDOT.
The truck traffic needed to deliver water to a single fracking well causes as much damage to local roads as nearly 3.5 million car trips. The state of Texas has approved $40 million in funding for road repairs in the Barnett Shale region, while Pennsylvania estimated in 2010 that $265 million would be needed to repair damaged roads in the Marcellus Shale region.
And this from an NPR State Impact statement:
“With all the traffic, it’s destroying our roads. Some are already completely destroyed,” says Frio County Judge Carlos Garcia in South Texas. It’s in the heart of the Eagle Ford Shale formation, where oil production from hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” in nearby Karnes County now leads the state.
Public roads, especially those a few decades old, are by nature money losers which require a rising level of maintenance over time to remain useful. Asphalt and diesel costs for road maintenance have risen sharply during the past decade, along with rising oil prices; the crude oil used for making gasoline and diesel has more than tripled in price over the last decade.

Nationwide, driving decreased by about 1.6% in the last year, according to the FHWA TVT data for September 2012, as compared to September 2011; see lower right of this chart. We see that total U.S. driving peaked in 2007, and has fallen roughly 3% over the last five years. This bumpy downward trend line is largely due to a combination of a poor economy and rising fuel costs. Rising fuel costs contributed to the poor economy.

Over the same last five years, U.S. population has been increasing by about .75 % per year, which means a 3.75% U.S. population increase over this time. If you add both trends, per capita U.S. driving decreased nearly 7% in the last five years. People are driving less, while using transit more, except that U.S. urban transit typically isn't very efficiently matched to existing land uses and work trips.

Whither fuel prices? Globally, total liquid fuel supply has been flat since conventional (the old cheap stuff) oil production peaked worldwide about five years ago, and seems unlikely to rise much above 90 million barrels a day. Looking ahead, this implies a continuing recession and higher driving costs.


The rising long-term price of TxDOT's denial

TxDOT's current planning is in denial by being geared toward handling a most unlikely continuation of the rising car and road travel seen in past decades. Any shift away from road building is guaranteed to upset the Texas road lobby; a constellation of the big road contractors, land developers, and engineering firms. Together these comprise some of the most politically powerful interests in Texas, whereas TxDOT is one of the most politicized state agencies in terms of its policies and priorities.

Low density suburban sprawl growth encouraged and subsidized by publicly funded roads is beginning to be recognized as a type of Ponzi scheme. Whenever the rate of new growth slows down, the fact that this kind of growth doesn't pay for itself is revealed by the sorts of funding shortfalls that TxDOT is experiencing now.
In America, we have a ticking time bomb of unfunded liability for infrastructure maintenance. The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) estimates the cost at $5 trillion -- but that's just for major infrastructure, not the minor streets, curbs, walks, and pipes that serve our homes. The reason we have this gap is because the public yield from the suburban development pattern -- the amount of tax revenue obtained per increment of liability assumed -- is ridiculously low.

Over a life cycle, a city frequently receives just a dime or two of revenue for each dollar of liability. The engineering profession will argue, as ASCE does, that we're simply not making the investments necessary to maintain this infrastructure. This is nonsense. We've simply built in a way that is not financially productive.
Arguably, the wisest mode of damage control to remedy its looming fundings shortfalls would be for TxDOT to shift its priorities toward preserving and maintaining at least the most important of its existing roads, including the interstates, non-interstate highways, and toll roads.

TxDOT needs to shift its focus away from planning roads it can no longer afford to maintain, and in the direction of public mobility by increasing the current minimal level of state funding for transit (the feds prefer to fund transit much more than TxDOT does).

Because of budget constraints, people increasingly need to live where TxDOT can still afford to fund and maintain transportation infrastructure and mobility and not a future overwhelmingly based on more cars and roads.

In the future, TxDOT's planning should be geared toward discouraging private vehicle travel. In fact, TxDOT really doesn't have much alternative to moving in that direction, either willingly or unwillingly. To try to continue their current denial of financial and travel demand trends can only make TxDOT's future problems worse.

Bottom line: If you have trouble driving to work, you shouldn't expect much help from TxDOT.

[Roger Baker is a long time transportation-oriented environmental activist, an amateur energy-oriented economist, an amateur scientist and science writer, and a founding member of and an advisor to the Association for the Study of Peak Oil-USA. He is active in the Green Party and the ACLU, and is a director of the Save Our Springs Association and the Save Barton Creek Association in Austin. Mostly he enjoys being an irreverent policy wonk and writing irreverent wonkish articles for The Rag Blog. Read more articles by Roger Baker on The Rag Blog.]

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22 June 2009

Roger Baker : Transportation Politics and the Austin Road Lobby

I-35 in downtown Austin. Photo by noname 77065.

Part 2:
The Austin Road Lobby
Texas transportation politics, the developers and those pesky populist reformers
By Roger Baker / The Rag Blog / June 22, 2009

[This is the second part of a series on transportation in Austin. In the first installment, Baker debunked the myth of growth in Austin traffic congestion. Here he examines the politics of the highway establishment. This was to be a two-part series, but Roger tells us there's more to come.]

How it got to be that way

The Author has been an observer of transportation politics in Austin since about 1979, beginning as a transit advocate, and then observing the sad failure of the Austin Tomorrow Plan; this is still official Austin growth policy but is mostly ignored due to the political influence of special interests tied to land development. While it is convenient to use the term "Road Lobby", in many ways locally it is actually a land development lobby.

Given the strong historical role of real estate in Texas politics, it was almost inevitable that a politically powerful road lobby would evolve. Political corruption involving roads in Texas is a matter of long tradition, dating back to the period soon after the Texas Highway Department was established in 1916. After Texas Gov. James "Pa" Ferguson was impeached for corruption in 1918, his wife "Ma" Ferguson ran and won in 1924 and she became Texas' first woman Governor. Subsequently, road contracting scandals kept her from being reelected in 1926. Here are some details about these early days of Texas road politics:
"...Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the department remained a focal point of Texas politics. The 1924 gubernatorial election of Miriam Amanda Fergusonqv placed the state road agency in a politically precarious situation, since control of construction and maintenance contracts meant potentially lucrative patronage to Ferguson supporters. A legislative enactment passed a year before Ma Ferguson's election staggered the terms of the highway commissioners, and she appointed all three members of the reorganized highway commission. Her appointees soon took political and monetary advantage of a vulnerable road program..."
Later, the road scandals and a relative lack of road money during the depression years caused the Texas Highway Dept to clean up its political act. Dewitt Greer, a celebrated TxDOT director, kept TxDOT politics clean for decades.

The 1950s saw easy federal money for new interstate highways under President Eisenhower, and lots of new road contracts; roads were apparently a permanent growth industry. With the advent of the federal highway trust fund, roads came to be considered a sort of permanent land developer entitlement. See the Texas Monthly link to Griffin Smith's story in Part 1 of this series.

Increasingly since the Carter Administration, notably under Reagan, and up until only a few years ago, most of the federal “social economic and environmental” regulations governing roads became increasingly lax and weakly enforced. As one telling example, CAMPO is self-certified; the feds let CAMPO vote to proclaim they are complying with all the federal law. In effect the foxes get to vote on whether they steal chickens.

Road privatization plus easy credit under lax rules led to new suburban roads being generously proposed to meet future land development projections supplied by the developers themselves. The road lobby thus flourished as a special interest coalition with hundreds of millions of dollars worth of real estate loans at stake. Increasingly TxDOT formed political alliances with the interests that benefited from road-based growth. Rarely if ever have TxDOT Commissioners been appointed on the basis of transportation expertise rather than political or business connections. Meanwhile, in the mid-1980's, public transportation got only about 1% of TxDOT's funds.

The fading of the Sharpstown era building bubble in Houston sent a lot of cash trapped in Texas by intrastate banking law to Austin. The Savings and Loan bubble especially contributed to making Austin a hot growth area in the mid-1980s. It seemed easy to recruit an endless supply of high tech jobs. Some of the land development politics of that era is detailed in Harvy Katz's book Shadow on the Alamo.

These factors all helped to stimulate a big new development boom in the Austin area. Developer lobbyist Ed Wendler Sr. was notably active in lining up political support and votes on the ATS for the "Outer Loop,” or SH 45, a giant ring road proposed to circle Austin. The SH 45 ring road was favored by an influential group of suburban land developers. Soon the road ran into trouble as part of the fallout after the Texas Savings and Loan bust killed off the construction boom. Key developers who had promised to donate free right of way for the Outer Loop went broke in numbers sufficient to delay its construction. Here is how the author reported the situation in July 1986. The end of the mid-1980s Austin growth boom caught nearly everyone who benefited from it completely by surprise. Go here, here, here, and here.

Austin has since seen several boom and bust cycles. Here is how the Austin region land development lobby, tied closely to roads, looked to the author in 1994, in terms of regional growth policy:

Not a lot has changed since the mid-1980s in the way the politics operates, except nowadays the road lobby is now much better organized to resist populist meddling in the affairs of those promoting roads. And the public money is running out fast.

Now, almost a quarter century later, this same Outer Loop, SH 45, has been largely built as pieces under different names. The west side of the loop was always to be the existing Ranch Road 620 and US 71. The east side of the Outer Loop has been constructed as the SH 130 toll road. Two more sections, SH 45 N and SH 45 SE are now open as toll roads. Meanwhile, the road lobby is still trying to build a remaining portion of the loop, SH 45 SW, as a new road over the Edwards Aquifer, but nobody knows where to get the money to build it. Travel demand on the existing segment of SH 45 SW is about flat, but the road lobby hasn't given up. Here is the business media pitch to encourage this SH 45 SW in January 2009, which still assumes the politics can overcome the money problem.

The Austin road lobby now

Texas transportation infrastructure is obviously of key importance to the Texas economy and the TxDOT budget reflects that. TxDOT had learned to depend on a continually growing budget of about $8 billion a year, but that is shrinking and TxDOT is under broad political attack. The major road building decisions in Texas are in essence almost totally political. This is because the governor appoints the TxDOT board that then channels most of the state and federal gas tax money down to the local level; predictably, TxDOT Commission appointments by the Governor have become a traditional political reward.

Meanwhile, TxDOT's gas tax dollars have been falling increasingly short of traditional expectations for more than a decade. TxDOT now usually requires new roads to be "leveraged" by seeking local matching contributions including toll road bonds from those who seek roads. Given this situation, it is understandable that transportation lobbying has become an important part of Texas politics.

Local Austin area lobby groups revolving around real estate now complement TxDOT's old traditional state level allies tied to state road contracts. Between sporadic populist uprisings opposing toll roads, etc., CAMPO's Austin meetings tend to be dominated by well-dressed businessmen representing the many interests that stand to benefit from roads.

The road lobby, sometimes called the highway establishment, is a sort of constellation of allied special interests, with TxDOT at the center. A leading example of a powerful statewide TxDOT-associated lobby is Associated General Contractors, or AGC, a politically active coalition, with many offices across the state.

Texas Good Roads Association. Spend more on roads.

The Texas Good Roads Association tends to focus more on organizing local Texas political support among community leaders and politicians to support spending on roads. It has not been too difficult for a powerful state agency like TxDOT to have its friends line up political support for spending on local roads. Since road funding is a discretionary political decision of the TTC, local governments have learned to either play ball with TxDOT, or lose favor and get no roads:

Always politically active in the background, but ordinarily trying to keep a low profile is the Greater Austin Chamber of Commerce. When exploring groups like this, one should study the memberships of the various boards and committees and subcommittees. Then google the important individuals to get an idea of the many common ties among the lobby groups, hinting at the political dynamics below the surface.

The Real Estate Council of Austin, RECA, has long been active in promoting roads, generally to the exclusion of rail. Dependable and profitable new home construction has been thriving in the suburbs, with the help of publicly funded roads, for the last thirty years in the Austin area. It is how much of the private money is and has been made in the Austin area. As a group representing many of those who depend on and closely represent suburban sprawl growth beneficiaries, RECA can be depended on to turn out its realtors and home builders for contentious road hearings at CAMPO to weigh in on the side of lots of public funds money for roads and toll roads to serve future sprawl development.

There are sometimes road lobby efforts that seem to arise from nowhere. "Take on Traffic" is a local road lobby group funded by none other than the Greater Austin Chamber of Commerce, as you can see from the fine print at the bottom of the following link. This site closely reflects the recent position taken by Sen. Watson in the current legislative session, to support a local option (ten cent gas tax) funding. This is thought to be the best of the politically unpopular options as the state money runs out. What this potential local revenue is intended for is not clear:
"...With troubling news of shortfalls from the federal government and the Texas Department of Transportation, the time has come to allow communities the option to generate additional funding locally for transportation projects to help meet our increasing mobility needs."
The Capital Area Transportation Coalition, pronounced "kat-see,” is a primarily road lobby headed by Bruce Byron who comes to nearly every CAMPO meeting, often to urge more road funds. CATC, like the other branches of the road lobby, actively promotes roads that serve suburban real estate interests, often with the help of the drowning-in-traffic argument:
…More cars, more driving. Right now, there are about four cars for every five people in Central Texas. In five years, there will be at least another 130,000 cars on the road. And those cars are driving farther and longer as the region expands into the surrounding counties. Right now, Central Texans are spending nearly an hour every week -- 51 hours a year -- stuck in traffic, and that figure is rising. And our roads are becoming less safe. Our rate of traffic fatalities is 45% above the national average...
The local business press works hard to perpetuate the ever-increasing-traffic myth, usually also focusing on roads. The Austin Statesman newspaper has had an obvious incentive to be supportive of car-centric transportation solutions, since a large portion of its ad money has historically come from cars and suburban real estate. The local business press like Neighborhood Impact News and the Austin Business Journal have been historically supportive of spending public money on roads to serve proposed low density development.

Here is another example:
...Texas A&M University’s Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) calculates travel delay (the amount of extra time spent traveling due to congestion) in Austin at an index of 1.22, meaning peak hour travel takes an average of 22 percent longer than free flow travel as of June 2004. Today, Central Texas residents spend an additional 52 hours each year in their vehicles because of congestion on our jam-packed roadways. That extra time in our cars, trucks and SUVs costs each of the travelers about $1,000 during the year, which is a higher cost than those commuters in Seattle, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Denver, Phoenix and San Antonio -- all cities much larger in square mile and in population than we are -- endure. We are stuck like Chuck in traffic, and the motors are all running...
Recently, while conspicuously avoiding the funding shortfalls, a common position of the Austin area business press is trending increasingly toward advocating BOTH roads and rail:

Money Problems

Until about 2006, with the help of leveraging such as Texas Mobility Fund borrowing, the road contracting money flowed freely, and TxDOT kept building. Under TxDOT Commission Chair Ric Williamson, TxDOT got pretty sloppy about its finances. Due largely to the Trans Texas Corridor, TxDOT had gotten a reputation for arrogance from rural landowners who saw no benefit from a huge new $185 billion network of roads a quarter mile wide crisscrossing the state. Then TxDOT got wide and unfavorable attention for double counting over a billion dollars in revenue.

District 14 of TxDOT, which handles the Austin area, finally had to admit to CAMPO in late 2007 that its accumulated Austin area road commitments were so great that it was being forced to turn over responsibility for building a bundle of promised new toll roads to the CTRMA, and henceforth concentrate on maintenance.

As Texas Transportation chair Ric Williamson said in May, 2004: "It's either toll roads, slow roads or no roads." TxDOT coordinated closely to help the CTRMA to contract and build its first and only toll road, US 183A. In fact, Regional Mobility Authorities like the CTRMA were being actively promoted and groomed by TxDOT statewide to shoulder the responsibility of funding and building regional toll roads without being subject to the usual state and federal laws applying to TxDOT.

In the case of Austin, TxDOT has used a TxDOT subagency called the Texas Turnpike Authority to build a group of toll roads including SH 130, SH 45 N and SW, and MoPac North. This raises the following question. If TxDOT can build and operate these existing toll roads, then why can't they also build the same ones that they are now expecting the CTRMA to build? Probably this is because the CTRMA can wheel and deal on financing and avoid a lot of existing state law that TxDOT finds burdensome. In fact, the CTRMA appears to coordinate closely with TxDOT on projects like US 290 E. The CTRMA offers legal advantages plus a financial firewall that protects the big dog with deep pockets in the road game, which is TxDOT, from bond holders.

Trains (literally) arrive in Austin.

Rail becomes a factor

Recently, local business interests and politicians (previously anti-rail former Rep. Mike Krusee being one example) have begun to recognize that roads alone cannot meet the anticipated future travel demand, leading them to now support passenger rail. Dallas-area support for expanded rail transit through Sen. Carona was one of the main reasons for Texas Senate support of the local option transportation tax, which failed when HB 300 died in the Texas legislature.

The Central Texas transportation lobby is not a pure road lobby anymore. The ASA rail lobby group now has the favor of key elements of the Austin-San Antonio political establishment, although they don't have much money because TxDOT, under the Texas Constitution, and due to the road lobby, has to spend most of its gas tax money on roads. Furthermore, ASA lives under the thumb of TxDOT, which now regulates rail. ASA managed to get about $8.7 million in new rail planning money from the Texas legislature to keep the doors open, but this is far short of the $1.8 billion or so it will take to move rail freight to the east of IH 35 and unclog the existing line UP line for passenger service.

Nowadays, there is even an Austin-area wing of the political establishment supporting transit; the Alliance for Public Transportation or A4PT (here and here), has joined forces with the road lobby as we can see below. A4PT chair Joe Coffee, is also the Elgin city planner. He was appointed by Sen. Kirk Watson, incidentally an Elgin Frontier Bank co-owner, to CAMPO's Transit Working Group. The Green line is meant to serve transit oriented development in the Elgin area. Coffee seeks to promote rail projects like the Green line to Elgin.
"CATC and RECA have joined with the Austin Chamber of Commerce, Downtown Austin Alliance, and the Alliance for Public Transportation for something more important than the old ‘road verse rail’ battle lines… more local funding and the chance to fight over that later."
Pesky Persistent Populist Reformers

Austin has always had a lot of environmentalists and they decided pretty early, through the Austin Tomorrow Plan, that they did not want any new roads over the Edwards Aquifer. By about 1980 CAMPO's earlier incarnation, the Austin Transportation Study (ATS), had already become a focus of the developer versus environmentalist conflict. When (later Governor) Ann Richards became Travis County Commissioner, she publicly sided with the environmentalists fighting to keep TxDOT, and interested land developers like Gary Bradley, from making MoPac into a second crowded version of the IH 35 now leading to the Edwards Aquifer. Since that era there has been a more or less constant string of battles going on between environmentalists and the increasingly organized road lobby, trying to keep building roads to serve expanding rings of sprawl development.

The road lobby and TxDOT have always been more than happy to blame environmentalists for stopping roads. The truth is that any fair appraisal of the Austin area situation would show that over-optimistic road planning, blind to funding limits, has been a much more important factor. Road opposition has now widened from the early liberal environmentalists, even Earth First! in the early 1990s, to a much broader political spectrum of transportation reform advocates, now active statewide. Everyone can see the existing system is corrupt and badly needs reform, although not everyone can agree on how to fix it.

There is even a documentary video, "Truth Be Tolled.” Lots of rural conservative Republican property owners, Libertarians, and grass roots environmentalists opposed the Trans-Texas Corridor, largely on the basis of opposition organized and supported by web activists David and Linda Stall.

In Austin there is still a strong anti-toll road coalition, partly due to reform politics and Libertarian influence. Muckraker/anti-toll road and skilled media activist Sal Costello played a major role in organizing Austin toll road opposition in 2006 and 2007.

Currently, Terri Hall's TURF group in San Antonio is probably the most active group fighting TxDOT, the road lobby, road taxes, and toll roads:

And the environmentalists remain active, especially in the Austin San Antonio area. As one example, SH 45 SW has been actively promoted as a new road over the Edwards Aquifer to serve new commuters in Hays County who face a lot of congestion getting onto Southern MoPac. But roads like this to serve development over the Edwards Aquifer have always attracted strong opposition from Austin environmentalists. As of now, SH 45 SW is on hold, remaining a magnet for environmentalist opposition, and without a plausible funding source.

Likewise, US 290 W at the "Y" at Oak Hill in Austin is stalled partly by some federally required studies, but more seriously from a lack of money from the CTRMA that has accepted responsibility for rebuilding this road as a toll road. This road is now on the back burner. Likewise the CTRMA's US 290 E toll road is under attack from a swarm of activists. TxDOT approved stimulus funds for building an interchange at US 183, but this toll road would cost about $620 million and most of the funds to build this road are hypothetical. Actual travel demand on both these roads has been flat for years.

Statewide, the opposition to the Trans Texas Corridor became heated enough to make the TransTexas Corridor a campaign issue for former Comptroller Carol Strayhorn. She also wrote an exposé about the politics behind the CTRMA.

Now Perry's big TTC toll road network has even become a prime political target for Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchinson, who is expected to run for governor. United citizen opposition to TxDOT's traditionally heavy handed policies have thus taken a heavy political toll on that agency. TxDOT is now widely unpopular across the state,

In fact, TxDOT came under heavy political attack in the recent session of the legislature, and TxDOT got abolished as a state agency, although a special session will fix that. And they are out of money, unable to issue the $5 billion in bonds authorized by voters. Sen. Carona, promoting a local option fuel tax as part of the ill fated HB 300, held a press conference announcing that TxDOT may have to quit building ALL new roads by 2013. But it gets worse. Austin and San Antonio are both strapped for transportation cash. There is the matter of $5 billion in unissued bonds authorized by Texas voters, That amount was shrunk to $2 billion to make it more politically appealing, but even this did not pass the Texas legislature. Lots more problens detailed here.

The bad news for TxDOT just keeps on coming, and with it much of the future that The Texas road lobby had mapped out before the recent legislative session, much of which was tied to HB 300. If there is any good news for TxDOT and the road lobby, it is probably that Gov. Rick Perry has called a special session of the legislature to save TxDOT from being permanently "sunsetted" into oblivion. Also TxDOT's political clout in the legislature prevented serious reforms called for by the Texas Sunset Commission, like an elected transportation Commission, from being passed with strong support from the Texas House of Representatives. See the Sunset Advisory Commission Staff Report, here:

TxDOT is at this point quite unlikely to regain anything like its former political clout. This is because it is now so politically unpopular, together with the fact that it is essentially broke. Locally the CTRMA's toll road bonds are almost certain to default within a decade or so, due to rising fuel prices due to peak oil.

If the problem facing TxDOT was peak oil alone, it would be bad enough, but now the United States faces complex interacting economic factors tied to peak oil (see here, and here; trying to solve one problem only tends to worsens others, like reducing the strength of the dollar.

See Part 1 of this series: Roger Baker: Austin Drowning in Traffic Growth? Think Again by Roger Baker / The Rag Blog / June 7, 2009

See Roger Baker's earlier Rag Blog articles on Austin transportation here, here, and here.

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01 December 2008

Texas Toll Roads : Feds Must Take Lead

Texas Sen. Kirk Watson at public meeting on toll roads in Austin, September, 2007. Photo by Kelly West, Austin American-Statesman.
Our national transportation infrastructure crisis is now so serious and the funds are so short of the scale of the problem that it is absolutely going to take a comprehensive federal approach rather than a state approach to get anywhere.
By Roger Baker / The Rag Blog / December 1, 2008
See 'Time is Now to Fix Transportation' by Texas senators John Corona and Kirk Watson, Below.
There are a number of questionable assertions in the op ed piece by Texas senators John Corona and Kirk Watson, below, and also some good ones. The devil is in the details.

In essence the article says we need to change our transportation policy, which is true. But the editorial misses its target in one important respect; in light of energy (oil supply and climate-related) constraints and credit market constraints, the change is going to have to be deeper and more dramatic than portrayed here, and should properly be initiated at the national level. A bankrupt Detroit and a frozen bond lending market signify anything but business as usual.

The feds need to take the lead, rather than Texas politicians, who will predictably do too little, too late. We can muddle through at the Texas level, apply band aids, talk about these problems, and anticipate needed changes.

Our national transportation infrastructure crisis is now so serious and the funds are so short of the scale of the problem that it is absolutely going to take a comprehensive federal approach rather than a state approach to get anywhere. A more comprehensive approach which is likely to be coming, in some form, from our new Congress and the new Democratic Administration, whether we like it or not.

On to some details:

The DPS helps keep the big roads safe (everyone passes you on IH 35 if you only drive 5 MPH over the 70 MPH speed limit). What is bad about using our gas tax rather than the general revenue to keep the big roads safe? We end up paying the same no matter where it comes from. Let’s focus on how many dollars we really need rather than which
taxpayer pocket it comes from.

We cannot afford to solve congestion problems by building big new toll roads. Especially if we say, as the editorial does, that we are going to reduce car dependence. We need entirely different and financially constrained planning strategies; at least Detroit can't afford to call the shots so much anymore.

There is certainly no transparency the way the CTRMA is running things, yet Sen. Watson seems to support them and whatever toll road "system" they have in mind in regard to US 290 E, and the other roads they propose.

"Regional financing tools" seems to mean more local bonding authority, but the credit market to supply long range speculative toll road debt has largely collapsed. What then are these tools?

Indexing the gas tax to inflation would have little effect unless it were increased a whole lot, like maybe doubled, which would be VERY unpopular.

"Explore new alternatives" is commendable -- but it should not mean CAMPO-proposed sprawl growth as usual, with roads or even using rail. We can't afford to provide publicly funded infrastructure out to low density suburbs and wherever the land speculators have bought land. We need to shift to either more compact urban growth or perhaps clustered
growth along whatever passenger rail corridors we can actually afford, while increasing rail service with the urban area too. The "rail relocation fund" may not be affordable or make sense in light of current finances. I believe it was proposed to move rail hubs out of the urban areas which might not be wise. We need to preserve our rail lines and restructure its uses, since new rails will not be cheap.

Reforming TxDOT is another good goal. But does that mean supporting the specific TxDOT reforms outlined by the Sunset Commission report on TxDOT or what?

For those who have not seen them yet , here are some additional comments of mine that apply more specifically to the proposed policy changes on US 290 E and the "system" of other Austin-area toll roads initiated by the CTRMA. Changes which CAMPO will consider and perhaps vote on this coming Monday:

Texas Toll Road Soup : The Environment, Federal Funding and Peak Oil by Roger Baker / The Rag Blog / Nov. 28, 2008

COMMENTARY
Carona and Watson: Time is now to fix transportation

By John Carona and Kirk Watson, Texas Senate / November 26, 2008

Texas highways were once the pride of the state — and justifiably so. Our extensive infrastructure allowed generations of farmers and ranchers to feed the state and the world, and it turned our cities into economic powerhouses. Our transportation networks allowed generations of Texans to charge into a prosperous future without having to catch up with the present.

But for a generation, the state has approached old and new transportation challenges in a very different way. We have struggled simply to keep up with our needs. This has left Texas at a critical intersection, and the choices the Legislature makes over the next several months will determine both how we live in the short term and what opportunities our children will inherit.

Texas now faces a transportation crisis. We spend more and more of our lives in traffic instead of with our families. We seldom, if ever, see major roads built without toll booths. And the rail lines and highway lane miles we know we need are being scaled back or scrapped in the face of a hopeless inability to pay for them.

It is only becoming harder to address these needs. The costs of concrete, steel and other basic road building materials have risen by 60 percent over the past five years. However, the state motor fuels tax — our primary source of transportation funding — has been frozen at 20 cents per gallon since 1991. The disparity has left the state facing 21st century challenges with a 20th century tool.

The Texas Lyceum, a group of the state's top thinkers and policy makers, will focus on this issue at its annual public conference in Houston on Dec. 3 (for more information, see http://www.texaslyceum.org/). And in January, the 81st Texas Legislature will begin weighing opportunities to make a meaningful investment in transportation. Here are alternatives that we believe the state must explore:
• End transportation funding diversions. The State Highway Fund has long provided money for the Department of Public Safety and other priorities. We must focus this money on roads and other transportation projects.

• Use bond funding transparently. A year ago, Texans voted to dedicate $5 billion in tax-supported bonds to transportation projects. The Legislature should appropriate this money for its intended purpose and commit to using it with complete transparency and accountability.

• Support regional financing tools. Other than toll roads and privatization schemes, the state has provided few options for cities, counties and other local jurisdictions to pay for transportation. The Legislature should offer voter-approved funding mechanisms for regions to plan and pay for roads, rail lines and other projects.

• Rewrite the gas tax. Texas' primary source of transportation funding cannot provide for the state's transportation needs. The Legislature must have a serious debate about restructuring the motor fuels tax to reflect the enormity of our tasks by indexing it to inflation.

• Explore new alternatives. Texas must move past a 20th century model that relies so heavily on single-occupancy vehicles and work to create a truly comprehensive statewide system for moving people and freight. This should begin by funding the Rail Relocation Fund that voters overwhelmingly approved in 2005.

• Reform the Texas Department of Transportation. With its overt advocacy of privatization and occasional disregard for the Legislature, the department has rightly incurred the wrath of Texans and their representatives. Though we applaud the department's recent efforts to be more transparent and accountable, the Legislature must fundamentally reform the agency so that Texans are fully aware of its activities and never question its objectives.
These changes will not be easy, and they will confound the frequent promises of something-for-nothing. But they are necessary if we are to address the needs we see every day at rush hour — challenges that will only become greater. Our children must not be the first generation of Texans to inherit an inadequate transportation infrastructure with nowhere to grow.

[Carona, R-Dallas, and Watson, D-Austin, are members of Texas Senate.]

Please see Source / Austin American-Statesman
Texas Toll Road Soup : The Environment, Federal Funding and Peak Oil by Roger Baker / The Rag Blog / Nov. 28, 2008

For additional Rag Blog material by Roger Baker on toll roads in Texas, go here.

The Rag Blog

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25 August 2008

Texas : Raiding Pension Funds to Build Toll Roads

Northbound Texas Toll 130 at the Exit 426 off-ramp. This toll road northeast of Austin opened for traffic in 2006.

'An irresponsible and immoral idea"
By Paul Burka / August 23, 2008

I doubt whether Rick Perry, David Dewhurst, or Tom Craddick has ever heard of the Lane Cove Tunnel in Sidney, Australia. If they had, they might not be so eager to raid the teacher and state employee retirement funds to build toll roads.

On the day the Olympics opened (08/08/08), the Sidney Morning Herald carried the news that the tunnel “is rapidly turning into a bottomless pit for its financial backers….” Two credit rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, have warned that the toll road could default on its $1.1 billion debt with a year. The tunnel has suffered three consecutive monthly dropoffs in traffic usage. The estimated usage before the road was built was 100,000 vehicles per day; actual numbers in June and July barely exceeded 50,000. A Standard & Poor’s analyst predicted that unless the project gets fresh capital (at least half a billion dollars), it will default within 10 to 16 months. Perhaps TxDOT, since it is such a believer in such projects, would like to invest.

The problem with the financial wheeling and dealing with retirees’ funds that Perry, Dewhurst, and Craddick have proposed is that toll road projects are risky investments. They are risky for two reasons. One is that they are subject to economic fluctuations that affect people’s driving habits, such as the price of gasoline or the pace of development. The second reason is that, when government is involved, they are vulnerable to political pressure and favoritism. Google “toll road defaults” and you will find a trove of stories with unhappy endings. The Camino Columbia toll road in Laredo, which was rife with political intrigue over which landowners would benefit from having a road go through their property, opened in 2000 and defaulted in 2004. Cost: $90 million. Auctioned off for: $12 million. Tx-DOT bail out acquisition payment: $20 million. The Dulles Greenway toll road to Washington’s Dulles Airport defaulted on its bonds within a year of its opening in 1995. The private owner, Toll Road Investors Partnership II, have lost money every year since the road opened. When toll roads lose money, tolls go up–in this case, to $4.80 by 2012. That works out to an astronomical 35 cents per mile. There are similar stories in Orange County, California (where the state had to buy failing toll lanes), and along Florida’s west coast, and near Richmond, Virginia, where the 8.8-mile Pocohantas Parkway, financed with tax-free bonds, has suffered around a 50% shortfall in projected toll receipts; the state has had to maintain the road because the private owners don’t have the money. Bond ratings have been lowered to below investment grade. To pay off the bonds, the toll was increased by 50%.

It is true that many toll roads have been success stories. In Texas these include the Dallas-Fort Worth Turnpike, which paid off bondholderes with toll revenues after thirty years and became free Interstate 30; the Dallas North Tollway and its northern extension; and the Sam Houston Tollway on the west side of Houston. The issue here is not toll roads per se. It is toll roads built with pension funds (and probably other investment funds as well, such as the Permanent School Fund and the Permanent University Fund). These are trust funds. They belong to the members. It is morally wrong to require fund managers to invest them in risky ventures like toll roads. Does anybody doubt that there will be pressure on the pension funds to invest in certain projects that favor certain people and certain contractors and certain areas? We all know what kind of people we are dealing with here. Rick Perry can’t resist it. He appointed the members of the boards that oversee the pension funds. These deals will be neck-deep in politics.

The Statesman’s story on the leadership’s plan quotes Britt Harris, the chief investment officer of the Teacher Retirement System, as saying that investments in infrastructure made sense if the proposal was “equal or better than something we can get [in another project].” Harris then pointed out that the fund’s “ultimate loyalty is to the members,” not to target investments based on geography or politics. The last clause does not appear in quotation marks in the article. Bravo for Britt Harris, but I think he should keep his resume updated.

The biggest risk in toll roads as investments is political pressure. The pressure comes in two forms. The first is pressure on the consultants to provide favorable projections for use of proposed toll roads. Does anybody trust TxDOT–or the consultants they hire, or the private entities they seek to contract with–to do hardnosed, accurate projections? If you do, then consider these comments from an article in Business Week several years ago, at about the time Rick Perry was unveiling his proposal for the Trans-Texas Corridor:

* “There is a history of feasibility studies for toll roads being overly optimistic,” says John J. Hallacy III, director of municipal bond research for Merrill Lynch and Co.

* “Of the 10 major private toll roads constructed since the mid-1990s, nearly half carry far less traffic than projected. Some $4 billion in toll road bonds risk default over the next five years unless they’re refinanced,” estimates Robert H. Mueller, a municipal bond analyst at the J.P. Morgan securities Inc.

What about financing toll roads with bonds? Well, don’t expect bond raters to give the bonds a good rating. I’m quoting here from an article that appeared eight years ago in a tollroad industry publication, so it is possible that things may have changed, though I doubt it. Credit is much harder to get today than it was in 2000.

Fitch-ICBA, the New York bond rating agency says that there is a permanent bifurcation of the toll road bond market. Established systems of toll facilities can expect to be rated in the range A to AA, whereas most standalone and startup toll facilities will be rated BB- to BBB. They see a continuing demand for new toll road financings because of what they call a “seemingly unbridgeable gap” between highway needs and the ability to finance them with tax monies that toll projects can often help to fill.

According to BondsOnline, bonds rated BBB are “lower medium grade” and bonds rated BB- are “speculative.” The lower the bond rating, of course, the higher the interest rate that bond buyers demand. No one is going to be getting any bargains on toll road bonds. And AAA ratings are just a dream: “Fitch says that the ever present possibility of state governments siphoning off surplus toll revenues or leveraging them for other borrowings prevents state owned turnpikes from achieving the AAA rating.” So how can asking pension funds to invest in these bonds ever be a prudent investment? It can’t.

The article continues: Another problem with bonds for highways is that bond rating houses distrust state governments. It is unlikely that any state owned turnpikes will ever reach AAA: The key reason is susceptibility to political interventions.

I have said this before, and I will say it again. There is a sensible way to finance roads. It is to increase the gasoline tax and index it to inflation in the highway construction index. The gasoline tax has some weaknesses. Part of it is diverted to public education. People drive less when gasoline prices go through the roof. Cars are more fuel-efficient. All of this cuts into the revenue potential of the tax. Nevertheless, Texans still love their cars. The suburban lifestyle here is designed around the automobile. Even if the revenue per mile driven is declining, there is a lot of life left in the tax. A portion of the revenue could be dedicated to paying off the bonds for toll roads. This should be capped to ensure that money will still be available for free roads. While the resistance to tax increases is formidable, so is the resistance to toll roads. If you can persuade the public that a gasoline tax increase will reduce the need for toll roads, I think that proposition could be sold. Anything is better than insisting that the savings of retired teachers and state employees be invested in risky ventures like toll roads.

Source / Burkablog / Texas Monthly

See Austin and US 290 E: You Can’t Get There From Here by Roger Baker / The Rag Blog / August 13, 2008

Thanks to Roger Baker / The Rag Blog

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27 August 2008

Toll Roads : Soon to be Yesterday's News?

Toll road protest in California earlier this year.

'Ordinary people will look back on this era, shake their heads in wonder and ask: how on earth did anyone ever think toll roads were sexy?'
By Roger Baker
/ The Rag Blog / August 28, 2008

The latest news regarding toll roads, their current status, their long range prospects, and more, below:
There will come a time in the not-too-distant future when ordinary people will look back on this era, shake their heads in wonder and ask: how on earth did anyone ever think toll roads were sexy.

From the tulip bubble in Holland in the 1630s through to the dotcom boom of the late 1990s, otherwise rational minds have discarded logic and joined the frenzied mob in whatever investment fad promises fabulous wealth.
Without fail, they always end in tears. And so it is with the infrastructure boom.

Yesterday, Macquarie Group found itself under concerted attack from hedge funds as its shares fell 10 per cent to $41.61.

That's wiped out all the gains from the bull market and left senior executives floundering in a sea of confusion about how to stop the rout...

Roads to hell paved with debt by Ian Verrender / Sydney Morning Herald / August 28, 2008
But why? There is a key central, big-picture flaw in the management of not only the US economy, but also the whole global economy:

It all boils down to the fact that the capitalist system is based on paying interest on borrowed funds. However, a finite planet can only be milked so far before the rate of exploitation has to slow down. Nobody has put this better than Kenneth Boulding:
"Anyone who believes exponential growth can go on forever in a finite world is either a madman or an economist."
In our times the key growth limiting factors is oil/fossil fuel (and soon enough fresh water and greenhouse gases, assuming there were a viable substitute for cheap oil to move people and goods in the global economy).

Meanwhile the health of the global capitalist economy demands that existing debts be repaid with interest, even though the production of material goods must eventually fall short of expectations. So quite naturally, the bankers persuade the governments to print up enough currency to paper over the temporary shortfall until the economy can recover and the current crisis is replaced by the anticipated recovery.

One can see where this leads. When Mother Nature finally gets too exhausted to keep expanding her physical blessings for human benefit at a rate that matches the rate of interest demanded for the normal functioning of the banking system and the capitalist business cycle, then invested savings will necessarily shrink over time, rather than rewarding the saver.

Economists are trained to be blind to the big picture, and the ultimately devastating implications of exponential growth over the long run.

Not only that, but our infrastructure is crumbling terribly nationwide, including the electrical transmission grid. The corporate empire that rules our lives has had the social character and planning perspective of an impetuous infant.

Toll roads have the short-sighted advantages over other critically needed, wise infrastructure investments by their subsidizing an established lobby centered on the road contractors, plus the suburban sprawl interests centered on the bankers, developers and land speculators. Factor in dysfunctional, special interest-based politics and it is easy to see that building new toll roads will win out over maintaining the crumbling existing infrastructure any day of the week, to say nothing of shifting our funds toward a new and more sustainable planning perspective, which by definition lacks a special interest lobby.

See Cities Debate Privatizing Public Infrastructure by Jenny Anderson / New York Times / August 26, 2008

"...The American Society of Civil Engineers estimates that the United States needs to invest at least $1.6 trillion over the next five years to maintain and expand its infrastructure..."

That is on the order of $1000 per years per capita in a population already tens of thousands in personal debt due to credit cards, home mortgages etc., while living under a government busy bailing out banks on an emergency basis while simultaneously fighting apparently endless foreign wars involving oil or something.

As we used to say, it don't take a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.

Here is the most important recent news, documenting a sharp decline in toll road use due to soaring fuel price and the downgrading of toll road bonds by Fitch, etc:
...Traffic on tax roads in the US seems to have dropped on average by 4 to 5% and on toll roads by 5 to 6% over the past year. The reduced travel is attributable almost entirely to the big run-up in gasoline prices and is about was to be expected from long-established economists' estimates of the price elasticity of demand of about -0.2. Fuel prices which dominate the marginal cost of driving are about 30% higher so you would expect traffic as measured by vehicle-miles traveled (VMT) to be 6% lower (-0.2x0.30=-0.06). Deduct one percent for the sluggish economy and you have 5%. Toll road traffic may be down marginally more than tax roads traffic because tollroads are somewhat skewed to discretionary travel...

Traffic hit hard by fuel prices / TollRoadsNews / August 24, 2008
Meanwhile, as I have recently pointed out, our three top Texas politicians (Perry, Craddick and Dewhurst) have made it clear that they would like to use state retirement funds under their control to keep building the toll roads when Wall Street is afraid to issue such debt because of the obvious risk to lenders in light of the information above. Such a policy is both a tribute to the political clout of the Texas road lobby (allied with the banks that have funded land speculation in raw land surrounding the major Texas urban areas), and also a revealing commentary on the moral character of our state political leaders. Here is the link:

Investing pension funds in toll roads is an irresponsible–and immoral–idea / Burkablog / Texas Monthly / August 23, 2008

Finally, to explain and to document the unwillingness of traditional bond lenders to fund bond projects of any sort, even of a kind much less speculative than toll roads, here are two links that explain the current situation quite adequately:

Bond fundraising costs soar / Financial Times / August 25, 2008

Bankers caught between hope and despair Financial Times / August 25, 2008

From the foregoing it is quite apparent why the road lobby is forced to turn to Texas politicians and the pension funds under their control as a last resort. Here the only risk is that Texas schoolteachers might get wind of the plan, might be smarter and more motivated than anticipated, and might be able to organize politically during the next legislative session in time to stop them. Any state bonds are nearly certain to fail because of the combined effect of the abysmal credit conditions described above and peak oil. For those who wish to document the peak oil risk in a scholarly way, here are three key links:

Crude Oil Price Retreat: Sunrise or a Lull Before the Storm? by by James Leigh / Energy Bulletin / August 12, 2008

PEAKING OF WORLD OIL PRODUCTION:
IMPACTS, MITIGATION, & RISK MANAGEMENT


Peak oil primer and links / Energy Bulletin

Also see Austin and US 290 E: You Can’t Get There From Here by Roger Baker / The Rag Blog / August 13, 2008

And Texas : Raiding Pension Funds to Build Toll Roads by Paul Burka / The Rag Blog / August 23, 2008

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24 January 2013

Roger Baker : Can TxDOT Avoid Financial Disaster?

Maybe TxDOT should heed its own sign.

Warning sign:
Can TxDOT avoid financial disaster?

By Roger Baker / The Rag Blog / January 24, 2013
"Things can become complicated when you actually try to understand them." -- Richard Vodra
This is the first of a two-part series.

AUSTIN -- The funding shortfall at the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) is about 50% of its entire budget. How did it ever come to this? TxDOT's roads are now at war with our schools, nursing homes, and health clinics in the Texas legislature, all fighting for survival level funding.

There is great pressure to use an official increase in state revenue to restore the big cuts made to education, health, and human services in the last Texas budget. Every sort of social and governmentally funded need is competing for a piece of the budget increase since Texas Comptroller Susan Combs recently declared a substantial increase in available state revenues compared to the last budget two years ago.

This coming budget battle leads us to an important policy question concerning TxDOT and its roads. How could anyone even hope to manage a state agency that, according to it own management, falls 50% short of its needs? Yet this is the situation described by TxDOT Director Phil Wilson as the Texas Legislature prepares to meet, wheel and deal, and eventually to hammer out TxDOT's two year budget allotment.

One way to lobby for road money, although they can't call it that, is by inflating future hypothetical travel and road construction needs. TxDOT director Phil Wilson describes the situation this way:
TxDOT needs an additional $1 billion-a-year alone to shore up its maintenance budget, he said. And going forward, the agency will likely need another $3 billion-a-year infusion to its current $10 billion annual budget to “address congestion long-term with a sustainable method.”
The reality is that TxDOT's proclaimed road construction needs of $3 billion a year are utterly unfundable pipe dreams appealing to road builders and land developers. By contrast, the estimate of $1 billion a year in maintenance shortfalls is probably way short, but maintenance lacks political sex appeal. In fact, Texas road maintenance has been underfunded to such a degree that "Texas received a 'D' in roads, ranking Texas from 17th in 2008 to now 43rd for highway spending per capita."

Lets take TxDOT Director Phil Wilson's claim at face value. If TxDOT's current budget is $10 billion and needs an added $1 billion in maintenance, and another $3 billion to deal with congestion, that means that TxDOT is already about 40% short. This picture of a dire need for money for new roads does not even consider the fact that TxDOT already spent a billion dollars more than it took in last year.

Once you add the $1 billion net deficit for this year, the claimed gap between the available cash and current spending plus claimed needs rises to about 50%! Further complicating this situation is the fact that TxDOT is now about $14.6 billion in debt, and the debt service alone required nearly a billion dollars in 2012. (See pages 13 and 28 of TxDOT's Annual Financial Report.)

Meanwhile, for accounting purposes, TxDOT is claiming its state roads as assets, all together worth about $64 billion. The reality is that TxDOT's roads should be seen as constantly growing maintenance liabilities. In the context of high oil prices, a stagnant economy, and reduced driving, TxDOT's roads are like an oil-addicted, tax money-starved monkey solidly chained to the back of Texas taxpayers for the foreseeable future.


Texas Road Politics 101

TxDOT offers an important window on Texas politics, both because of the large size of the budget and because of the opportunity for political interests to affect the budget, which can change a lot from year to year, depending largely on legislative whim.

How could things be otherwise? Texas has been ruled since its early days primarily by its landed gentry, first those tied to agriculture, then to the oil interests. A strong focus on "property rights" has been basic to Texas politics ever since the Texas constitution was written, soon after the Civil War, after the Yankee "carpetbaggers" were expelled.

Celebrated Texas journalist Molly Ivins used to call TxDOT "the Pentagon of Texas" for good reason. TxDOT roads have been a political pork barrel for many decades, with all that this implies. In the 1920s, soon after the formation of the  Texas Highway Department, as it was then called, Texas Gov. James E. (Pa) Ferguson got caught up in a Texas road contracting scandal, which forced him to resign and have his wife Miriam A. (Ma) Ferguson become a replacement governor. After this, the Highway Department kept its nose clean for a few decades, particularly under director Dewiltt Greer.

In recent decades, Texas road contractors have regained their old clout as key political players, nowadays in alliance with suburban sprawl land developers. The latter have benefited greatly from publicly funded roads that serve new development ringing the urban areas where most Texans now live. During Gov. Rick Perry's first term, the big road contractors gave him more than $1 million in campaign contributions. Texas is the kind of state where it is always possible to bribe a politician, as long as you call it a campaign contribution.

Gov. Rick Perry appointed a fellow Texas Legislature warhorse and friend, Ric Williamson, to chair the Texas Transportation Commission, TxDOT's governing body, when Perry first got elected. TxDOT Chair Williamson pulled out all the stops to promote Perry's hugely unpopular $185 billion Trans-Texas Corridor -- a deluxe road building solution in search of a future problem to solve.

Williamson died in 2007, and Perry appointed another close associate, Deirdre Delisi to chair the Commission. A little over a year ago, in September 2011, Perry appointed Phil Wilson, one of his top advisors, to be director of TxDOT and its budget. He was appointed to solve TxDOT's problems at a time when that agency had become distinctly unpopular with the legislature. With Wilson installed to manage TxDOT policy from the inside, there was no longer the need to control the Commission from the outside. Delisi resigned soon thereafter.

Before Wilson's appointment, TxDOT directors had all been engineers promoted from within TxDOT's own ranks. This had the effect of limiting TxDOT's top management to those good at building roads, but not necessarily those good at politics or balancing budgets. By most accounts, what Wilson brings to the table is smarts and skillful politics. Wilson's approach seems geared to working harder to raise money to build roads or toll roads as usual. This rather than facing the political reality that the traditionally entrenched transportation solutions and trends are so unsustainable that they demand a basic shift in transportation policy away from roads.


TxDOT has embraced a mountain of new road debt, despite deteriorating finances

It was clear that TxDOT was an agency in deep denial even several years ago when Paul Burka quoted a newly released legislative report on TxDOT in this 2010 blog post:
At present, State Highway Fund revenues are not as stable as in previous years, nor are they continuing to increase at the same pace as in the past. In addition, from 2005 through 2007, TxDOT used a combination of State Highway Fund revenues and bond funding for operations and capital investments. During this period their expenditures for these areas outpaced revenues, resulting in TxDOT using approximately $700 million of reserves to pay for operating and project expenses during this period...

First, when TxDOT bumped up spending through the use of bond funding, baseline expectations for TxDOT spending levels in any given year were raised both inside and outside the organization, even though that approach was not sustainable and represented a marked deviation from historical spending levels. Second, TxDOT incurred a significant debt service burden associated with the bonds it issued -- and that servicing reduces the availability of General Revenue and Fund 6 dollars for TxDOT to use for operations and new projects. [In other words, the bondholders had to be paid from the funds -- general revenue and Fund 6 -- that were being used to pay for the projects.]

The end effect is that TxDOT’s available budget (for maintenance, new projects, etc.) is effectively lower than it would have been before the bond funding was issued. At the same time, maintenance requirements are increasing as a result of having increased the size of the highway system (every new road brought into the system must be maintained).
To which Burka responded:
In other words, the Legislature acted in a fiscally irresponsible manner when it issued several billion dollars in bonds to pay for road projects. By going into debt to build roads, TxDOT ended up with less money for new roads than if it had just used gasoline tax money. This is what happens when lawmakers spurn the pay-as-you-go principle. This is not fiscal conservatism. This is spending beyond your means. You can’t blame TxDOT. The blame belongs with the Legislature and in particular the leadership at the time, Dewhurst and Craddick. And with the voters, who approved the bonds...
Since this was written, not a lot has changed. TxDOT still likes the idea of toll roads, just so long as someone else is responsible for managing them. There has been no discernible shift in policy away from trying to build as many roads as fast as possible. Roads are considered urgently necessary to meet TxDOT's hypothetical, but always increasing, future travel demand estimates.

A growing number of TxDOT roads are now being built with the help of a sort of road bidding competition. This demands that local government contribute matching funds to help TxDOT pay for construction. With the "pass-through tolling" being encouraged by TxDOT, TxDOT helps by building a road while a county (like Williamson and Hays near Austin) helps front the money. The county gets reimbursed by TxDOT, but ONLY if the projected traffic shows up in TxDOT's subsequent traffic counts.

As an agency currently in obvious financial trouble, TxDOT is doing whatever it can to shift its debt burden toward private lenders, toward local level government, and toward making roads a general obligation of Texas government.

In Part 2 of this series we will take a closer look at why TxDOT's denial of current trends is leading to financial disaster.

[Roger Baker is a long time transportation-oriented environmental activist, an amateur energy-oriented economist, an amateur scientist and science writer, and a founding member of and an advisor to the Association for the Study of Peak Oil-USA. He is active in the Green Party and the ACLU, and is a director of the Save Our Springs Association and the Save Barton Creek Association in Austin. Mostly he enjoys being an irreverent policy wonk and writing irreverent wonkish articles for The Rag Blog. Read more articles by Roger Baker on The Rag Blog.]

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18 February 2009

Roger Baker : Texas Toll Road 183-A: The Economics and the Special Interests

Texas Tollroad U.S 183A northbound in outskirts of Austin, approaching toll plaza.

Shrinking traffic increases could mean bond default problems for US 183-A
The road lobby operates as a sort of well-funded shadow government, organized to overcome citizen opposition to unpopular toll roads intended to serve hypothetical sprawl development.
By Roger Baker / The Rag Blog / February 18, 2009

In August 2007, the Central Texas Regional Mobility Authority’s (CTRMA's) first toll road, US 183-A, was newly opened and was acclaimed as a star performer. And yet it could still be in trouble due to outside factors beyond the control of the CTRMA. Let us drill down and examine the background and details.

The success of 183-A is important because the CTRMA, which manages 183A, intends to use the current extra revenue being generated by 183-A as a financial "backstop.” The 183-A toll revenue will essentially serve as collateral for leveraging funding for another toll road, US 290 E, that the CTRMA is actively promoting. Such speculative use of deficit spending to leverage rapid growth in road infrastructure was part of a leveraged debt trend encouraged under Bush, called public-private partnerships (PPPs).

The plan that the Capital Area Metropolitan Planning Organization (CAMPO) recently approved, urged by CTRMA bond consultant JP Morgan Chase Securities, is to combine these two toll roads using the 183-A surplus toll revenues as a substitute for bond default insurance on 290E. 183A does have bond default insurance, but it has now become unaffordable for 290 E due to the credit crisis. (TxDOT partly wants to get 290 E built to help bail out SH 130, a relatively underused toll road which suffers from slow access into Austin).

Not long after the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) famously mismanaged their finances about a year ago, by double counting $1 billion in revenue, TxDOT cut back its construction spending drastically. TxDOT then decided to turn over its plans for six planned Austin area planned toll roads to the Central Texas Regional Mobility Authority. Under strong organized pressure from the road lobby, CAMPO, which approves federal funds for roads, accepted this shift in funding and construction responsibility.

The Texas road lobby, similar to the situation in many parts of the USA, is basically a coalition of special interests, both local and statewide. Statewide, these revolve around Texas road consulting and road construction in coalition with local regional banking, development and land speculation interests. The Texas road lobby and its allies (like the Texas Good Roads Assn., and Associated General Contractors or AGC) has been around as a significant force in Texas politics since about 1950. Now they are recognized as one of the most powerful lobby groups in Texas. Molly Ivins used to call TxDOT "the Pentagon of Texas.”

Locally, the road lobby is closely linked to the Greater Austin Chamber of Commerce, Opportunity Austin, and the Capital Area Transportation Coalition .

In the last year or so, the same interests that were previously focused solely on roads have developed a much stronger interest in regional and commuter rail to San Antonio, Cedar Park, Elgin, etc. At the same time federal funds for rail starts have become scarce. There is no easy money for rail or roads anymore.

Bankers, developers, and land speculators all share a strong interest in the outcome of most decisions on public infrastructure funding. Special interests fund "astroturf" media campaigns meant to mimic grass roots input. For example, this link is a good example of such an effort to promote 45 SW, a planned but mostly unfunded toll road over the sensitive recharge zone of the Edwards Aquifer.

The road lobby operates as a sort of well-funded shadow government, organized to overcome citizen opposition to unpopular toll roads intended to serve hypothetical sprawl development. It aims to persuade politicians to issue public debt to subsidize what up until recently was highly profitable sprawl growth in the suburban fringes that were predicted to grow rapidly forever. The money incentive is strong in Texas, with its many property rights laws imbedded in the state constitution. However, Texas has a heavily urbanized population distribution. As with other sunbelt cities that grew rapidly in an affluent era of cheap oil, Texas has large rings of car-addictive sprawl development surrounding its major cities.

Although the two are legally distinct, TxDOT maintains tight control over the CTRMA toll road projects through close collaboration on planning, long-standing ties involving ex-TxDOT engineers, common contractors, etc.

The use of a defacto puppet agency like the CTRMA allows TxDOT to use the CTRMA as a financial firewall, to avoid bond default blowback. It also allows TxDOT to preserve control in a new and less regulated part of state law, recently crafted to give expanded toll road deal-making power to the RMAs; the regional mobility authorities, RMAs, like the CTRMA. TxDOT and the late Transportation Commissioner Ric Williamson had strongly encouraged establishing RMAs around Texas, although they have had limited success.

In other words, 183-A is being promoted as an example of the CTRMA's bonding prowess, demonstrating that 183-A can be used as a financial engine to pull along 290 E. Let us take a closer look at the engine.

Here is a glowing August, 2007, account in Toll Road News , a national pro-toll newsletter. The article shows that despite heavy public opposition to the toll road package passed by CAMPO in October of 2007, the early 183-A numbers toll numbers looked excellent. It seems that this road jumped ahead to match its future numbers:
...Central Texas may be a hotbed of anti-toll activism but motorists there love the tollroads. Traffic and revenue on the four pikes that have opened this year is way above expectations. In six months on the 183-A toll road they are meeting third year traffic and revenue forecasts.

Tollers in Austin seem to have found a way to bypass the dread "ramp up" that has afflicted many new tollroads in their first several years - from the Dulles Greenway VA to the Suncoast Parkway FL and the 91 Express Lanes CA. At five to ten years old these tollroads tend to be closer to forecast but they had horrible startup numbers for three or four years.

Take the Central Texas RMA and its 183-A tollroad. Since full toll rates have been in effect 183A has been pulling in $1.2m to $1.3m/month. On that basis it should gross $15m in its first year. The Vollmer Stantec forecast for the first full calender year (2008) was $10.3m. 2009 was forecast at $13.9m...

CTRMA don't think the traffic forecasts they got from Vollmer Stantec are flawed on the low side. They think that the marketing model they and TxDOT adopted in Austin has allowed them to bypass "ramp-up" and jump straight to a trend traffic level...
This was the situation a year and a half ago, but now we have about a year and a half of data that allow us to see how well things are actually doing on US 183-A. Since the bond brokers expect that toll roads will not do very well at first, until they are marketed to the public as a convenience, there is a bond debt reserve fund set aside. This is to cover the bond shortfalls through the ramp-up phase until a predicted ridership saturation point is reached. Financial training wheels of a sort.

In some ways things still look very good, including the fact that there is still more than enough revenue to pay the bond creditors. Whereas the 183-A toll road was only projected to collect $10.3 million in 2008, it actually brought in a bit more than $17 million. So 183-A is more than financially solvent for now. And 183-A would be likely to prosper if the transportation trends of the past were to continue.

In essence, 183-A jumped way up to a sort of plateau near its post-ramp-up projections, attributed to good marketing, but now the rate of revenue growth has slowed down considerably. The year over year toll transaction increase from the last quarter of 2007 to the last quarter of 2008 rose about 12.8%, whereas the revenue increase over the same period is about 10.8%.

Here were the bond projections for 183-A revenue:
  • 2008 -- $10,336,000 (2008 was the first full year of revenue, which counts weekends)
  • 2009 -- $13,937,000 (a 35% yearly increase projected)
  • 2010 -- $19,595,000 (a 40% increase)
  • 2011 -- $23,446,000 (a 20% increase)
  • 2012 -- $26,306,000 (a 12% increase)
(These 183-A revenue forecasts are from the official bond statement on the CTRMA website, showing projected increases during the initial ramp-up period; Table ES-1, page ES 3.)

But what if the 183-A revenues, off to a fast start, were only to grow at the current year over year rate of 10.8%, continuing over the next few years? Comparing with the numbers above, such increases would then fall behind the bond revenue projections after 2010, as follows:
  • 2008 -- $17 million
  • 2009 -- $18.9 million
  • 2010 -- $19.8 million
  • 2011 -- $21.4 million
  • 2012 -- $23.1 million
The truth is that when you inspect monthly 183A revenues, which jump around a lot from month to month, most of the last year looks fairly stagnant, about flat since May, 2008, when 183-A took in about $1,446,000. In December, 2008, the 183A toll revenue was down to $1,364,000.

These stagnant 183-A numbers probably tend to reflect the background situation that national road travel has been decreasing sharply for the last few years due to fuel prices and the recession. This chart makes this unprecedented travel decrease quite obvious:

Clearly there are unpredicted economic and growth risk factors at work, which are certain to affect 183-A traffic as well as the CTRMA's other planned toll roads. What are these risk factors?

These factors were outlined in the official bond statement to be found on the CTRMA website. Here are some of the risk factors spotlighted in the 183-A bond statement by the bond consultant, Vollmer and Assoc. prior to the 2005 bond sale, This is taken from page 66 of the US 183-A Official Bond Statement posted on the CTRMA's website:
10. "2005 Project traffic during the early years of operation will ramp up as formulated in the Traffic and Revenue Report." (Reality: Much faster early increases than projected, but looks like there may be a plateau and relative stagnation now.)

12. "Motor fuel will remain in adequate supply during the forecast period, and motor fuel prices (i.e., the average price for regular gasoline) in the foreseeable future will not increase above the 1980 peak, which, if adjusted for inflation, in current dollars would not be more than $3 per gallon." (Reality: These figures were greatly exceeded, peaking in July 2008, but now fuel prices have collapsed with the general economy.)

14. "No radical change in travel modes, which would drastically curtail motor vehicle use, is expected during the forecast period." (Reality: The FHWA travel chart above shows that this risk factor is in place and rapidly growing.)

"15. In the long term, generally normal economic conditions will prevail in the State and the United States, and there will not occur a major depression, national emergency or prolonged fuel shortage." (Reality: The IMF says that all the world's major economies are in a world-wide depression now, and long range fuel supply problems are apparent.)
Are there any further problems likely to crop up? Frankly yes. Not only are there about $66 million in federal TIFIA loans at stake in 183A, which have to be paid back starting in 2012, in addition to about another $166 million in private bond debt, but it is entirely unclear that the private bond insurance would still pay out in case of default. In case of 183A bond default, the insurance policy might amount to toxic waste requiring a federal bailout.

The feds are already distinctly pissed off at the way that TxDOT manages its federal toll road loans, and have threatened to cut off TIFIA funds, without which projects like 290 E seem impossible: Go here and here.

In the next year, the world economy could make a miraculous recovery and the 183A revenue trends could turn around, but it is very hard to find municipal bond investors willing to risk money on that possibility.

Such bonds tend to be favored by high income individuals who find tax-free municipal revenue bonds attractive as a tax shelter, partly because most such bonds were insured at a low cost. The current inability to get affordable bond default insurance today on toll road bonds is a problem. We don't know if the feds will bail out insured toll bonds, while uninsured toll bonds are like naked bets putting capital at risk for 40 years. US 183A is largely a commuter road designed to serve future residential development of a kind that is now reported to be in sharp decline in the Austin area (reporting in the Statesman on growth in Manor). Detroit, which makes the cars needed for expanding the future toll traffic, is broke and other car companies are in big trouble. CAMPO is now considering sharp cutbacks in its other road projects incorporated in its new long range 2035 plan.

This link explains how and why most toll road authorities tend to overestimate long range future demand.

Next is a link that explains how rapidly and unexpectedly once-assumed travel behavior can turn around in Texas, given our changing economic environment.

A willingness to invest private bond money on the theory that the weak 183A toll user trends might turn around fairly dramatically, even enough to help finance other projects like 290 E on its coat tails, is thus beginning to look like a heroic investment gamble.

In fact, the official travel numbers on the road 183A is designed to help -- 290E -- show approximately level traffic demand. [I hope to post the documentation later on The Rag Blog.] The TxDOT vehicle count numbers for 290 E have been stagnant for the last several years, and the accident statistics are trending downwards. Plus new home starts in fringe cities on 290 E, like Manor and Elgin, are in sharp decline. These trends undermine the major justifications commonly used for promoting new roads.

Sen. Kirk Watson, who chairs CAMPO, (and owns an interest in a bank in Elgin, on 290 E) is a skilled, energetic and powerful politician. He is also the vice chair of the Senate Committee on Transportation and Homeland Security and usually gets what he wants from CAMPO, the body that controls Austin's shrinking federal funds.

In more normal times, and if politics could still leverage money the way it used to do a few years ago, 290 E would probably be a done deal by now. But now we are living in times when the available public infrastructure funds are shrinking a whole lot faster than the old style of special interest politics can accommodate.

Also see Texas Toll Road Soup : The Environment, Federal Funding and Peak Oil by Roger Baker / The Rag Blog / Nov. 28, 2008

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